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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and background
Work is a central activity in most peoples’ lives. Today, the majority of the
working-age population participates in the labor market (Eurostat, 2013) and
spends a considerable amount of their time on the job (OECD, 2015). For ex-
ample, expected lifetime working hours for U.S. men born between 1950 and 1970
amount to around 74,000 to 83,000 hours (Hazan, 2009). Work also constitutes the
primary source of income, accounting for around 60 to 80% (Gollin, 2002; Kara-
barbounis and Neiman, 2014), and significantly shapes individuals’ life satisfaction
beyond providing the means to consume goods and services (Layard, 2011, p. 67).
In light of this, the Great Recession of 2007–20091 has drastically illustrated
the consequences of poor labor market performance for many societies around
the world (see, for example, Elsby et al. (2011) or Bentolila et al. (2012) for
assessments of the labor market crisis). Although labor market conditions have
generally improved in the aftermath of this recession, recovery is still incomplete
in most Western countries, with current unemployment rates exceeding pre-crisis
levels and a significant amount of individuals, especially the low-skilled, being
1 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the U.S. recession started after the
economy’s peak in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 (NBER, 2010). For the Euro Area,
the Centre for Economic Policy Research dated the recession from the first quarter of 2008 to
the second quarter of 2009 (CEPR, 2010), which was succeeded by another recession starting
after the economy’s peak in the third quarter of 2011 and ending in the first quarter of 2013
(CEPR, 2015).
1
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trapped in long-term unemployment (OECD, 2015).
Persistent unemployment in the aftermath of recessions has been generally at-
tributed to cyclical or structural explanations, and suitable macro policy responses
differ substantially with regard to the causes of unemployment (Lazear, 2014). For
the recession of 2007–2009, evidence, in particular from the U.S., suggests cyclical
deficient labor demand to be the key explanation (see, among others, Lazear and
Spletzer, 2012; Rothstein, 2015). Sahin et al. (2014), for example, provide evid-
ence of cyclical mismatch at the industry and occupational level, i.e., misallocation
of vacancies and job seekers across industries and occupations, which increased
throughout the recession but decreased thereafter.
Independent of this current labor market crisis, however, substantial structural
changes in firms’ labor demand behavior have been well observed in many Western
countries over the past decades. Technological change and continued globalization
have substantially lowered firms’ demand for routine tasks, which has decreased
employment prospects for medium-skilled relative to high- and low-skilled workers
and induced polarization of Western labor markets (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011;
Goos et al., 2014).
Pecuniary and non-pecuniary consequences of unemployment can be numerous,
and in some cases long-lasting. In addition to the (temporary) reduction in income
and consumption, unemployment has been found to serve as a screening signal for
firms, with longer spells of unemployment significantly lowering the likelihood of
receiving job interview offers (Kroft et al., 2013; Eriksson and Rooth, 2014), and
to lead to sustained earnings losses even after re-entering employment (Couch and
Placzek, 2010). In addition, unemployment has been found to lower the phys-
ical (Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009) and mental health of the people concerned
(Marcus, 2013) as well as to exert direct negative effects on wellbeing beyond the
effect that stems from the loss of income (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998;
Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009).
In addition to the consequences of job loss for the individuals concerned, un-
employment also affects societies at large. High levels of unemployment have been
shown to reduce aggregate output and income, create inequality and deteriorate
societies’ human capital (Layard et al., 2005). Moreover, unemployment has been
shown to reduce nations’ wellbeing to an extent beyond the fall in GDP and the
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increase in the number of the unemployed, which gives rise to the existence of
psychic costs of recessions even for those people not subject to unemployment
(Di Tella et al., 2003).
Against the backdrop of these substantial costs of unemployment, the recent
recession has fueled discussions about the labor market effects of governmental
policies regarding the unemployed, especially with respect to the design of the un-
employment insurance (UI) system, which varies over the business cycle in some
countries but remains constant in others (Schmieder et al., 2012). As a large liter-
ature has shown that more generous UI prolongs individuals’ duration of nonem-
ployment (see, for example, Card et al., 2007; Schmieder et al., 2012), debates
about the optimal design of UI and suitable policy reforms to counteract moral
hazard behavior continue to shape the scientific and public discussion.
The assertiveness of intended policy reforms may, however, be limited during
times of high unemployment. Recessions have been shown to undermine peoples’
trust in public institutions, which may constrain policy makers’ abilities to enforce
reforms (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2011). Societies’ distrust in public institutions
may thus lower the quality of the economic policies pursued (Easterly and Lev-
ine, 1997) and weaken democratic governance as a whole (Almond and Verba,
1963), but public institutions may also shape peoples’ trust in turn (Alesina and
Angeletos, 2005; Aghion et al., 2010). Irrespective of this reciprocal relationship,
high levels of trust within a society reduce individuals’ transaction costs and facil-
itate economic activity (Arrow, 1972; Knack, 2001), thus triggering positive and
long-lasting effects on a country’s economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1997;
Algan and Cahuc, 2010).
The importance of work in peoples’ lives and the substantial costs of unem-
ployment for the individuals concerned, but also societies at large, highlight the
relevance of further improving the scientific understanding of the functioning of
labor markets. Against this backdrop, the present dissertation aims at contribut-
ing to the understanding of central labor market mechanisms by analyzing open
questions on (i) determinants of firms’ labor demand, (ii) unemployed individuals’
job search behavior and (iii) the state’s role in shaping peoples’ trust and, thereby,
affecting labor market outcomes and economic performance in general.
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1.2 Research questions and main findings
The following section describes and motivates each chapter of this dissertation
in more detail, presents the respective empirical strategies chosen to answer the
research questions raised and summarizes the main findings of each study.
Chapter 2: Heterogeneity in the Wage Elasticity of Labor Demand2
Chapter 2, a joint work with Andreas Peichl (ZEW Mannheim) and Sebastian Sie-
gloch (University of Mannheim), contributes to the understanding of firms’ labor
demand behavior by rigorously investigating one key parameter of interest in labor
economics as well as many other related disciplines, the own-wage elasticity of labor
demand. Among others, firms’ labor demand responses to wage changes have been
shown to crucially influence the outcomes of labor market reforms (Hamermesh,
1993) as well as to point to structural changes in production arising from, for
example, skill-biased technological change or globalization.
While the importance of this parameter is reflected by the large number of
studies in the literature devoted to the estimation of labor demand elasticities,
heterogeneity in the estimates as well as in researchers’ beliefs about the size of this
parameter (see Fuchs et al., 1998) is apparent. Against this backdrop, Chapter 2
conducts a comprehensive meta-regression analysis of the corresponding literature
to investigate different dimensions of heterogeneity in this elasticity and thereby
explain the diverse estimates of and beliefs about this crucial parameter.
Using different meta-regression techniques and information from 1,334 estim-
ates of the elasticity obtained from 151 different micro-level studies, the results
of this chapter demonstrate that there is no central, statistically defined elasticity
of labor demand. Rather, heterogeneity in the estimates is natural to a consider-
able extent and can be explained by different theoretical concepts of the elasticity,
heterogeneity in the characteristics of the workforce, differences between indus-
tries and countries, as well as changes in the labor demand behavior of firms over
time. Researchers and policy makers should hence carefully acknowledge these
dimensions of heterogeneity when evaluating the effects of intended reforms or
2 This chapter has been published as “The Own-Wage Elasticity of Labor Demand: A Meta-
Regression Analysis”, see Lichter et al. (2015).
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when calibrating models. The analysis, however, additionally shows that some
part of the prevalent heterogeneity is also explained by the different empirical pro-
cedures applied or the different types of data used, implying undesired discretion
for researchers to produce estimates in line with their assumptions. This potential
problem is corroborated by evidence of considerable publication (or reporting) bias
in the estimates, suggesting selection with respect to the empirical results that are
reported or published.
Chapter 3: The Effects of Exporting on Labor Demand3
While Chapter 2 explores various sources of heterogeneity in the estimates of the
own-wage elasticity of labor demand, Chapter 3, a joint work with Andreas Peichl
(ZEW) and Sebastian Siegloch (University of Mannheim), adds to the literature
by investigating the effects of exporting, one key feature of globalization, on the
wage elasticity of labor demand. The analysis is motivated by growing concerns
that rising trade volumes, despite being beneficial for societies at large, may have
increased the responsiveness and vulnerability of employment to shocks (see, for
example, Rodrik, 1997, for an early argument).
In light of this, Chapter 3 relies on detailed administrative linked employer-
employee panel data to explore a long-known theoretical mechanism that may
explain more elastic employment responses to wage shocks for exporting than
non-exporting firms. In order to analyze the suggested mechanism, labor demand
models are estimated by means of fixed effects OLS and instrumental variables
techniques to capture time-invariant as well as time-variant plant characteristics
that may affect both firms’ selection into the export market as well as the extent
of exporting.
The results of Chapter 3 provide new insights about the consequences of glob-
alization for workers by providing empirical evidence that exporting, both at the
extensive and intensive margin, renders firms’ demand for labor more elastic.
Building upon the theoretical model of Krishna et al. (2001) and recent evid-
ence demonstrating that a country’s product demand becomes less price elastic
with rising per-capita income, it is shown that this finding can be explained by
3 An earlier version of this chapter circulates as “Exporting and Labor Demand: Micro-Level
Evidence from Germany”, see Lichter et al. (2014).
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one of the long-known Marshall-Hicks laws of derived demand: exporting firms in
high-income countries are exposed to an overall more price elastic product demand
than a comparable firm only serving its domestic market. This translates into more
wage elastic demand for labor, unconditional on output. Using industry-level data
on country-specific trade-flows, evidence for the proposed mechanism is corrobor-
ated by showing that those exporting firms selling a relatively large share of their
output to low- and medium-income countries, thus serving markets with relatively
price elastic product demand, react particularly elastically in their demand for
labor with respect to changes in wages.
Chapter 4: Benefit Duration and Job Search4
Chapter 4, which is single-authored, takes account of the long-lasting consequences
of unemployment by analyzing individuals’ job search behavior in response to the
generosity of unemployment insurance (UI). Although UI may allow individuals
to actively search for suitable reemployment opportunities by temporarily com-
pensating for income losses, a large literature has established that the extent of UI
coverage significantly affects the duration of nonemployment and hence partly off-
sets the intended policy effects. While scholars have mainly attributed this effect
to lower job search effort and a UI-induced moral hazard, evidence supporting the
assumed relationship is particularly scarce.
Against this backdrop, the analysis detailed in Chapter 4 provides direct evid-
ence of the effect of UI generosity on the job search behavior of unemployed indi-
viduals. In order to identify this direct effect, survey data from Germany is used
that provide detailed information on the job search strategies of unemployed in-
dividuals at the beginning of their unemployment spell. Using quasi-experimental
variation in the potential benefit duration for one particular group of workers
arising from a unique legislative episode during the time of the survey period,
difference-in-differences techniques are applied to identify potential disincentive
effects of UI.
Overall, the results of the chapter extend the understanding of unemployed
individuals’ job search behavior. In line with the theoretical predictions of a non-
4 This chapter is based on a (so far unpublished) manuscript titled “Benefit Duration and Job
Search Effort: Evidence from a Natural Experiment”, see Lichter (2015).
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stationary job search model, the empirical results provide considerable evidence
in favor of a UI-induced moral hazard. Increases in the potential benefit duration
substantially lower individuals’ job search effort, which is measured by means of
the number of applications filed as well as the probability of applying for jobs
that require moving. By providing direct evidence on disincentive effects of UI,
the chapter thus complements evidence on prolonged spells of unemployment in
response to more generous benefits by verifying one of the theoretically expected
mechanisms explaining this finding. The results of the analysis prove robust to a
variety of sensitivity checks and suggest the moral hazard to be particularly strong
for those individuals who spent less time (or effort) on their education.
Chapter 5: The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance5
Finally, Chapter 5 of this dissertation, a joint work with Max Lo¨ﬄer (ZEW Man-
nheim) and Sebastian Siegloch (University of Mannheim), turns to exploring the
remarkable relationship between societies’ level of trust and economic growth as
well as the observed interaction effects between governmental policies, trust and
economic performance. By investigating the effects of state surveillance, a fea-
ture of many (authoritarian) countries, on peoples’ trust and regional economic
performance in a single-country setting, this chapter significantly adds to the un-
derstanding of this important relationship.
To assess the long-term consequences of state surveillance, the analysis ex-
ploits county-level variation in the number of spies of the Ministry for State Secur-
ity (Stasi) in the former socialist German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
in combination with information on individuals’ trust and economic performance
in different regions after reunification. Potential non-randomness in the alloca-
tion of spies into counties is accounted for by implementing two distinct research
designs. Different average levels in the intensity of spying across East German
states (Bezirke) due to the territorial organizational structure of the state security
service facilitate the use of a border discontinuity design. Harmonized county-level
data for pre- and post-treatment years further enable the estimation of fixed effects
panel data models (in the spirit of Moser et al., 2014), which allows controlling for
5 An earlier version of this chapter circulates as “The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance: Evid-
ence from Stasi Spying in East Germany”, see Lichter et al. (2015).
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county fixed effects in the regressions.
The results provided in this chapter of the dissertation offer direct evidence on
the substantial costs of state surveillance. It is shown that the extent of spying
in socialist East Germany has had long-lasting negative consequences on peoples’
trust in fellow citizens and public institutions even years after the end of the com-
munist regime. The results of this analysis further highlight that diminished trust
in turn impedes regions’ economic performance, with self-employment rates and
population growth, for example, being significantly lower in regions that were sub-
ject to high levels of state surveillance. Overall, these findings thus verify and ex-
tend cross-country evidence on the positive and long-run association between the
quality of public institutions and economic growth by providing within-country
evidence on governmental policies’ effects on trust and, hence, on economic per-
formance.
General findings of the dissertation.
The importance of work for today’s societies and the particular role of public policy
in shaping labor market outcomes and thereby peoples’ trust, and vice versa, mo-
tivates the four quite different chapters of this dissertation. By contributing to the
understanding of central labor market mechanisms, the present studies all high-
light the importance of sound policy making and provide important implications
thereof.
The findings of Chapter 2 illustrate that firms’ labor demand behavior is sig-
nificantly affected by labor market institutions, with the absolute value of the
elasticity of labor demand being negatively correlated to the level of employment
protection legislation in a given country. The results of Chapters 2 and 3 fur-
ther point to important heterogeneities in firms’ labor demand elasticities arising
from differences in production technologies, workforce characteristics or the en-
gagement in international trade, among others, which may significantly impact
the effectiveness of labor market policies in turn (Hamermesh, 1993). Under these
circumstances, the optimal design of labor market policies may thus differ with
respect to the characteristics of a firm or an industry. With Lee and Saez (2012),
for example, demonstrating that the optimal design of minimum wage policies de-
pends on firms’ labor demand elasticities, the results of Chapter 3 suggest different
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optimal minimum wage policies for trade-exposed and trade-sheltered sectors. In
light of this, policy makers should thus take account of potential heterogeneities
in firm responses to policy reforms in order to avoid unintended consequences of
their interventions.
Chapter 4 provides exemplary evidence for unintended effects of labor market
policies, with an extension of the potential benefit duration being found to reduce
job search effort of the unemployed. As this finding can be interpreted as evidence
in favor of a UI-induced moral hazard, the results of this chapter emphasize the
need to carefully balance supportive and restrictive policies associated with the UI
scheme. Evidence from Black et al. (2003), for example, stresses that mandatory
participation in training systems may reduce UI-induced moral hazard and shorten
nonemployment durations. Therefore, an extension of the potential benefit dura-
tion might be preferably combined with policies that suppress moral hazard. In
addition to highlighting the direct (unintended) effects of labor market policies,
the results of Chapter 5 of this dissertation further point to the overall importance
of governmental policy for a nation’s economic performance and wellbeing. State
surveillance, a feature of many (authoritarian) countries, is found to erode peoples’
trust in their fellow citizens and public institutions and, thereby, to hamper the
performance of the labor market and suppresses economic growth.
While the results of this dissertation thus highlight that sound governmental
policy may significantly improve the efficiency of the labor market and shape soci-
eties’ economic wellbeing in general, it has been argued that any intended policy
reform should be assessed against the constraints faced by politicians as well as
the (long-term) political consequences of these actions (Dixit, 1997; Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2013). If, for example, labor market policy reforms strengthen “the
already dominant groups in society” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013, p. 175), unin-
tended political consequences may emerge from these policies that may eventually
outweigh the potential efficiency gains in the labor market. While such an analysis
demands the foundation of a new conceptual framework (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2013), it appears that (labor) economists might gain important new insights by
assessing labor market policies against this broader context in future research.
Chapter 2
Heterogeneity in the Wage
Elasticity of Labor Demand∗
2.1 Introduction
The own-wage elasticity of labor demand is a key parameter of interest in labor
economics crucially influencing the effectiveness of many labor market policies
(Hamermesh, 1993) and pointing to structural changes in production due to skill-
biased technological or organizational change. It also plays a key role in many
other fields besides labor economics. Firms’ labor demand responses to wage rate
changes have gained increasing attention in public finance, with own-wage elast-
icities of labor demand serving as an important input in optimal tax models of
individuals and firms (Jacquet et al., 2012; Riedel, 2011) as well as determin-
ing the deadweight loss due to taxation. In international economics, the wage
elasticity of labor demand serves as an important parameter in theoretical mod-
els of international trade (Rauch and Trindade, 2003) as well as when assessing
the effects of globalization on the volatility of employment and wages (Rodrik,
1997). Moreover, estimates of wage elasticities of labor demand are used to cal-
ibrate macro and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models in various fields,
typically using “guestimated” elasticities (Boeters and Savard, 2013).
∗ The following chapter has been published as “The Own-Wage Elasticity of Labor Demand: A
Meta-Regression Analysis” (joined with Andreas Peichl and Sebastian Siegloch, see Lichter et al.
(2015)).
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The importance of this parameter is reflected by the enormous number of stud-
ies devoted to the estimation of firms’ labor demand responses to wage changes.
Despite extensive research, heterogeneity in the estimates of the own-wage elasti-
city of labor demand is apparent, with most estimates ranging between zero and
minus one. Correspondingly, Fuchs et al. (1998) show that beliefs about the size of
the own-wage elasticity are widely dispersed among economists. In this paper, we
explore different sources of heterogeneity in the estimates by conducting a com-
prehensive meta-regression analysis of the relevant literature. Using information
from a total of 151 micro-level studies and 1,334 elasticity estimates, we account
for sources of heterogeneity due to the type of elasticity being estimated and the
empirical specification being used.
Specifically, we test whether empirical findings back up theory: given different
theoretical concepts of the labor demand elasticity, we expect some heterogeneity
in the estimates. We investigate how much of this heterogeneity can be explained
by the empirical specification of the labor demand model or by characteristics of
the dataset. Moreover, we analyze whether the elasticity of labor demand differs
for various types of workers, industries or countries and whether the elasticity
has increased over time (for example, due to technological change or increasing
globalization). In addition, we explicitly test for publication selection (or report-
ing) bias, given that journals’ preference to publish statistically significant results
(DeLong and Lang, 1992) and economists’ strong beliefs in particular economic
relationships might prompt researchers to report, and journals to publish, expec-
ted empirical results only (Card and Krueger, 1995; Franco et al., 2014). With
respect to the own-wage elasticity of labor demand, there is unanimous belief in
a negative relationship between real wages and labor demand, and thus, a neg-
ative own-wage elasticity. With his seminal contribution, Hamermesh (1993) has
further shaped this belief by providing an interval, ranging from -0.15 to -0.75, of
likely values for the constant-output elasticity of labor demand. In our study, we
therefore explicitly test whether there is evidence of publication bias in this strand
of the literature.
Our meta-regression analysis offers six key results. First, a considerable share
of the variation in the estimates can be explained by the different concepts of
elasticities applied: according to labor demand theory, we find that the elasticity
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of labor demand is smaller in the short than the intermediate and long run and
that the total elasticity of demand – obtained from a structural model – exceeds
the constant-output elasticity. Second, firms’ responses to wage changes are de-
pendent on worker characteristics, with the elasticity of labor demand being higher
for low-skilled and atypical workers compared to the average worker. Third, we
find sizeable differences in elasticity estimates across industries and countries, with
labor demand being particularly elastic in countries with low levels of employment
protection legislation. Fourth, labor demand has become more elastic over time,
possibly due to technical progress and increased globalization. Thus, variation in
the estimates of the labor demand elasticity is natural to a considerable extent.
There is no central elasticity of labor demand; rather, researchers need to care-
fully assess which type of elasticity to estimate in a given context or adapt when
calibrating a model.
However, differences in the estimates are (fifth) also due to differences regard-
ing the empirical specification of the labor demand model and the type of data
used: structural-form models better correspond to theory, while estimates based
on industry-level data understate firms’ labor demand responses to changes in
the wage rate. Sixth, the results of our analysis also point to substantial upward
publication (or reporting) bias, especially in reduced-form models.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we ex-
plore various dimensions of heterogeneity in the estimates of the elasticity (2.2.1)
and provide descriptive statistics for our meta data (2.2.2). In Section 2.3.1, we
introduce our meta-regression model and the underlying estimation strategy. We
present and discuss our results in Section 2.3.2, while investigating the presence
of publication (or reporting) bias in Section 2.3.3. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The meta sample & sources of heterogeneity
The data for our meta-analysis are collected by thoroughly examining the liter-
ature on labor demand and related topics.1 Overall, we identify 151 studies that
1 In detail, all studies included in our data are either listed in google scholar or given in the
reference list of previously identified papers. In addition, we rely on the excellent survey of earlier
empirical labor demand studies by Hamermesh (1993) to identify relevant studies published prior
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provide micro-level estimates of the own-wage elasticity of labor demand. As most
studies supply more than one elasticity estimate, the sample comprises those es-
timates that differ in an important source of heterogeneity only. Thus, we include
all estimates from a particular study in case where they are derived from different
specifications of the theoretical and empirical model, estimation procedures ap-
plied, or when they are worker-, industry-, time-, or country-specific. In contrast,
if estimates only differ due to minor variations in the specification2, the authors’
preferred estimate is used. If there is no preferred estimate, we rely on the most
comprehensive specification. Overall, this leaves us with 1,334 estimates of the
own-wage elasticity. Tables 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 in the Appendix list the dimensions of
heterogeneity and the particular source, i.e., the corresponding table or passage,
for each estimate included in our meta-regression analysis.
Figure 2.2.1: Distribution of labor demand elasticities
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Notes: The figure plots the distribution of estimates collected for the meta-regression analysis.
For illustrative purposes, estimates exceeding the absolute value of 2 are excluded from this
figure.
Figure (2.2.1) shows the distribution of labor demand elasticities in our data.3
The mean (median) own-wage elasticity is -0.551 (-0.420), the standard deviation
to 1993.
2 For example, due to the inclusion or exclusion of a specific control variable.
3 For the sake of clarity, this graph does not include estimates of the own-wage elasticity of labor
demand that exceed the value of two in absolute terms (N=55).
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is 0.747 and the vast majority of estimates (83%) lies within the interval of minus
one and zero.
2.2.1 Sources of heterogeneity
Given the widespread estimates, we identify likely sources of heterogeneity in the
own-wage elasticity of labor demand: (i) labor demand theory, (ii) the empirical
specification, (iii) the underlying data, (iv) characteristics of the workforce, and
(v) variation across industries and countries as well as over time. Whereas (i)
points to variation in the concept of the elasticity being estimated, (ii) and (iii)
indicate different empirical strategies. Lastly, categories (iv) and (v) account for
potential heterogeneity across groups and over time.
Labor demand theory. Heterogeneity in elasticity estimates is implied by the-
ory. Firms’ labor demand responses are more limited in the short run than in the
intermediate and long run. In the short run, firms are assumed not to fully adjust
the stock of labor employed when facing changes in the wage rate. For example,
adjustment costs due to institutional regulations, such as employment protection
legislation, limit firms’ responses. In turn, firms are assumed to adjust the stock of
labor and materials to the optimal level in the intermediate run, whereas the stock
of capital remains fixed. Adjustments of the capital stock only occur in the long
run. Limited flexibility in the adjustment of production inputs should thus trans-
late into a lower own-wage elasticity of labor demand in the short run compared to
the intermediate and long run.4 Moreover, the total (unconditional) elasticity of
labor demand should further exceed the constant-output (conditional) elasticity of
labor demand. The conditional elasticity indicates the substitution effect between
labor and other inputs of production at a given level of output and is determined
by minimizing the costs of production conditional on output. The unconditional
elasticity, in turn, reflects labor demand responses to wage rate changes where
firms maximize profits and covers both the substitution and scale effect.
4 For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we thus classify each estimate by means of the
(dis)equilibrium state of labor and capital. Note that labor demand adjusts to the optimal level
in a static labor demand model by definition, such that short-run labor demand can be only
modeled in a dynamic model of labor demand.
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The empirical specification. Differences regarding the empirical specification
and identification of the labor demand model constitute another likely source of
heterogeneity in the estimates of the labor demand elasticity.
Structural-form models usually apply the dual approach, minimizing costs con-
ditional on output to derive labor demand functions.5 Costs are specified by means
of a linear second-order approximation to an arbitrary cost function in the follow-
ing general form
C = C(w, Y, Z),
with w denoting a vector of input prices of the production factors, Y denoting
output, and Z capturing other variables affecting production, such as technological
change over time or capital in case being specified as a quasi-fixed input factor
reflecting an intermediate- rather than a long-run perspective, in which capital is
a flexible input factor.6 By minimizing costs and applying Shephard’s Lemma,
fully specified estimable factor demand equations are obtained
X = f(w, Y, Z).
Demand for input factor i thus depends on input prices, output, Z and the para-
meters of the assumed cost function. Own-wage elasticities can be calculated
by using parameter estimates of the factor demand equations. Structural-form
models thus provide an explicit framework to infer parameters of production that
eventually determine the relevant elasticities of demand (Hamermesh, 1993, p.38).
Reduced-form models in turn lack a specific theoretical structure. Given firms’
cost of production absent any specific functional form, C(w, Y ), conditional factor
demand equations can be derived by minimizing costs and applying Shephard’s
5 Less frequently, researchers also model complex production functions to obtain fully specified
models of unconditional factor demand. See, for example, Kim (1988).
6 Generalized Leontief, Translog and Box-Cox cost functions constitute the most common spe-
cifications in the literature, although many other specifications exist. See Diewert and Wales
(1987) or Koebel et al. (2003) for details.
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Lemma:
X = Xd(w, Y ).
Taking logarithms yields estimable log-linear specifications of factor demand, with
the estimated coefficients of the factor prices representing the respective elasticit-
ies. Estimates of the total elasticity of labor demand are obtained when estimat-
ing the same factor demand specifications, but with the output variable dropped
(Hamermesh, 1993, p.74). Due to lacking theoretical structure, reduced-form spe-
cifications of labor demand thus allow researchers considerable discretion regarding
the inclusion of additional control variables in the empirical model.
Identification of both types of labor demand models often hinges on the as-
sumption that wages are unaffected by demand and hence exogenously given to
the individual firm. When relying on structural modeling, this problem is often
assumed away, given that the theoretical model should stipulate the correct re-
lationship between wages and employment.7 In reduced-form models, however,
endogeneity due to reverse causality/simultaneity is a first-order concern. Given
the positive relationship between labor supply and wages, endogeneity would result
in upward biased estimates of the own-wage elasticity of labor demand. In prac-
tice, many studies assume that wages are exogenous from the perspective of the
individual employer (Hamermesh, 1993). While this assumption seems to be quite
strong, it is less likely to hold when estimating labor demand at the industry level.
Consequently, the validity of the wage exogeneity assumption is widely discussed
in most current papers, and many attempts have been made to find instruments for
the wage rate. However, credible instruments are still scarce. Often, researchers
deal with endogeneity concerns in labor demand models by using lagged values of
the wage rate as instruments. However, serious concerns have been raised about
the validity of lagged endogenous variables as instruments (Angrist and Krueger,
2001, p.76f.). Due to the importance of addressing endogeneity concerns when es-
timating labor demand functions, we pay special attention to the wage treatment
and the exogeneity assumption when running our meta analysis.
7 Note that this assumption may be justified on theoretical grounds but may still lead to biased
estimates when bringing the model to the data.
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The dataset. Precise information on wages (and employment) is essential when
estimating the elasticity of labor demand. In contrast to survey data, measure-
ment error in wages is minimized when using information from administrative
sources. Different sources of data may thus add to the heterogeneity in the estim-
ates of the own-wage elasticity. Heterogeneity may likewise arise from differences
in the level of observation. In his seminal work, Hamermesh (1993) reasons that
industry-level data estimates of the own-wage elasticity cannot account for employ-
ment shifts within a given sector/industry and hence understate firms’ employment
responses to changes in wages. Studies using industry-level data are hence expec-
ted to provide downward biased estimates. Lastly, unobservable heterogeneity
across firms (such as productivity differences) may affect employment, wages and
hence the elasticity of labor demand. By relying on panel rather than time-series
or cross-sectional data, researchers can easily account for unobservable firm- or
industry-fixed effects and thus a potential form of bias in the estimates of the
parameter of interest.
Workforce characteristics. Labor is not a homogenous production factor, and
we expect labor demand elasticities to vary by worker types. For example, it is
generally believed that firms’ demand for low-skilled labor is more responsive to
changes in the wage rate than the demand for medium- or high-skilled workers,
given that low-skilled tasks may be more easily executed by machines or outsourced
to low-income countries. In our meta-regression, we thus differentiate among low-
skilled, high-skilled and overall labor demand.8 We also distinguish the average
worker from workers in blue- or white-collar occupations. Likewise, we test whether
firms’ demand for female labor and workers on atypical contracts is more elastic
than for the average worker.
Variation across industries, countries and over time. Sectoral differences
in labor demand are likely to contribute to the heterogeneity of own-wage elasti-
city estimates, given that some sectors are more dependent on domestic labor than
8 We use overall demand as a category due to the fact that many studies do not account for
heterogeneous types of labor and obtain elasticities for the overall workforce. Differences in the
own-wage elasticity for low- and high-skilled labor are thus relative to the overall workforce,
which represents medium-skilled workers on average.
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others, e.g., due to differences in the capital to labor ratio or divergent opportunit-
ies to outsource parts of the production process. We therefore account for sectoral
differences in the elasticity up to the 2-digit level.9 Cross-country differences in in-
stitutional regulations regarding employment protection and dismissal may further
crucially affect firms’ labor demand behavior in response to changes in the wage
rate. Moreover, the acceleration of international production sharing, global com-
petition and technological advances may have rendered firms’ demand for labor
more elastic over time. Controlling for the study’s year of publication to account
for methodological advances in the literature, we analyze whether the magnitude of
the elasticity of labor demand increases with the mean year of observation covered
in the respective dataset.
Additional sources of heterogeneity. We stress that there are more dimen-
sions of heterogeneity worth exploring: the presence of collective bargaining agree-
ments at the firm or industry level may limit firms’ employment responses but may
also lead to wage moderation. Accordingly, as multinational firms are assumed
to relocate production processes at lower costs, they may respond differently to
changes in the wage rate compared to domestic firms. However, due to a lim-
ited number of studies explicitly distinguishing unionized from non-unionized and
multinational from domestic firms, we have to discard these likely source of het-
erogeneity from our analysis. In addition, we do not explicitly control for firm size
in this analysis. As the assignment mechanism of firms into different size classes is
study-specific and the number of studies accounting for firm size is small, creation
of non-overlapping and sizeable groups in our meta-analysis is unfeasible.
2.2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2.1 provides descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the
meta-regression.10 We differentiate between two samples: the full sample covers all
estimates obtained from the literature (N=1,334), whereas the baseline sample is
9 Note that many studies focus on one-digit sectors or do not account for sectoral differences at
all. Thus, we control for sectoral differences with respect to the overall economy.
10 Tables 2.6.3 and 2.6.4 provide the characteristics of the explanatory variables for each paper
included in the meta-regressions.
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restricted to those estimates with a given or calculable standard error (N=890).11
With respect to theory, we first note that around 80% of the estimates refer to
the intermediate or long run. Moreover, estimates of the constant-output elasti-
city of labor demand outnumber those of the total demand elasticity, indicating
the literature’s focus on the identification of long-run patterns of factor substi-
tutability. Turning to the empirical specification, the majority of estimates come
from reduced-form models of labor demand. Given that structural-form models
account for the conceptual differences between the conditional and unconditional
elasticity more explicitly, we allow for interdependencies between the empirical
and theoretical specifications in our meta-regression analysis by interacting the
latter variables. In terms of identification, most studies rely on the assumption
that wages are exogenous to the firm or industry, with less than one-fifth of the
estimated elasticities stemming from specifications where the wage variable has
been instrumented.
Regarding the data, we observe that more elasticities are estimated using ad-
ministrative rather than survey data and using variation at the industry level
rather than at the firm level. Indeed, industry-level estimates are very rarely
based on survey data. In our analysis, we account for this fact by including an in-
teraction term of the data source and the unit of observation. Furthermore, panel
data estimates constitute more than three-quarters of all elasticities in our ana-
lysis, with the majority stemming from specifications that account for unit-fixed
effects.
The studies covered in our meta sample also account for a variety of worker
characteristics: in terms of skills, 6.1% and 10.2% of the elasticity estimates in
our baseline sample explicitly refer to high- and low-skilled labor, respectively.
Likewise, explicit elasticities are given for blue- and white-collar workers, females
and employees on atypical contracts. Moreover, it is apparent that the majority of
studies has focused on the manufacturing sector, while rather few estimates refer
to the service or construction sectors. Around one-third of the estimates apply to
the overall economy.
11 For the meta-analysis conducted below, standard errors are necessary to account for hetero-
scedasticity by applying Weighted Least Squares (WLS), using the inverse of the error term
variances as the corresponding weights.
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Table 2.2.1: Explanatory variables for heterogeneity in labor demand elasticities
Baseline Sample Full Sample
Explanatory variable Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
Specification
Time period
Short-run elasticity 0.197 0.398 0.163 0.369
Intermediate-run elasticity 0.454 0.498 0.372 0.484
Long-run elasticity 0.349 0.477 0.465 0.499
Total demand elasticity (opposed to: constant-output elasticity) 0.211 0.408 0.156 0.363
Structural-form model (opposed to: reduced-form model) 0.372 0.484 0.475 0.500
Instrumenting wages (opposed to: exogenous wage) 0.161 0.367 0.177 0.382
Dataset
Administrative data (opposed to: survey data) 0.784 0.412 0.812 0.391
Industry-level data (opposed to: firm-level data) 0.626 0.484 0.695 0.461
Panel data specification
No panel data 0.165 0.372 0.275 0.447
Panel data/No fixed effects 0.116 0.320 0.113 0.317
Panel data/Fixed effects 0.719 0.450 0.612 0.488
Workforce characteristics
Skill level
All workers 0.837 0.370 0.854 0.353
High-skilled workers 0.061 0.239 0.055 0.228
Low-skilled workers 0.102 0.303 0.091 0.288
Female worker 0.033 0.178 0.022 0.146
Atypical employment 0.065 0.247 0.044 0.206
Worker type
All workers 0.899 0.302 0.921 0.269
Blue-collar workers 0.062 0.241 0.047 0.212
White-collar workers 0.039 0.194 0.032 0.175
Industry (One-digit level)
All 0.341 0.474 0.311 0.463
Manufacturing 0.544 0.498 0.596 0.491
Service 0.045 0.207 0.035 0.184
Construction 0.058 0.235 0.039 0.194
Other (Mining, Wholesale, Transportation, Electricity & Water) 0.012 0.110 0.019 0.135
Country (Aggregated)
Continental European countries 0.299 0.458 0.253 0.435
Northern European countries 0.030 0.172 0.062 0.240
United Kingdom/Ireland 0.070 0.255 0.053 0.223
Southern European countries 0.023 0.148 0.030 0.171
USA/Canada 0.175 0.380 0.245 0.430
Asia 0.027 0.162 0.029 0.166
Latin America 0.070 0.255 0.062 0.242
Eastern European countries 0.101 0.302 0.070 0.256
Africa 0.029 0.168 0.021 0.143
Aggregate data 0.176 0.381 0.175 0.380
Mean year of observation 1989 9.7 1985 12.8
Mean year of publication 2002 7.6 2000 9.8
Notes: The baseline sample covers 890 observations and includes all point estimates with a given or calculable
standard error. The full sample (N = 1,334) further includes all point estimates without a given or computable
standard error.
CHAPTER 2. 21
Our meta data includes estimates of the wage elasticity of labor demand for
37 countries as well as estimates based on aggregate OECD or European data.12
To simplify representation, mean values and standard deviations are given at an
aggregate level in Table 2.2.1, with countries clustered by geographical location.13
We note that a large share of estimates relate to Continental European countries14
as well as the US and Canada, amounting to about 50% of the total estimates.
By contrast, only a few elasticity estimates are given for Southern European,
African or Asian countries. Lastly, we emphasize that the meta data cover studies
published over more than four decades from 1971 to 2012.15 The mean year of
data in the respective studies is 1989 in the baseline and 1985 in the full sample.
2.3 Meta-regression analysis
Having identified likely sources of heterogeneity, we next turn to our meta-regression
analysis. In Section 2.3.1, we briefly present the meta-regression model and es-
timation techniques. Section 2.3.2 presents the results, discusses the identified
dimensions of heterogeneity and checks the sensitivity of our results. We sub-
sequently test for the presence of publication selection bias in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 The regression model
In line with standard meta-regression analysis techniques (e.g., Card et al., 2010;
Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011), we assume that the ith estimate of the own-wage
elasticity collected from study s, denoted ηis, is obtained by means of an econo-
metric procedure such that the estimate of the elasticity varies around its true
value (η0) due to sampling error (is) and is driven by study- (X
′) and estimate-
specific (Z′) effects, as introduced in the previous section. The regression model
12 Table 2.5.2 provides the number of estimates obtained for each country.
13 Precisely, we group elasticities for Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg to Continental Europe, whereas Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden constitute the
Nordic European countries. We further combine the estimates from Italy, Spain and Portugal
to Southern Europe and group elasticities from Turkey, Macedonia and the former CIS states
to Eastern Europe.
14 Here, the share of elasticities based on German data is particularly high.
15 Table 2.5.2 provides the year of publication for the studies covered in the meta data.
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thus reads as follows:
ηis = η0 + βX
′
i + δZ
′
is + is. (2.3.1)
We account for heteroscedasticity in the meta-regression model in the estima-
tion: the variance of the individual estimate of the elasticity (ηis) decreases with
the size of the underlying sample, which differs between studies and/or within
a single study in our sample: V (is|X′i,Z′is) = σ2is . The specific form of het-
eroscedasticity is given by the standard error of the estimate and is thus known
when applying meta-regression techniques. As a consequence, we estimate equa-
tion (2.3.1) by WLS, using the inverse of the error term variances, i.e., the inverse
of the squared standard error of the parameter estimate.16 To control for study
dependence in the estimates, standard errors are clustered at the study-level. In
order to provide evidence for the robustness of our results, we also estimate our
model for the full sample (including those elasticities without a standard error) by
simple OLS, using the inverse of the number of observations taken per study as
the corresponding weight.17
2.3.2 Results
The baseline results of our meta-regression analysis are presented in Table 2.3.1.
We begin by separately analyzing the effects of different dimensions of heterogen-
eity on the own-wage elasticity of labor demand: namely, (i) the theoretical and
empirical specification, (ii) characteristics of the dataset applied, and (iii) features
of the workforce (columns (1) to (3)). Subsequently, we simultaneously account
for all dimensions of heterogeneity in one model (column (4)) and additionally
control for variation across industries and countries as well as over time in our
most comprehensive specification (column (5)).
Column (1) shows that the empirical evidence backs theory: firms’ labor de-
mand responses to changes in the wage rate are more elastic in the intermediate
and long run than in the short run since costs prevent firms from immediate adjust-
ments to the optimal level of employment. However, intermediate- and long-run
16 Stanley and Doucouliagos (2015) show that this estimator is preferable to other standard
meta-regression estimators. Nonetheless, we test the sensitivity of our results by applying
different estimators used in meta-studies below (see Table 2.3.2).
17 See Tables 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 for the number of estimates taken per study.
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elasticities are quite similar in magnitude. Our results further show that the total
(unconditional) elasticity of labor demand exceeds the constant-output elasticity
in absolute terms when being derived from a structural-form model of labor de-
mand. In contrast, estimates of the total and constant-output elasticity of labor
demand do not differ when being obtained from reduced-form models. Estimates
from structural-form models thus tend to better comply with theory. As detailed
in Section 2.2.1, a possible explanation for this finding lies in the empirical spe-
cifications of both models. Whereas structural-form estimates for unconditional
and conditional elasticities are based on differing functional forms, reduced-form
specifications of labor demand merely incorporate an additional control variable to
capture firms’ output when conditional rather than unconditional elasticities shall
be obtained. As concerns the heterogeneity due to differing assumptions regarding
the identification of the labor demand model, we find no statistically significant
differences in the estimates with respect to the two polar assumptions about wage
exogeneity. The results suggest, however, that estimates from specifications with
instrumented wage variables exceed those estimates where wages are assumed to
be exogenous.
We next investigate whether heterogeneity in the estimates of the elasticity of
labor demand is data driven. The results displayed in column (2) suggest that
the characteristics of the dataset add little to the heterogeneity in the estimates.
However, data-driven heterogeneity becomes more important when controlling for
the year of publication (see column (5)) since detailed firm-level data from admin-
istrative sources have only become available in recent years.
In line with our expectations, characteristics of the workforce are important
determinants for the heterogeneity in the estimates. The results given in column
(3) show that demand for high-skilled (low-skilled) workers is less (more) elastic
than for the overall workforce. For low-skilled workers, more elastic demand may,
for example, reflect higher substitutability of low-skilled tasks with capital as well
as increasing possibilities of offshoring these tasks. In addition, demand for fe-
males and workers on atypical contracts is also more price elastic. For the latter
group, one potential explanation is found in lower firing costs for the marginal and
temporary employed. When controlling for worker characteristics only, we further
note that estimates of the elasticity for both blue- and white-collar workers exceed
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Table 2.3.1: Baseline results: meta-regression analysis
Dependent variable:
Labor Demand Elasticity (η) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification
Time period (omitted: Short-run)
Intermediate-run -0.243∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.084) (0.052) (0.045)
Long-run -0.302∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.041) (0.046)
Labor demand model (omitted: Conditional/Reduced-form)
Conditional/Structural-form 0.203∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.049
(0.075) (0.055) (0.070)
Unconditional/Reduced-form 0.009 -0.028 -0.009
(0.054) (0.052) (0.027)
Unconditional/Structural-form -0.123∗∗ -0.389∗∗∗ -0.150
(0.053) (0.078) (0.103)
Instrumenting wages -0.113 -0.117∗ 0.008
(0.077) (0.064) (0.013)
Dataset
Panel data specification (omitted: No panel data)
Panel data/No unit-fixed effects 0.083 -0.060 -0.266∗∗
(0.086) (0.064) (0.123)
Panel data/Unit-fixed effects -0.012 -0.144∗∗ -0.249∗∗
(0.042) (0.058) (0.121)
Industry-level data 0.037 -0.075 -0.067
(0.088) (0.074) (0.081)
Administrative data 0.267∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ -0.116
(0.065) (0.039) (0.114)
Industry-level, admin data -0.128 -0.020 0.255∗
(0.092) (0.074) (0.148)
Workforce characteristics
Skill level (omitted: All workers)
High-skilled workers 0.320∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.044
(0.080) (0.070) (0.079)
Low-skilled workers -0.409∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.041) (0.035)
Demand for female workers -0.118∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.045) (0.031)
Atypical employment -0.745∗∗∗ -0.614∗∗∗ -0.539∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.055) (0.046)
Worker characteristics (omitted: All workers)
Blue-collar workers -0.420∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗ -0.075
(0.035) (0.068) (0.054)
White-collar workers -0.314∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.062
(0.076) (0.051) (0.056)
Estimates’ mean year of observation (centralized) -0.008∗
(0.004)
Constant -0.077∗∗∗ -0.287∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.354∗
(0.028) (0.072) (0.023) (0.065) (0.193)
Industry dummy variables No No No No Yes
Year of publication dummy variables No No No No Yes
Country dummy variables No No No No Yes
No. of observations 890 890 890 890 890
Adjusted R-Squared 0.366 0.227 0.455 0.636 0.850
Notes: The table shows estimates based on regression model (2.3.1) for the baseline sample. Columns (1) through
(5) are estimated by Weighted Least Squares using squared inverse standard errors of the estimates as weights.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the study level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01
(***).
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the estimates for the overall workforce (not differentiating by collar type).18
We next include all three dimensions of heterogeneity in one regression. The
results given in column (4) show that most of the previous findings prevail. Thus,
we further add industry and country dummy variables to our regression in column
(5), given that industries differ in terms of labor intensity and cross-national differ-
ences in labor market institutions are likely to affect firms’ labor demand behavior.
Moreover, we analyze whether labor demand has become more elastic over time.
To identify potential shifts in the own-wage elasticity of labor demand over recent
decades, we control for both the mean year of observation underlying the partic-
ular point estimate and the study’s year of publication to capture methodological
advances. Again, the results only slightly change: empirical evidence backs theory
as firms’ labor demand responses to changes in the wage rate are more limited in
the short run compared to the intermediate or long run. Moreover, we offer clear
evidence that demand for low-skilled and atypical workers is more elastic than for
the overall workforce. However, our results also point to data-driven heterogeneity,
given that industry-level estimates from administrative data sources are particu-
larly small in absolute terms. This finding is in line with Hamermesh (1993), who
argues that industry-level estimates understate firms’ employment responses to
changes in wages since intra-industry shifts in employment are not accounted for.
The regression results further show that labor demand elasticities vary consider-
ably by industry.19 Figure 2.3.1 plots differences in the industry-specific own-wage
elasticity with respect to the elasticity for all sectors.20 The graph shows that
the elasticity of labor demand is significantly larger in the construction sector (F),
overall manufacturing (C), and for manufactures of basic metals (ISIC 24) and
metal products (ISIC 25) - two industries that are particularly labor intensive and
where production has shifted to low-wage countries in recent decades.
Due to advances in technology and increasing globalization, it is widely believed
that labor demand has become more elastic over time. Our meta-regression ana-
18 While this finding is rather unexpected, we stress that the difference in the elasticity for
white-collar workers and the average worker vanishes when controlling for the study’s year of
publication.
19 The corresponding regression results are available upon request.
20 For the sake of clarity, this graph only displays the difference in the own-wage elasticity only
for those industries in which more than two estimates were given from at least two different
studies.
CHAPTER 2. 26
Figure 2.3.1: Industry-specific own-wage elasticities
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Notes: The figure shows the differences in industry specific labor demand elasticities relative to
the overall elasticity. Industry codes refer to Mining (B); Manufacturing (C); Manufacture of
food, beverages, tobacco (10-12); Manufacture of textiles, apparel, leather (13-15); Manufacture
of wood & wood products (16); Manufacture of paper & paper products (17); Manufacture of
chemicals & chemical products (20); Manufacture of rubber & plastic products (22); Manufac-
ture of non-metallic mineral products (23); Manufacture of basic metals (24); Manufacture of
metal products (25); Manufacture of electrical equipment (27); Manufacture of transport equip-
ment (30); Other manufacturing (32); Electricity, gas and water supply (D-E); Construction
(F); Service (I-S).
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lysis provides support for this view, with column (5) showing that – controlling for
all other dimensions of heterogeneity – the elasticity of labor demand has increased
in absolute terms over recent decades. Figure (2.3.2) illustrates this development,
grouping observations according to the mean year of the underlying data and con-
trolling for other sources of heterogeneity.
Figure 2.3.2: The elasticity of labor demand over time
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of the elasticity of labor demand over time, controlling
for all other sources of heterogeneity as shown in the baseline model (column (5) of Table 2.3.1).
The graph groups the (mean) year of observation into 100 equally sized bins. Data bins are
depicted by circles, the linear fit is indicated by the line.
We further find substantial differences in the labor demand elasticity across
countries.21 To illustrate these differences, Figure (2.3.3) plots the predicted labor
demand elasticities against the country-specific OECD Employment Legislation
Index. The graph shows a positive relationship between overall employment pro-
tection and the wage elasticity, with labor demand being less elastic in countries
that have rather strict rules of employment protection legislation (for example,
Spain and Mexico). In contrast, labor demand is more elastic in those coun-
tries that have weak rules on employment protection (for example, the UK and
Canada). Differences in employment protection legislation among countries may
21 The corresponding full regression results are available upon request.
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thus contribute to the country-specific estimates of the labor demand elasticity.
Figure 2.3.3: The elasticity of labor demand and employment protection legislation
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Notes: The figure plots predicted labor demand elasticities by country against a country-specific
measure of the strictness of employment protection legislation. Predictions are based on the
the preferred specification (column (5) of Table 2.3.1). The measure of employment protection
legislation is calculated as the average of the OECD Employment Legislation Index for the
late-1980s, late-1990s and 2003 (see Table 2.A2.4 of the OECD Employment Outlook 2004).
Overall, our analysis shows that heterogeneity in the estimates of the own-wage
labor demand elasticity is natural to a considerable extent: heterogeneity is im-
plied by different theoretical concepts of the elasticity, and responsiveness crucially
depends on worker characteristics, with elasticities being larger for low-skilled and
atypical workers. Moreover, estimates vary across industries and countries and
have increased over time, supporting hypotheses concerning the effects of technical
progress and globalization on labor demand. Thus, researchers need to carefully
assess which elasticity to estimate in a given context or adapt when calibrating a
model. Yet, heterogeneity is also due to researchers’ choices regarding the empir-
ical specification of the labor demand model and the dataset applied. Our analysis
highlights that structural-form models better correspond to theory, and estimates
based on industry-level data are considerably downward biased.
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Sensitivity analysis In the preceding analysis, we have identified various factors
causing heterogeneity in the estimates of the wage elasticity of labor demand. Next,
we test the sensitivity of our results when (i) restricting the sample along various
dimensions and (ii) using different estimators.
Recall that our sample includes all estimates of the wage elasticity of labor
demand from a particular study when being derived from different specifications
of the theoretical and empirical model, estimation procedures applied or in case
being worker-, industry-, time- or country-specific, leading to 890 observations.
However, some studies excessively contribute to the number of observations by
providing, for example, estimates of the elasticity of labor demand for each single
year in the underlying dataset.22 Thus, in order to test the robustness of our
results, we limit the number of estimates included in our meta-regression analysis
along three dimensions. We begin by limiting the number of estimates by applying
stricter selection rules. For example, in the case when the estimate of labor demand
is given for many different years, only the estimate of the mean year is taken,
reducing the number of observations in our meta data to 609.23 We further drop
estimates that are statistically insignificant and randomly take two estimates from
each study.24 From columns (1) to (3) of Table 2.3.2, we infer that restricting the
data along these three dimensions does not significantly affect the conclusions of
our analysis.
The sensitivity of our results is further tested by applying simple OLS and
‘random effects’ meta-regression techniques. When OLS is used, observations are
weighted by the inverse of the study’s number of elasticities included. In turn,
‘random effects’ meta-regressions estimate an additional between-study variance
term to cover differences in the estimates beyond pure sampling error and those
captured by the control variables (Feld and Heckemeyer, 2011). Columns (4) and
(5) present the OLS results for the full and baseline sample, the former including all
22 For example, Hijzen and Swaim (2010) provide estimates of the conditional and unconditional
elasticity of labor demand for each single year from 1983 to 2002.
23 Additional examples are studies that show the robustness of their results by obtaining estimates
of the elasticity of labor demand by using cost and employment shares in structural-form models
or by applying various lags when differencing the data.
24 For the latter approach, we limit the control variables according to the specification provided
in Column (4) of Table 2.3.1, given that the number of observations drops to 197. All other
regressions in this section are based on our most comprehensive model.
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Table 2.3.2: Sensitivity analysis: reduced samples and different estimators
Dependent variable: WLS WLS WLS OLS OLS RE
Labor Demand Elasticity (η) N=609 T-value> 2 N=197 N=1334 N=890 Meta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification
Time Period (omitted: Short-run)
Intermediate-run -0.110∗∗ -0.183∗∗∗ -0.099∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.053) (0.059) (0.113) (0.085) (0.041)
Long-run -0.147∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.434∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.242∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.074) (0.041) (0.095) (0.063) (0.034)
Labor demand model (omitted: Cond./Reduced-form)
Conditional/Structural-form -0.066 -0.036 -0.175∗ 0.050 0.117 -0.015
(0.076) (0.084) (0.095) (0.073) (0.071) (0.047)
Unconditional/Reduced-form 0.015 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.066 -0.193∗∗ -0.042 -0.030
(0.038) (0.013) (0.066) (0.090) (0.054) (0.035)
Unconditional/Structural-form -0.184 -0.129 -0.526∗∗∗ 0.381∗ -0.000 -0.099
(0.113) (0.121) (0.105) (0.226) (0.124) (0.192)
Instrumenting wages 0.001 0.008 -0.152∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.064∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.069) (0.075) (0.076) (0.038)
Dataset
Panel data specification (omitted: No panel data)
Panel data/No unit-fixed effects -0.297∗∗∗ -0.364∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.043 -0.153∗
(0.108) (0.091) (0.085) (0.074) (0.110) (0.084)
Panel data/Unit-fixed effects -0.310∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ 0.045 -0.007 -0.212∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.087) (0.071) (0.083) (0.095) (0.080)
Industry-level data -0.071 -0.110∗ -0.092 -0.148 -0.207∗∗ -0.010
(0.075) (0.062) (0.092) (0.109) (0.089) (0.071)
Administrative data -0.130 -0.147 0.006 -0.405∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.114) (0.087) (0.094) (0.072) (0.056)
Industry-level admin data 0.328∗∗ 0.332∗∗ 0.121 0.478∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗
(0.138) (0.137) (0.130) (0.134) (0.130) (0.079)
Workforce characteristics
Skill level (omitted: All workers)
High-skilled workers 0.046 -0.012 0.344∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.055 0.003
(0.086) (0.100) (0.079) (0.096) (0.089) (0.046)
Unskilled workers -0.270∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.040) (0.084) (0.098) (0.079) (0.035)
Demand for female workers -0.174∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.041 -1.323 -1.436 -0.295∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.024) (0.035) (0.851) (0.868) (0.079)
Atypical employment -0.539∗∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗ -0.391 -0.446∗ -0.325 -0.403∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.037) (0.384) (0.262) (0.304) (0.049)
Worker characteristics (omitted: All workers)
Blue-collar worker -0.054 0.002 -0.320∗∗∗ -0.160 -0.370∗∗∗ -0.121∗
(0.066) (0.071) (0.055) (0.140) (0.107) (0.067)
White-collar worker -0.012 0.015 -0.225∗∗∗ 0.106 -0.027 -0.082
(0.068) (0.072) (0.069) (0.114) (0.104) (0.073)
Estimates’ mean year of observation (centralized) -0.008 -0.008∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Constant 0.211 0.414∗∗∗ 0.121 0.511∗∗∗ -1.492∗∗∗ 0.387∗
(0.140) (0.131) (0.086) (0.148) (0.267) (0.234)
Industry dummy variables Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Year of publication dummy variables Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country dummy variables Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 609 627 197 1,334 890 890
Adjusted R-Squared 0.827 0.856 0.550 0.288 0.281 –
Notes: The table shows estimates based on regression model (2.3.1) for the various samples and different estima-
tion techniques as indicated in the table head. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the study level.
Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***).
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1,334 observations. In line with previous results, the results do not significantly
differ. Notably, the results in column (4) and (5) provide evidence for higher
elasticities of labor demand when instrumenting the wage rate. Column (6) further
shows that our findings remain unaffected when applying ‘random effects’ meta-
regression techniques, thus underlining the robustness of our results.25
2.3.3 Publication selection bias
In the second part of our analysis, we evaluate whether publication selection bias is
present in the empirical literature on labor demand. Journals’ tendency to publish
statistically significant results as well as researchers’ strong beliefs in particular
economic relationships and distaste for publishing null findings might induce a
selection process of empirical findings that biases the true population parameter
and hence limits knowledge about a particular economic relationship (DeLong and
Lang, 1992; Franco et al., 2014).
One common method for detecting publication selection bias is to analyze the
relationship between the estimated coefficient and its standard error (Card and
Krueger, 1995; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2015). In the absence of publication
bias, there should be no systematic relationship between estimates and standard
errors. However, if authors (journals) tend to only report (publish) results that are
at least significant at the 10% level, implying a t-value (t) of about 1.6, a tendency
to report significant results will induce a correlation between the elasticity estimate
(b) and its standard error (SE ), given that t = b/SE (Card and Krueger, 1995).
As the elasticity of labor demand is generally believed to be negative (b < 0), we
expect to find a negative relationship between the standard error and the elasticity
estimate in case of publication bias.
”Funnel plots” are a first approach to visualize publication bias by plotting
point estimates against the inverse of the standard error (Sutton et al., 2000).
If there is no publication bias, the graph is expected to be funnel-shaped, i.e.,
low-precision estimates should be widely dispersed. However, when plotting the
elasticity estimates against the inverse of their standard errors, the distribution
is asymmetric and skewed to the left (Figure 2.3.4). As this asymmetry reflects
25 The full regression results are provided upon request.
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Figure 2.3.4: Funnel plot for publication bias
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Notes: The figure plots point estimates of the labor demand elasticity against the inverse of
the corresponding standard error. For illustrative purposes, high-precision estimates with an
inverse standard error greater than 500 are excluded. The funnel plot is meant to visualize
publication bias. In the absence of publication bias, low-precision estimates should be widely
dispersed.
publication (or reporting) bias, researchers seem to be inclined to frame their
empirical specification in such a way that they obtain negative wage elasticities
that are in line with theory (see Card and Krueger, 1995).
Despite the visual evidence, we also test for publication bias within our most
comprehensive meta-regression specification, presented in column (5) of Table
2.3.1. According to random sampling theory, point estimates and respective stand-
ard errors should be independent. However, column (1) of Table 2.3.3 shows that
the standard error has a particularly strong and statistically significant effect on
the own-wage elasticity of labor demand in our model.26 As expected, the sign
is negative, reflecting the assumed negative elasticity and suggesting significant
publication bias in the estimates towards more negative elasticities.
Given this evidence, we analyze whether publication bias is less prevalent in
peer-reviewed journals and differs with the quality of the journal. We thus control
26 As the empirical results concerning the sources of heterogeneity prevail, we limit our presenta-
tion to those variables indicating publication bias only. The full regression results are provided
upon request.
CHAPTER 2. 33
Table 2.3.3: Testing for publication selection bias
Dependent variable: WLS WLS WLS WLS WLS
Labor Demand Elasticity (η) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standard error -1.053∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗ -0.985∗∗∗ -1.449∗∗∗ -1.417∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.427) (0.296) (0.313) (0.346)
Normalized impact factor -0.164
(0.156)
Std. error*Normalized impact factor 0.287
(0.895)
Std. error*Short-run elasticity -0.462 -0.119
(0.640) (0.636)
Std. error*Structural-form model 0.913∗ 0.882∗
(0.513) (0.521)
Constant -0.374∗∗ -0.327∗ -0.372∗∗ -0.390∗∗ -0.389∗∗
(0.175) (0.178) (0.174) (0.181) (0.182)
No. of observations 890 890 890 890 890
Adjusted R-Squared 0.855 0.856 0.855 0.856 0.856
Notes: The table shows the estimates of the baseline model (cf. column (5) of Table 2.3.1), additionally con-
trolling for (interactions of) the respective standard error of the estimate. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the study level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**) and 0.01 (***).
for the impact factor of the respective journal within which the own-wage elasticity
estimate was published and interact the standard error with the impact factor
variable.27 The results in column (2) show that the journal’s impact factor has no
statistically significant effect on the extent of publication bias.
We further evaluate whether publication bias is driven by the theoretical or em-
pirical specification of the labor demand model. Precisely, we analyze whether pub-
lication bias is stronger for estimates of the short-run rather than the intermediate-
and long-run elasticity of labor demand and whether it is less pronounced when
the elasticity estimate is obtained from a structural-form model. We expect that it
is more likely to estimate a non-negative or insignificant elasticity in the short run
because these estimates should be lower in theory. In addition, publication bias
should be less present in structural-form models where modeling choices are con-
strained by theory. Column (3) shows that publication bias is stronger, albeit not
statistically significant, for estimates of the short-run rather than intermediate-
and long-run elasticity. However, column (4) reports evidence that publication
bias is much weaker when the elasticity is derived from a structural-form model
rather than a reduced-form model. Column (5) shows that the latter effect remains
27 In detail, we use the IDEAS/RePEc Simple Impact Factor as of October 23, 2013. The impact
factor is normalized to a range between zero and one.
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statistically significant when including both interaction terms in one regression.
2.4 Conclusion
The own-wage elasticity of labor demand serves as a key parameter in economic
research and policy analysis crucially influencing the effectiveness of policy reforms
and the outcomes of many economic models. This importance is reflected by
a large number of empirical studies devoted to the estimation of labor demand
elasticities. Nonetheless, heterogeneity in the estimates of the own-wage labor
demand elasticity has been apparent. Building on detailed information from 151
different micro-level studies, this paper uses meta-regression techniques to identify
sources of heterogeneity affecting the estimates of the elasticity of labor demand.
Our analysis provides six key findings. First, heterogeneity in the estimates
of labor demand can be explained by the different concepts of elasticities applied.
Second, labor demand responses to wage changes depend on worker character-
istics, with elasticities being higher for low-skilled and atypical workers. Third,
labor demand elasticities are industry- and country-specific, with low levels of em-
ployment protection legislation implying more elastic demand for labor. Fourth,
firms’ labor demand has become more elastic over time, supporting hypotheses
concerning the effects of technical progress and globalization on labor demand.
Hence, heterogeneity in the estimates of the elasticity of labor demand is natural
to a considerable extent. Fifth, some differences in the estimates are due to the
estimation procedure applied and the type of data used. More precisely, the res-
ults show that estimates from structural labor demand models better correspond
to theory and suggest that instrumenting the wage variable leads to higher es-
timates of the own-wage elasticity. Moreover, industry-level estimates are lower in
absolute terms compared to firm-level estimates. Sixth, and even more worryingly,
our analysis also points to substantial publication (or reporting) bias, especially
in reduced-form models.
Several important conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. Our findings
highlight that the prevalent heterogeneity in the estimates of the labor demand
elasticity has to be taken into account. There is no such thing as a central elasticity
of labor demand; rather, researchers need to precisely determine the type of elasti-
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city that best corresponds with their analysis. Moreover, our analysis points to
potential dangers in reporting biased elasticities. The choice of data and empirical
specification applied seems to influence the estimated elasticities, which implies
some arbitrariness and unwanted discretion for researchers to produce estimates
that are in line with the priors. In particular, we find that industry-level elasticity
estimates are downward biased, and estimates obtained from structural-form mod-
els better correspond with theory. This potential problem is corroborated by our
finding of substantial publication bias, particularly present in reduced-form stud-
ies, where there is much more discretion in terms of the empirical specification
applied.
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2.5 Appendix
Table 2.5.1: Distribution of labor demand elasticities by sector/industry
No. of estimates
Baseline Sample Full Sample
All sectors 303 415
Mining (B) 3 9
Manufacturing (C) 378 557
Manufacture of food,beverages,tobacco (10-12) 6 20
Manufacture of textiles,apparel,leather (13-15) 6 23
Manufacture of wood & wood products (16) 3 11
Manufacture of paper & paper products (17) 7 17
Printing (18) 1 5
Manufacture of coke & petroleum (19) 2 2
Manufacture of chemicals & chemical products (20) 16 22
Manufacture of rubber & plastic products (22) 2 7
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products (23) 11 21
Manufacture of basic metals (24) 8 32
Manufacture of metal products (25) 6 10
Manufacture of electrical equipment (27) 5 9
Manufacture of machinery (28) 10 21
Manufacture of transport equipment (30) 8 14
Other manufacturing (32) 15 24
Electricity, gas and water supply (D-E) 5 9
Construction (F) 52 52
Wholesale (G) 3 3
Transportation (H) 0 4
Service (I-S) 36 43
Information and communication (J) 1 1
Financial & insurance services (K) 3 3
Notes: The baseline sample covers 890 observations and includes all estimates of the own-wage elasticity with a
given or calculable standard error. The full sample (N=1,334) further includes all point estimates without a given
or computable standard error. Industrial classification according to ISIC Rev.4 of the United Nations Statistics
Division. Due to changes in the ISIC classification over time, industries 10− 12, 13− 15, D−E had to be pooled.
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Table 2.5.2: Distribution of estimates by year of publication and country
No. of estimates No. of estimates
Baseline Sample Full Sample Baseline Sample Full Sample
Year
1971 0 4 1995 6 7
1974 0 4 1996 19 19
1975 0 5 1997 28 28
1977 0 2 1998 57 70
1979 0 9 1999 16 34
1980 10 12 2000 8 22
1981 5 95 2001 77 79
1983 0 2 2002 13 33
1984 18 22 2003 65 96
1985 2 17 2004 33 52
1986 38 44 2005 71 73
1987 1 17 2006 46 47
1988 12 20 2007 47 50
1989 0 2 2008 78 91
1990 1 16 2009 6 6
1991 8 9 2010 167 237
1992 16 51 2011 7 7
1993 19 19 2012 14 31
1994 2 2
Country
Aggregate Data 138 202 Lithuania 2 2
Aggr. European Data 19 32 Macedonia 2 4
Argentina 4 6 Mauritius 2 2
Belgium 6 10 Mexico 7 7
Bulgaria 2 2 Netherlands 5 10
Canada 4 40 Norway 3 4
Chile 2 2 Peru 13 13
China 1 1 Poland 7 7
Colombia 31 50 Portugal 3 3
Czech Republic 9 9 Romania 1 2
Denmark 1 2 Slovak Republic 6 6
Finland 1 2 Slovenia 1 2
France 12 16 South Korea 4 4
Germany 243 302 Spain 6 23
Ghana 0 2 Sweden 22 74
Hungary 9 9 Tunisia 24 24
India 3 3 Turkey 51 51
Ireland 5 5 United Kingdom 57 65
Italy 11 14 United States 152 287
Japan 16 30 Uruguay 5 5
Notes: The baseline sample covers 890 observations and includes all estimates of the own-wage elasticity with a
given or calculable standard error. The full sample (N=1,334) further includes all point estimates without a given
or computable standard error.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Exporting on
Labor Demand∗
3.1 Introduction
The worldwide volume of exports has dramatically increased over recent decades.
Although the total benefits of globalization are believed to exceed the losses, most
scholars assume that globalization increased the responsiveness and hence the vul-
nerability of employment to shocks (see Rodrik (1997), for an early argument).
While (accelerating) international trade is a relatively modern phenomenon, a the-
oretical mechanism explaining more elastic employment responses to wage shocks
has long been known: one of the Hicks-Marshall laws of derived demand states that
the unconditional, long-run own-wage elasticity of labor demand is higher, ceteris
paribus, the higher the price elasticity of product demand (Hamermesh, 1993).
Exporting firms have been shown to face destination-specific price elasticities of
product demand, which are decreasing in per-capita income of the destination
country (Markusen, 2013; Simonovska, 2015). Hence, exporters in high-income
countries are exposed to an overall more price elastic product demand compared
to a firm that only serves the domestic market. As a consequence, exporters should
also face a higher elasticity of labor demand.
∗ This chapter is based on a joint work with Andreas Peichl and Sebastian Siegloch, circulating
as Lichter et al. (2014).
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Despite its importance, the effect of firms’ export behavior on the elasticity
of labor demand has not been explicitly investigated to date. In this paper, we
explore this relationship using administrative linked employer-employee data from
Germany. To theoretically corroborate our hypothesis, we follow Krishna et al.
(2001), who show that the implication of the Hicks-Marshall law of demand holds
true in a model with firms exhibiting some price-setting power. Allowing for non-
homothetic consumer preferences across countries, as in Markusen (2013), more
elastic product demand for exporting compared to non-exporting firms transmits
into higher own-wage elasticities for firms engaged in exporting.1 Empirically, we
use German administrative linked employer-employee data from 1996 to 2008 and
industry-level data on trade flows to test our hypothesis and explicitly analyze the
effect of exporting at both the extensive and intensive margins on the elasticity
of labor demand. Focusing on Germany holds particular interest in this context,
given that the German economy is heavily reliant on exports, with the export
share on national GDP amounting to around 50% and around one-quarter of all
jobs depending on exporting (Yalcin and Zacher, 2011). Moreover, Germany is a
high-income country with trade ties to many low- and medium-income countries,
thus making it a suitable candidate to test our theoretical predictions.
Indeed, we find that exporting at both the extensive and intensive margins
has a positive effect on the absolute value of the unconditional own-wage elasti-
city of labor demand: The mean elasticity of labor demand for exporting plants
is around one-third higher than the mean elasticity for non-exporters (-0.66 vs. -
0.47). Our results are not driven by selection into exporting as we control for
firm fixed effects and find a similar effect of exporting (at the intensive margin)
when limiting the analysis to exporting firms only. Moreover, we show that our
results are robust to endogeneity concerns by applying an instrumental variables
strategy in the spirit of Autor et al. (2013), using U.S. exports to China as an in-
strument. Relying on industry-level data on export flows by destination countries,
we further demonstrate that exporting increases the elasticity of labor demand
for those firms that export a relatively large share of their output to low- and
1 When speaking of higher/larger or lower/smaller own-wage elasticities, we refer to absolute
values throughout the paper. Hence, a higher wage elasticity means ‘more negative’ and thus
de facto a wage elasticity with a lower value.
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medium income countries. In turn, we find no effect of exporting on the elasticity
of labor demand in case exports are primarily destined for high-income markets,
i.e., markets resembling the domestic one. Our findings hold true for single-plant
firms, whereas exporting has no effect on the elasticity of labor demand of plants
belonging to a multi-plant firm.2 Given that exporting is usually the first step
when becoming an international actor in the product market, these results suggest
that multi-plant firms have accommodated export-induced volatility by adjusting
its production processes and structure. When accounting for worker heterogen-
eity, we further find that medium-skilled workers are mostly affected by exporting,
whereas demand for high-skilled labor does not respond to exporting behavior.
These findings are in line with routine-based technological change, which has been
shown to hit medium-skilled workers in particular. In line with our hypothesis, we
further verify that the results are not due to differences in the conditional elasticity
of labor demand, given that estimates conditional on output are not statistically
different for exporting and non-exporting plants. We take these results as suggest-
ive evidence in favor of our proposed mechanism: different scale effects for exporters
and non-exporters drive differences in unconditional labor demand elasticities.
Overall, we add to the existing literature in three ways. First, we propose and
verify an important mechanism of how exporting behavior – a central element of
globalization – affects workers in the national labor market through higher labor
demand elasticities. This channel is relevant for both theoretical models of inter-
national trade and policy analysis. For example, with the optimal minimum wage
policy depending on the actual size of the (low-skilled) wage elasticity of labor
demand (Lee and Saez, 2012), optimal policy interventions might be different in
trade-exposed and trade-sheltered sectors. Second, our study adds to the growing
literature on the characteristics of exporting firms. It has been established that
exporting firms differ considerably from those merely serving the domestic market
(see Bernard et al. (2007) for an overview). Nonetheless, it is important to estab-
lish a causal interpretation for these differences, as the decision to export is clearly
endogenous (Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Clerides et al., 1998). Therefore, we expli-
citly address firms’ selection into exporting and endogeneity concerns in our em-
pirical analysis by applying a firm fixed effects, instrumental variables estimator.
2 Note that labor demand is generally more elastic in multi-plant plants.
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Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on globalization and
(the elasticity of) labor demand to use administrative linked employer-employee
data. In recent decades, the literature has moved from using country- to industry-
and firm-level data. By using administrative linked employer-employee micro-level
panel data, we are able to base our estimations on a rich set of establishments and
their employees, thus analyzing differential effects of exporting on heterogeneous
types of plants and workers.3
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides
a discussion of the related literature, focusing on the effects of globalization on
the elasticity of labor demand, as well as differences between exporting and non-
exporting plants. We subsequently present the theoretical mechanism and empir-
ical model in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes the dataset used in our analysis and
provides descriptive evidence on the plants’ export behavior and performance. We
present and discuss our empirical results in Section 3.5, placing particular emphasis
on the issue of endogeneity and heterogenous effects of exporting for different types
of plants and workers, before Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
We combine two broad strands of related literature in our paper: studies analyz-
ing (i) the effects of globalization on the elasticity of labor demand; and (ii) the
differences between exporting and non-exporting firms, as well as the causal effect
of exporting on firm behavior.
The analysis of different features of globalization and their corresponding ef-
fects on labor demand has attracted much attention in the literature. While
Slaughter (2001) shows that (non-production) production labor has (not) become
more elastic in manufacturing industries over time in the U.S., he finds only weak
evidence for a direct effect of trade. Exploiting exogenous variation due to trade
policy reforms in low- and middle-income countries, several studies analyze the
causal effect of trade liberalization on the elasticity of labor demand. Empirical
3 Note that the dataset focuses on the establishment rather than the aggregate, namely the firm,
and that the terms ”plant” and ”establishment” are used interchangeably in this paper. The
dataset yet allows us to distinguish between single- and multi-plant firms in our analysis.
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evidence is mixed, with Krishna et al. (2001) as well as Fajnzylber and Maloney
(2005) finding no significant empirical link between trade liberalization and the
elasticity of labor demand, whereas Hasan et al. (2007) and Mitra and Shin (2012)
show that corresponding reforms in India and South Korea rendered the demand
for labor more elastic.4 Focusing on key aspects of globalization, several studies
analyze the labor demand effects of firms’ decision to outsource production pro-
cesses, with the results suggesting that labor demand elasticities for (un-)skilled
workers increase (decrease) (Hijzen et al., 2005; Senses, 2010; Hijzen and Swaim,
2010), albeit not in every country (Fajnzylber and Fernandez, 2009). Other stud-
ies investigate whether labor demand elasticities differ between multinational and
domestic firms, yet no conclusive evidence has been found.5
Regarding the second strand of the literature, a variety of stylized facts has been
established concerning the differences between exporting and non-exporting firms.
Among others, exporting firms are larger in terms of both output and employment,
more productive and pay higher wages than comparable non-exporting firms (see,
for example, Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Bernard et al., 2007).6 However, most
differences do not stem from the mere act of exporting goods to foreign markets.
For example, Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (1999) show that only
the most productive firms select into exporting, whereas no significant productivity
gains occur after entering the export market.7 It has further been established that
exporting firms’ prices are destination-specific, with Manova and Zhang (2012)
showing that firms charge higher prices for the same product in richer and less
4 Clearly, these studies are related to our work as trade liberalization increases firms’ opportun-
ities to sell their goods abroad, among others. However, the respective studies do not explicitly
derive the effect of exporting on the elasticity of labor demand, but rather the overall effect of
trade openness. Only Mitra and Shin (2012) analyze the interaction effects of trade liberaliza-
tion reforms, importing and exporting behavior to some extent.
5 Evidence ranges from findings on higher absolute own-wage labor demand elasticities for mul-
tinational compared to domestic firms (Fabbri et al., 2003; Go¨rg et al., 2009; Hakkala et al.,
2010), no significant differences (Buch and Lipponer, 2010) to less elastic demand for labor by
multinationals (Barba Navaretti et al., 2003).
6 For Germany, Schank et al. (2007) – controlling for observable and unobservable worker and
firm characteristics – find wages to slightly increase with the firm’s export share in total sales.
Wagner (2007) reports productivity differences between exporting and non-exporting firms.
7 Aw et al. (2000) and Delgado et al. (2002) find similar evidence; however, Van Biesebroeck
(2005) and De Loecker (2007) report productivity gains from exporting for Sub-Saharan African
manufacturing firms and Slovenian firms during the transition from a plan to market economy,
respectively.
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remote countries, among others. Simonovska (2015) relates country-specific prices
to per-capita income differentials, with prices for the same product being higher
in richer and less price elastic countries.
Related to our work, recent studies have investigated the relationship between
the firm’s export behavior and volatility in sales and employment. Using panel
data on French manufacturing firms, Vannoorenberghe (2012) shows that firms’
sales volatility increases with the export share. Nguyen and Schaur (2012) find
similar evidence for Danish firms, yet show that the overall higher sales volatility
for exporting rather than non-exporting firms is mainly driven by firms that do
not continuously export. Focusing on employment, Kurz and Senses (2015) find a
non-monotonic effect of exporting on the volatility of employment for U.S. man-
ufacturing firms. We add to this evidence by providing an in-depth analysis of
plant-level sources of employment volatility, with the own-wage elasticity of labor
demand serving as an important proxy for employment volatility and wage pres-
sure. Moreover, by focusing on the elasticity of labor demand, we are further able
to propose a new channel determining the effects of exporting on labor demand,
while accounting for endogeneity concerns in the empirical analysis.
3.3 Theoretical background and empirical model
In order to derive our hypothesis, we follow Krishna et al. (2001) and model firms’
demand for labor in a monopolistic competitive product market setting, assuming
that there are no strategic interactions between firms. Firm i maximizes profits
by selling its product at either the domestic or at foreign markets, facing product
demand given by:
pi = θpQ
− 1
i
i , (3.3.1)
with pi denoting the price charged by firm i, p the average global product price,
θ a scaling factor, Qi the firm’s output, and i the price elasticity of product
demand.8 In line with Markusen (2013), we assume that consumer preferences are
non-homothetic across countries, such that the price elasticity of product demand
8 As noted by Krishna et al. (2001), this framework approximates a setting with a large number
of varieties in the product market, where each firm is an infinitesimal player but has some power
concerning the pricing of its product.
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is country-specific and decreasing in per-capita income.9 With each firm serving
its domestic and different foreign markets to a varying extent, the elasticity of
product demand becomes firm-specific, given by the sales-weighted average of the
country-specific price elasticities of product demand. Firms located in high-income
countries (such as Germany) and only serving their domestic market should thus
face a less price elastic demand for their products compared to those that export
some share of their output to foreign destinations, and to low- and medium-income
countries in particular.
Assuming the production function to be Cobb-Douglas in variable inputs, Qi =
n∏
k=1
V αkki , it can be shown that – in line with the Hicks-Marshall law of derived
demand – the absolute value of the elasticity of labor demand (ηlli) increases with
the price elasticity of product demand10:
∂ |ηlli|
∂i
=
αl
2i
[
1−
(
1− 1
i
)( n∑
k=1
αk
)]2 > 0. (3.3.2)
Hence, a more price elastic product demand faced by exporting compared to non-
exporting firms translates into a higher own-wage elasticity of labor demand as
already stipulated by the Hicks-Marshall law of derived demand.
The empirical set-up. In line with firms’ maximization of profits, the empirical
specification of the unconditional labor demand model is:
ln lit = δ lnwit + β lnwiteit + γeit + βX
′
it + ηi +ϕjt + it. (3.3.3)
The term ln lit denotes the logarithm of establishment i’s overall employment at
time t, lnwit the inflation-adjusted log mean wage rate and eit the respective
export variable, defined by either the export status or the export share in total
sales. Xit is a row vector of additional covariates, including log investments of the
9 This assumption is in line with recent empirical evidence showing that the price elasticity of
demand is decreasing with per-capita income and that (exporting) firms set higher prices in
richer countries (Simonovska, 2015; Manova and Zhang, 2012).
10 A more detailed derivation is provided in Appendix 3.7.3.
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previous year11, the share of intermediate inputs used in production and dummy
variables indicating whether wages are set under some form of collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) and whether the plant belongs to a multi-plant firm. We also
include establishment fixed effects (ηi) as well as industry-year fixed effects, which
are summarized by row vector ϕjt; the error term is denoted by εit.
In addition to estimating equation (3.3.3) for total employment, it can be
modified for N heterogenous types of labor as follows:
ln lsit =
N∑
k=1
(δsk lnw
k
it) + βs lnw
s
iteit + λseit + γsX
′
it + ηi +ϕjt + ist ∀s. (3.3.4)
The dependent variable becomes the log number of employees of labor type s,
ln lsit. We further control for the average wage of each skill group and interact the
skill-specific log wage (lnwsit) with the export variable. The remaining variables
are defined as before.
As both models are estimated in logarithms, estimates of the overall and skill-
specific own-wage elasticities of labor demand are given by:
∂ ln lit
∂ lnwit
∣∣∣∣
e
= δ + βeit and
∂ ln lsit
∂ lnwsit
∣∣∣∣
e
= δss + βseit, (3.3.5)
with βeit and βseit representing the differential effect of exporting on the elasticity
of labor demand, respectively. In turn, the own-wage elasticity of labor demand
for firms only serving their domestic market is given by the parameters δ and δss.
Estimation and identification. We estimate the overall labor demand model
(equation (3.3.3)) by means of fixed effects OLS and instrumental variables. The
set of demand equations for heterogeneous types of labor (equation (3.3.4)) is
estimated by fixed effects OLS and SUR (Zellner, 1962), with the latter estimator
explicitly accounting for the correlation of the error terms of each demand function
within the same establishment. By only using within-establishment variation to
identify the effects of exporting on labor demand, we account for time-invariant
self-selection into exporting. Establishment fixed effects additionally control for
11 As we do not observe capital prices, we assume that capital is quasi-fixed and thus control for
the level of capital, measured by means of the log investments of the previous year.
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unobserved time-invariant confounders such as plant location or product quality,
which might affect both left- and right-hand side variables. Industry-specific shocks
are captured by industry-year dummy variables.12
Regarding identification of the empirical models, we follow standard practice
(see, for example, Hijzen and Swaim, 2010; Senses, 2010) and assume that the
individual establishment faces perfectly elastic labor supply, such that wages are
exogenously given for the individual plant and shifts in labor supply, measured by
means of changes in the wage rate, trace out the labor demand curve (Slaughter,
2001).13 However, the establishment’s export behavior and its demand for labor
might depend on unobserved time-varying plant-level factors, notably productiv-
ity gains, which are not captured by plant fixed effects. Hence, the establishment’s
export share in total sales (eit), as well as the corresponding interaction term with
the wage rate (lnwiteit), might be endogenous, which could bias our estimates.
14
We explicitly account for this source of endogeneity by applying an instrumental
variables (IV) strategy. Conceptually, we follow Autor et al. (2013), who instru-
ment U.S. imports of Chinese goods by changes in other high-income countries’
imports stemming from China.15 We adjust their approach to our research ques-
12 As highlighted below, we account for endogeneity concerns regarding the plants’ export be-
havior by using 2-digit industry-level trade flows from the U.S. to China as an instrument.
In order to simultaneously account for industry-specific trends in the IV approach, we ag-
gregate industries within the manufacturing sector, differentiating cars, steel, durables, food
and non-durables. Note that the reported OLS results are robust to the inclusion of two-digit
industry-year fixed effects.
13 Hamermesh (1993) argues that the validity of this identifying assumption depends on the
level of aggregation in the data. As our analysis is based upon establishment-level data,
simultaneity bias arising from incorrectly assuming perfectly elastic labor supply should only
reflect minor concern in our study. We note that a common method to deal with endogeneity
concerns in labor demand models has been the use of lagged values of the wage rate as an
instrument. However, given that the ”use of lagged endogenous variables as instruments is
problematic if the equation error or omitted variables are serially correlated” and hence relies
on ”atheoretical and hard-to-assess assumptions about dynamic relationships” (Angrist and
Krueger, 2001, p.76f.), we do not apply this procedure. Besides these studies, to the best of
our knowledge, all other existing estimates of labor demand elasticities at the plant-level rely
on the assumption of exogenous wages for identification (see also Senses, 2010).
14 Imagine unobserved gains in productivity causing a higher export share and higher level of
employment. For a given wage rate, this would induce an upward bias of the interaction term
between wages and the export share. Therefore, accounting for this sort of endogeneity should
lead to more negative estimates of the interaction term. Consequently, our fixed effects results
serve as lower bound estimates.
15 Note that Dauth et al. (2014) also employ a similar instrumental variables strategy when
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tion by instrumenting the individual German establishment’s export share in total
sales with the corresponding industry’s value of U.S. exports (in logs) destined
for China. Given that China’s demand for foreign goods should similarly affect
U.S. and German plants, there is a high correlation between German and U.S. ex-
port shares to China as shown in Figure 3.3.1.16 Arguably, U.S. industry-level ex-
Figure 3.3.1: Overall U.S. and German exports to China
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Notes: The figure plots the relative increase in export flows from Germany and the U.S. to
China from 1996 to 2006. The corresponding trade data are provided by the United Nations
Statistics Division.
port volumes to China are not correlated with establishment-specific productivity
gains in German establishments and should affect employment decisions only via
the establishments’ export behavior. We derive the instrument at the two-digit
industry level (22 industries within the manufacturing sector), using yearly UN
Comtrade data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD).17 We
instrument both the export share as well as the interaction term of the export share
and the wage rate by following the procedure suggested in Wooldridge (2010). As
analyzing the effects of trade integration on local German labor markets.
16 Table 3.7.1 in the Appendix shows the correlations at the industry level.
17 Information are given at the HS Classification level and transformed to the ISIC level using
UNSD correspondence tables.
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the instrument is derived at the 2-digit industry-level, we cluster standard errors
accordingly.18
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
3.4.1 Data sources
For the purpose of our study we use administrative linked employer-employee
data (LIAB) from Germany, provided by the Institute of Employment Research
(IAB)19, and link it with industry-level export data from UN Comtrade and the
German Federal Statistical Office. As noted before, the case of Germany holds par-
ticular interest as its economy heavily depends on the export of goods and services,
the export share in national GDP (approximately 50%) being considerably higher
compared to most other developed countries.20 Moreover, although most exports
are destined for high-income countries, industry-level exports to medium- and low-
income countries range between 5 and 25% (see Figure 3.4.1). Germany’s strong
reliance on exporting is further reflected by the fact that around one-quarter of all
jobs depend either directly or indirectly on exports (Yalcin and Zacher, 2011).
Utilizing linked employer-employee data is crucial for our study, as we need
to observe both individual-specific variables such as employees’ occupations, qual-
ifications and wages, as well as establishment information on output or export
intensity to analyze the effects of exporting on the elasticities of labor demand
for heterogeneous types of workers and plants. The underlying employee data is
a two percent random sample of the administrative employment statistics of the
German Federal Employment Agency, which covers all employees paying social se-
curity contributions (payroll taxes) or receiving unemployment benefits.21 Among
others, the dataset comprises detailed information on the individuals’ qualification
and occupation, their employment type (full-time, part-time or irregular employ-
ment), as well as their daily wage, right-censored at the upper earnings threshold
18 Note that results remain statistically significant when clustering at the establishment level.
19 See Alda et al. (2005) for detailed information on this dataset.
20 See Figure 3.7.1 in the Appendix for a cross-country comparison.
21 Thus, the dataset does not cover self-employed or civil servants as they are not subject to
social security contributions.
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Figure 3.4.1: Industry export shares to high-income countries
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Notes: The figure plots the distribution of export shares to high-income countries across dif-
ferent industries over time. Country-specific trade flows are provided by the Federal Statistical
Office. Information on per-capita income by destination country is obtained from the World
Development Indicators (World Bank).
of social security contributions. In turn, the IAB establishment panel is a repres-
entative, stratified, random sample of German establishments with at least one
employee liable to social security. As the name indicates, the dataset focuses on
the establishment rather than the aggregate, namely the firm. It has covered West
and East German establishments since 1996 and contains various information on
the establishments’ business and employment structure, including data on invest-
ments, turnover, staff and the export share in total sales.
Following common practice, we restrict our analysis to the manufacturing sec-
tor, given that it accounts for the majority of Germany’s total exports and displays
substantial heterogeneity in terms of employment, export intensity and output.22
To account for heterogeneous effects of trade for differently skilled workers, we dis-
tinguish between low-, medium- and high-skilled workers. High-skilled employees
hold either university, polytechnical or college degrees, whereas medium-skilled
workers have either completed vocational training or obtained the highest Ger-
22 Helpman et al. (2012) reason for substantial heterogeneity in Brazilian manufacturing firms,
which we also find for the German case (see Table 3.4.2).
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man high school diploma (Abitur). By contrast, unskilled workers have neither
completed vocational training nor obtained the Abitur. We adjust all monetary
variables for inflation, notably wages and output, relying on the German consumer
price index obtained from the German Federal Statistical Office. Our sample spans
the period of 1996 to 2008 and ultimately comprises 7,871 establishments, which
are observed 3.24 times on average during this period. This amounts to 25,550
establishment-year and around 7 million worker-year observations.
3.4.2 Exporting and plant characteristics
It has been well established that exporting firms differ from non-exporting firms
in many aspects. Thus, we present descriptive plant characteristics for five types
of establishments: plants that (i) always export; (ii) never export; (iii) enter the
export market; (iv) stop exporting goods; and (v) change the export status more
than once within the sample.
Overall, our data confirms that the establishment’s decision to engage in ex-
porting is a rather long-term choice, given that 86.4% of the plants in our sample
do not change the export status. In turn, 5.0 (3.4)% of the plants covered enter
(exit) the export market, and around 5.2% export discontinuously. Despite the
observed persistence in the plants’ export status, the data displays considerable
variation at the intensive margin of exporting, i.e., at the plants’ export share in
total sales.
Table 3.4.1: Variation in plants’ export shares in total sales
Plant type Always Never Enter Stop Discontinuous
exporting exporting exporting exporting exporting
Number of plants 3,434 3,368 394 263 412
Export share
Mean value (in %) 37.77 – 14.08 9.24 8.74
Mean value (in %), when exporting 37.77 – 23.81 18.21 16.72
Between-plants variation (std. deviation) 24.41 – 15.43 11.28 12.45
Within-plant variation (std. deviation) 8.50 – 14.50 11.78 11.13
Notes: This table provides information on the number of distinct types of plants considered in the analysis and
indicates the respective export intensities of these plant types.
Table 3.4.1 presents the mean export share both conditional and unconditional
on exporting, as well as the between- and within-plant variation. As expected,
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the export share in total sales is highest for continuously exporting plants (around
38%) and lower for plants that enter (around 24%) or exit the export market
(around 18%) in the sample period, or export discontinuously (around 17%). In
terms of variation, the data show that the export share in total sales substantially
differs between plants and within the establishment over time. Between-plant
variation in the export share is particularly strong for always-exporting plants,
whereas within-plant variation in the export share is higher for those plants that
change their export status.23
Table 3.4.2: Exporting and plant characteristics
Plant type Always Never Enter Stop Discontinuous
exporting exporting exporting exporting exporting
Number of plants 3,434 3,368 394 263 412
Number of workers
Mean value 504.86 53.06 221.26 200.72 236.55
Between-plants variation (std. deviation) 1,493.29 179.36 627.22 333.54 711.85
Within-plant variation (std. deviation) 173.11 24.78 39.08 65.52 120.46
Skill composition of workforce
High-skilled workers (mean) 0.102 0.036 0.080 0.065 0.070
Medium-skilled workers (mean) 0.718 0.857 0.776 0.781 0.774
Low-skilled workers (mean) 0.180 0.107 0.144 0.154 0.156
Average monthly wage (in logs)
Mean value 7.905 7.550 7.741 7.726 7.731
Between-plants variation (std. deviation) 0.313 0.356 0.324 0.345 0.308
Within-plant variation (std. deviation) 0.049 0.070 0.054 0.064 0.060
Performance measures
Output (in logs) 17.17 14.11 16.00 15.71 15.86
Investments per worker 27,388 9,767 14,425 14,665 9,907
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics for the five distinct types of plants considered in the analysis.
All monetary values are given in 2008 Euros.
Table 3.4.2 further shows that, according to our expectations, plant character-
istics differ by export involvement. In line with the literature, our data show that
exporting plants are – on average – larger in terms of both output and employ-
ment, pay higher wages and have higher investment rates per worker. Regarding
workforce characteristics, continuously exporting plants are considerably larger
(mean: 505) than all other types of establishments considered. Plants that never
23 Figure 3.7.2 in the Appendix plots the distribution of the export share in total sales in our
sample. However, recall that identification of the labor demand model is only based upon
within-plant variation over time.
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export are rather small, with an average of 53 employees. Plants that start or
stop exporting within our sample, as well as those switching their export status
more than once, are similar in terms of employment and medium-sized, with the
average number of workers ranging between 201 and 237. Regarding worker het-
erogeneity, the share of both low- and high-skilled workers increases with export
involvement. For example, the average share of high-skilled workers in the total
workforce increases from around 3.6% for non-exporting plants to 7.0% and 10.2%
for discontinuous and permanent exporters, respectively.
When focusing on wages, the observed pattern prevails. Average wages are
highest (lowest) in plants that always (never) export within our sample, whereas
wages for the other types of establishments lie in-between. Between-plant variation
in wages is considerable and similar across establishment types. Within-plant
variation in wages is smaller, yet sizeable in absolute terms. In terms of plant
performance, average output of always-exporting plants considerably exceeds the
output of all other types of plants, while investments per worker are lowest for
never-exporting plants in our sample.
3.5 Empirical results
We start by presenting the results for total labor demand in Table 3.5.1. Recall
that each specification contains industry-year fixed effects, capturing aggregate and
industry-specific shocks over time, as well as establishment fixed effects. The over-
all unconditional wage elasticity for non-exporting plants is −0.471 in specification
(1), reflecting a reasonable magnitude for a static long-run elasticity (Hamermesh,
1993; Lichter et al., 2015). More interestingly, we find that exporting has the
expected effect on the own-wage elasticity of unconditional labor demand, as in-
dicated by the negative and significant interaction term of the log wage and the
export dummy: labor demand of exporting plants is considerably more elastic than
labor demand of non-exporting firms. We next turn to the intensive margin, sub-
stituting the export dummy variable with the establishment’s export share in total
sales. The results provided in column (2) mirror those presented in column (1),
with the establishment’s export share having a positive and significant effect on
the (absolute value of the) overall own-wage elasticity of labor demand. The own-
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wage elasticity of labor demand for the mean exporting establishment is −0.657,
compared to −0.469 for a comparable non-exporting establishment.24
Selection into exporting. In the next two specifications, we check the robust-
ness of the baseline results with respect to plants’ selection into exporting. In
column (3), we restrict the sample to exporting plants only, thus focusing on the
potentially selected group of exporting establishments. We find that the wage
elasticity increases compared to model (2), although we cannot reject that the two
coefficients are identical. Moreover, the interaction term remains statistically sig-
nificant, which indicates that labor demand elasticities increase with the exporting
intensity, even within the group of exporters. This finding suggests that our effects
are not driven by selection into exporting. Our model in column (4), within which
we restrict the sample to establishments that do not change their export status
over the observation period, corroborates this conjecture. Again, we find similar
estimates compared to those of specification (2).
Instrumental variables. As discussed in Section 3.3, our fixed effects estimates
presented before would be biased if both the establishment’s employment decision
and export behavior were affected by unobserved time-varying factors, such as
plant-specific productivity shocks. In the following, we thus present the results
from our IV approach. Recall that, in the spirit of Autor et al. (2013), we in-
strument the establishment’s export share with the corresponding U.S. industry’s
export value to China. Whereas we reason that U.S. industry’s trade volumes are
correlated with the respective establishments’ export shares, given that both are
driven by China’s demand for foreign goods, the instrument is not correlated with
establishment-specific productivity shocks.
The instrument is available at the two-digit industry level, covering 1996 to
2006. Hence, to enable the comparison of point estimates, we first present baseline
fixed effects results on the slightly restricted sample in column (5). In line with
our previous results, the export share in total sales has a positive effect on the
own-wage elasticity of unconditional labor demand. Moreover, the estimates in
column (5) are of similar magnitude compared to those of the baseline estimation
24 Conditional on exporting, the mean share of exports in total sales is 33%.
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using the full sample in column (2). We report our IV estimates in column (6),
noting that our model is well identified: clustering standard errors at the level
of the instrument, the Kleibergen-Paap test statistics suggest that the excluded
instruments are relevant and not weak.25 Moreover, we find that the point estimate
of the interaction term of the establishment’s export share and the wage rate
becomes more negative when accounting for endogeneity, which suggests that our
OLS estimates are biased towards zero. However, when comparing OLS and IV
results, we cannot reject that the parameters of the interaction terms in columns
(5) and (6) are statistically identical, suggesting that instrumenting might not be
necessary after all.26 Since the following analyses are quite demanding in terms of
statistical power (as we add another layer of interactions), we focus on the more
efficient OLS estimates.
Table 3.5.1: Labor demand & exporting: Fixed Effects & IV results
All plants Export Only ∆Export = 0 IV Sample (1996–2006)
Dependent variable: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Ln(employees) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(wage) -0.471*** -0.469*** -0.960*** -0.449*** -0.471*** -0.270**
(0.104) (0.102) (0.181) (0.116) (0.118) (0.129)
× Export Dummy -0.199***
(0.053)
× Export Share -0.0057***
(0.0018)
-0.0031**
(0.0016)
-0.0086***
(0.0028)
-0.0056***
(0.0020)
-0.0196***
(0.0055)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,550 25,550 16,961 19,984 21,245 21,245
No. of plants 7,871 7,871 4,503 6,802 7,051 4,553
Underidentification 11.18
Weak identification 65.35
Notes: Dep. variable: Ln(employees). All specifications include establishment and industry-year fixed effects.
The constant is omitted for the ease of presentation. We provide the Kleibergen-Paap statistics for the under-
identification and weak identification tests in column (6). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
establishment level in columns (1)–(5) and clustered at the 2-digit industry level in column (6). Significance
levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
25 The corresponding first-stage regressions are given in Table 3.7.5 in the Appendix.
26 In detail, we cannot reject that the parameters are identical at the 95% confidence level.
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Export destinations. In order to further test the suggested theoretical mech-
anism, we analyze whether the estimated effect indeed depends upon the (mean)
per-capita income level of the plants’ export destination countries. As informa-
tion on export destination countries are missing in the LIAB data, we make use of
detailed 2-digit industry-level data provided by the German Federal Statistical Of-
fice and calculate the industry-level share of exports to high-income countries. On
average, around 88% of the total German manufacturing exports are destined for
high-income countries, with the share varying considerably by industry though.
We exploit this variation across industries by interacting our effect of interest
(lnwiteit) with the respective industry’s export share to high-income countries,
which is categorized into quartiles. As shown in column (1) of Table 3.5.2, we in-
deed find evidence in favor of the proposed channel: exporting has a positive and
significant effect on the elasticity of labor demand for those firms which export
a relative large share of their output to low- and medium-income countries.27 In
turn, we find no effect of exporting on the elasticity in case exports are primarily
destined for high-income markets, i.e., in case the export market largely resembles
the domestic one in terms of purchasing power. When focusing on exporting plants
only, we find the same qualitative results (see column (2)).
Plant heterogeneity. Thus far, we have established that exporting at both the
intensive and extensive margins positively affects the absolute value of the elasti-
city of labor demand, controlling for selection into exporting and endogeneity
concerns. We next investigate heterogenous effects of exporting for different types
of plants. Precisely, we analyze differential effects of exporting due to the plants’
structure (single-plant versus multi-plant firms) and coverage by a collective bar-
gaining agreement (CBA). We distinguish single-plant firms from plants belonging
to a multi-plant firm to address concerns that the estimated effect may be only
driven by multi-plant firms, capturing differences in firm structure rather than the
effect of exporting, as those firms may more easily shift production between plants
located in domestic or foreign locations and thus have more elastic demand for
27 Note that the number of observations decreases slightly compared to the baseline model as
information on country-specific export flows are missing for some 2-digit industries in 2008.
When replacing the missing information with industry-level means, the results remain unaf-
fected.
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Table 3.5.2: Labor demand & exporting: destinations and plant heterogeneity
Export destinations Plant heterogeneity
Dependent variable: OLS
Ln(employees) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(wage) -0.510*** -0.964*** -0.660*** -0.432***
(0.129) (0.104) (0.128) (0.098)
× Export Share × High-Income Market Share
(Quartile 1) -0.0066***
(0.0019)
-0.0038**
(0.0017)
× Export Share × High-Income Market Share
(Quartile 2) -0.0070***
(0.0019)
-0.0043***
(0.0016)
× Export Share × High-Income Market Share
(Quartile 3) -0.0052**
(0.0023)
-0.0027
(0.0021)
× Export Share × High-Income Market Share
(Quartile 4) -0.0033
(0.0028)
-0.0011
(0.0027)
× Single Plant 0.2290***
(0.0778)
× Export Share × Multi-plant -0.0038
(0.0023)
× Export Share × Single-plant -0.0062***
(0.0019)
× CBA -0.0603
(0.0520)
× Export Share × No CBA -0.0045**
(0.0018)
× Export Share × CBA -0.0072***
(0.0024)
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,189 16,727 25,550 25,550
No. of plants 7,806 4,468 7,871 7,871
Notes: Dep. variable: Ln(employees). All specifications include establishment and industry-year fixed effects.
In column (2), the sample is restricted to exporting plants only. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the establishment level in columns (1)–(4). Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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labor. Moreover, we account for the plants’ coverage by a CBA, as our assump-
tion about wage exogeneity is corroborated in a setting in which plants are subject
to CBAs, and unions may limit firms’ adjustment in employment.
The results displayed in column (3) of Table 3.5.2 show that exporting affects
labor demand elasticities of single-plant firms in particular. In turn, exporting
has no effect on the elasticity of labor demand for plants belonging to a multi-
plant firm, albeit the elasticity is larger for those plants in general. Given that
exporting is usually the first step when becoming an international actor in the
product market, these results suggest that (i) more price elastic product demand
transmits to more elastic labor demand for single-plant firms, as suggested by the
proposed mechanism, whereas (ii) multi-plant firms have accommodated to export-
induced volatility in the product market by adjusting their production processes
and structure. When accounting for the plants’ coverage by collective bargaining,
the results presented in column (4) in turn provide no evidence for differential
effects of exporting due to collective bargaining; the elasticity of labor demand
increases with the export share in total sales in both types of plants.
Worker heterogeneity. As it has been shown that globalization affects different
types of workers to varying extents (cf. Section 3.2), we further investigate differ-
ential effects of exporting for heterogeneous types of labor, distinguishing between
low-, medium- and high-skilled workers. Table 3.5.3 presents the corresponding
results obtained from fixed effects SUR.28 In general, we infer from columns (1),
(3) and (5) that demand is least elastic for high-skilled workers, whereas the elasti-
city for low-skilled workers is highest in absolute terms.29 Moreover, we find that
exporting primarily affects medium-skilled workers, with the interaction term of
the corresponding wage rate and the export share being negative and statistically
significant (see column (3)). Our results also suggest that demand for low-skilled
workers becomes more elastic with an increasing export share in total sales, al-
28 We report the corresponding estimates obtained from fixed effects OLS in Table 3.7.6 in the
Appendix of this paper. Given that we do not find significant different results for overall labor
demand when applying fixed effects IV and OLS, we do not apply our IV strategy to the model
of heterogeneous labor demand.
29 Note that regression results in columns (1), (3), and (5) are based on one common specification
using SUR.
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Table 3.5.3: Labor demand & exporting: worker heterogeneity
High-skilled Medium-skilled Low-skilled
Dep. var: ln(employees) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(high-skilled wage) -0.354*** -0.241** 0.0421 0.0560 -0.120* -0.147*
(0.100) (0.095) (0.045) (0.043) (0.067) (0.084)
Ln(medium-skilled wage) 0.298* 0.223 -0.443*** -0.480*** -0.306 -0.341
(0.165) (0.168) (0.125) (0.125) (0.199) (0.217)
Ln(low-skilled wage) 0.112** 0.110* 0.106*** 0.118*** -0.457*** -0.495***
(0.0495) (0.0629) (0.0350) (0.0391) (0.0984) (0.122)
Ln(high-skilled wage)* Export
Share
-0.0013
(0.0018)
Ln(high-skilled wage)* Export
Share* CBA
-0.0025
(0.0021)
Ln(high-skilled wage)* Export
Share* No CBA
0.0000
(0.0025)
Ln(medium-skilled wage)*
Export Share
-0.0031***
(0.0012)
Ln(medium-skilled wage)*
Export Share* CBA
-0.0023*
(0.0013)
Ln(medium-skilled wage)*
Export Share* No CBA
-0.0038**
(0.0018)
Ln(low-skilled wage)* Export
Share
-0.0023
(0.0014)
Kn(low-skilled wage)* Export
Share* CBA
-0.0035*
(0.0018)
Ln(low-skilled wage)* Export
Share* No CBA
-0.0001
(0.0020)
Ln(high-skilled wage)* CBA -0.208 -0.0264 0.0520
(0.128) (0.0608) (0.0970)
Ln(medium-skilled wage)* CBA 0.151
(0.130)
0.0445
(0.0858)
0.0564
(0.166)
Ln(low-skilled wage)* CBA 0.0023 -0.0279 0.0566
(0.072) (0.0460) (0.138)
Export Share 0.0126 0.0010 0.0253*** 0.0313** 0.0179 0.0016
(0.0151) (0.0203) (0.0092) (0.0139) (0.0109) (0.0150)
CBA -0.0306 0.459 -0.0197 0.0647 -0.0169 -1.300
(0.0206) (0.900) (0.0151) (0.654) (0.0316) (1.217)
Export Share*CBA 0.0218 -0.0125 0.0260
(0.0219) (0.0143) (0.0183)
Plant-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 13,414 13,414 13,414 13,414 13,414 13,414
Breusch-Pagan Test 4773.7 4782.3 4773.7 4782.3 4773.7 4782.3
Notes: All estimates are obtained by means of fixed effects SUR. Additional plant-level controls are: the share
of intermediate inputs, log investments of the previous year and a dummy variable indicating whether the
plant belongs to a multi-plant firm. The constant is omitted for the ease of presentation. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are jackknife-cluster robust at the plant level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01
(***).
CHAPTER 3. 102
beit the effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels.30 Demand for
high-skilled workers is not affected by exporting.31
In the preceding analysis, we found no evidence for differential effects of export-
ing on total labor demand due to collective bargaining. However, we additionally
analyze differential effects for heterogenous types of labor, given that unions may
cover different workers to varying extents, with the corresponding results presen-
ted in columns (2), (4) and (6).32 Focusing on establishments without CBAs,
we find clear evidence that exporting only affects the elasticity of demand for
medium-skilled workers. The parameters of the interaction terms between the cor-
responding log wage rate, the export share and the collective bargaining dummy
variable show that there is no effect of exporting on the elasticity for low- and
high-skilled workers. This skill difference could be explained with routine tasks
(which are more common for medium-skilled workers) being more affected by glob-
alization and increasing competition (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). In contrast, the
observed pattern changes when considering plants covered by CBA. While export-
ing still renders demand for medium-skilled labor more elastic, the demand for
low-skilled workers is now also affected (see column (6)). Given that the median
union member is medium-skilled, it seems that unions mitigate the pressure from
globalization on their members by sharing the burden of higher volatility more
equally across the skill distribution.33
Conditional labor demand. Although our findings are in line with the pro-
posed mechanism, the results do not provide direct evidence for the Hicks-Marshall
law, given that higher unconditional own-wage elasticities for exporting compared
to non-exporting plants may be due to differences in the price elasticity of product
demand or the conditional elasticity of labor demand. Unfortunately, due to a
30 The p-value for the interaction term of the low-skilled wage rate and the export share given
in column (5) is 0.104.
31 We argue that establishment fixed effects should account for overall differences in the quality
and composition of the workforce. However, controlling for plants’ composition of the workforce
does hardly affect our results.
32 The regression results presented in columns (2), (4) and (6) are based on one common spe-
cification using SUR.
33 Note that there are no observable differences in the composition of the workforce for plants
with and without CBA (see Table 3.7.2 in the Appendix).
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lack of price data, we cannot estimate the direct effect of exporting on the price
elasticity of product demand. In this section, we thus provide estimates of the
conditional own-wage elasticity of labor demand for exporting and non-exporting
plants to implicitly verify our proposed mechanism.
To estimate the conditional labor demand elasticity we depart from a static,
structural model of firm behavior within which firms are assumed to minimize costs
given a constant level of output. We specify costs (C) by means of the flexible
Generalized Leontief cost function as given by Diewert and Wales (1987):
C =
∑
i
αiwi +
∑
i
∑
j
αiiw
0.5
j w
0.5
j Y +
∑
i
(βY Y iwi)Y
2, (3.5.1)
with w denoting the input prices of the production factors and Y plants’ output.
Applying Shephard’s lemma to equation (3.5.1), input-output ratios are given by:
Ri =
αi
Y
+ αii +
∑
j 6=i
αij
(
wj
wi
)0.5
+ βY Y iY ∀i. (3.5.2)
These ratios are estimated by fixed effects SUR, separately for exporting and
non-exporting plants and allowing for non-constant returns to scale while impos-
ing linear homogeneity in input prices. The conditional own-wage labor demand
elasticity (ηii) for input i is subsequently calculated by means of:
ηii = −0.5
Y
Xi
∑
j 6=i
αij
(
wj
wi
)0.5
, (3.5.3)
the term Xi denoting the level of input good i.
Table 3.5.4 reports the point estimates and standard errors for the conditional
elasticity of total as well as low-, medium- and high-skilled labor demand. Focus-
ing on total employment, we report very similar values for exporting (−0.13) and
non-exporting establishments (−0.17). The same picture emerges when consider-
ing conditional demand elasticities for the three different groups of workers. Point
estimates for the elasticity of medium- and low-skilled labor demand are similar
for exporting and non-exporting plants, and differences not statistically signific-
ant. For high-skilled labor, point estimates suggest that labor demand is less
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Table 3.5.4: Conditional labor demand elasticities
Conditional Own-Wage Elasticity Non-exporting Exporting
plants plants
Overall labor demand -0.17 -0.13
(0.12) (0.05)
High-skilled labor demand -0.41 -0.03
(0.50) (0.16)
Medium-skilled labor demand -0.14 -0.11
(0.10) (0.06)
Low-skilled labor demand -0.42 -0.33
(0.36) (0.09)
Notes: This table provides estimates of conditional labor demand elasticities for exporting and
non-exporting plants. Standard errors (in parentheses) are obtained from bootstrapping using
400 replications.
elastic for exporting compared to non-exporting plants. Despite standard errors
being rather large and the difference not being significant34, this finding could be
interpreted in favor of Matsuyama (2007), who suggests that exporting firms face
more skill-intensive tasks (e.g., by requiring workers with foreign language skills
or experience in international business) than non-exporting firms, which should
translate into higher demand for skilled labor, conditional on output. Overall, we
take these findings as suggestive evidence for our proposed mechanism in favor
of the Hicks-Marshall law of derived demand, with exporting plants having more
elastic unconditional demand for labor compared to non-exporting plants due to
more price elastic product demand.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that globalization increases worker vulnerability by demon-
strating that plants’ exporting activity has a positive and significant effect on the
absolute value of the own-wage elasticity of labor demand. With the price elasti-
city of product demand being country-specific and decreasing in per-capita income,
exporting firms located in high-income countries are exposed to an overall more
34 In line with Koebel et al. (2003) we report larger standard errors for the own-wage elasticities
of those inputs that have a small share in production.
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price elastic product demand than a comparable firm only serving its domestic
market. Building upon the theoretical model of Krishna et al. (2001) and as-
suming non-homothetic consumer preferences across countries, we show that more
elastic product demand for exporting compared to non-exporting firms should lead
to higher own-wage elasticities of labor demand for firms engaged in exporting, in
line with the Hicks-Marshall law of derived demand.
Indeed, our empirical results confirm that exporting at both the intensive and
extensive margins has a positive and significant effect on the unconditional own-
wage elasticity of labor demand. Using industry-level data on country-specific
trade flows we further corroborate our proposed mechanism by showing that ex-
porting only renders firms’ labor demand more elastic in case a relative large
share of their output is destined for low- or medium-income countries. Account-
ing for plant heterogeneity, we further find that exporting only affects the labor
demand of single-plant firms. Regarding heterogenous effects across worker types,
our estimates show that exporting affects the demand for medium-skilled labor in
particular, thus suggesting that workers performing routine tasks are most affected
by globalization (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Finally, we verify that our results
are not due to differences in the conditional elasticity of labor demand, taking this
as suggestive evidence in favor of our proposed mechanism.
Our findings have important policy implications. As it has been shown that
optimal minimum wage policies depend on the wage elasticity of labor demand
(Lee and Saez, 2012), optimal strategies may be different for trade-exposed and
trade-sheltered sectors. The same applies to other policies increasing the wage
costs of employers. In terms of future research, it would be interesting to revisit
our results using comparable datasets, yet with more information on the country-
specific export pattern of each plant or firm, as well as for a developing country
with strong trade ties to high-income countries, where our proposed mechanism
suggests reverse effects of exporting on the elasticity of labor demand.
CHAPTER 3. 106
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.7.1: U.S. and German exports to China by industries
Industry Correlation
Chemical Industries 0.982
Plastics/Rubber 0.911
Raw Hides, Skin, Leather 0.929
Wood and Wood Products 0.809
Textiles, Foodwear 0.964
Stone, Glas 0.955
Metals 0.991
Machinery 0.972
Transportation 0.782
Misc. Manufacturing 0.986
Notes: This table provides simple correlations for the industry-specific export flows
(HS classification) of the U.S. and Germany to China. Correlations are based on data
from the United Nations Statistics Division, 1996–2006.
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Figure 3.7.1: Export share on national GDP
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Notes: This figure shows the export share on national GDP for Germany, Great
Britain, France, Japan, China and the U.S. from 1996 to 2008 using World Bank
data.
Figure 3.7.2: Distribution of export shares across plants
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Notes: The figure plots the distribution of the export share on total sales for firms
covered in the estimation sample.
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Table 3.7.2: Differences by plant types
Plant type CBA/Exporting No CBA/Exporting CBA/Non-Exporting No CBA/Non-Exporting
No. of employees 649.217 127.943 137.976 31.996
Share of worker
High-skilled 0.101 0.092 0.041 0.043
Medium-skilled 0.712 0.755 0.836 0.847
Low-skilled 0.187 0.153 0.123 0.110
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics – the mean number of employees and the mean skill composition
– for the four different types of firms as indicated in the table head.
3.7.2 Additional regression results
Table 3.7.3: Full regression results of Table 3.5.1
All plants Export Only ∆ Export
Status = 0
IV Sample (1996–2006)
Dep. var: OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Ln(employees) Col.(1) Col.(2) Col.(3) Col.(4) Col.(5) Col.(6)
Ln(wage) -0.471*** -0.469*** -0.960*** -0.449*** -0.471*** -0.270**
(0.104) (0.102) (0.181) (0.116) (0.118) (0.129)
× Export Dummy -0.199***
(0.053)
× Export Share -0.0057***
(0.0018)
-0.0031**
(0.0016)
-0.0086***
(0.0028)
-0.0056***
(0.0020)
-0.0196***
(0.0055)
Export Dummy 1.579***
(0.409)
Export Share 0.0454*** 0.0246** 0.0677*** 0.0443*** 0.151***
(0.0138) (0.0123) (0.0222) (0.0156) (0.0443)
CBA 0.0112 0.0119 0.0199 0.0273 0.0070 0.0063
(0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0203) (0.0189) (0.0163) (0.0107)
Ln(investments) 0.0347*** 0.0347*** 0.0425*** 0.0330*** 0.0349*** 0.0364***
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0039)
Sh. intermediates -0.0047 -0.0042 -0.0143 -0.0080 0.0017 0.0104
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0179) (0.0159) (0.0156) (0.0129)
Single-plant -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0050 0.0097 0.0101
(0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0171) (0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0151)
Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,550 25,550 16,961 19,984 21,245 21,245
No. of plants 7,871 7,871 4,503 6,802 7,051 4,553
Underidentification 11.18
Weak identification 65.35
Endogeneity test
(p-value)
0.041
Notes: Dep. variable: Ln(employees). All specifications include establishment and industry-year fixed effects.
The constant is omitted for the ease of presentation. We provide the Kleibergen-Paap statistics for the under-
identification and weak identification tests. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the establishment
level in columns (1)–(5). Standard errors in column (6) are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. Significance
levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Table 3.7.4: Full regression results of Table 3.5.2
Export destinations Plant heterogeneity
Dependent variable: OLS OLS OLS OLS
Ln(employees) Col.(1) Col.(2) Col.(3) Col.(4)
Ln(wage) -0.660*** -0.432***
(0.128) (0.098)
× Export Share × High-Income Market Share
(Quartile 1)
-0.0066***
(0.0019)
-0.0038**
(0.0018)
× Export Share × High-Income Market Share
(Quartile 2)
-0.0070***
(0.0019)
-0.0043***
(0.0016)
× Export Share × High-Income Market Share
(Quartile 3)
-0.052**
(0.0023)
-0.0027
(0.0021)
× Export Share × High-Income Market Share
(Quartile 4)
-0.0033
(0.0028)
-0.0011
(0.0027))
× Single Plant 0.2290***
(0.0778)
× Export Share × Multi-plant -0.0038
(0.0023)
× Export Share × Single-plant -0.0062***
(0.0019)
× CBA -0.0603
(0.0520)
× Export Share × No CBA -0.0045**
(0.0018)
× Export Share × CBA -0.0072***
(0.0024)
CBA 0.0070 0.0063
(0.0163) (0.0107)
Ln(investments) 0.0349*** 0.0364***
(0.0037) (0.0039)
Sh. intermediates 0.0017 0.0104
(0.0156) (0.0129)
Single-plant 0.0097 0.0101
(0.0177) (0.0151)
Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 25,189 16,727 25,550 25,550
No. of plants 7,806 4,468 7,871 7,871
Notes: Dep. variable: Ln(employees). All specifications include establishment and industry-year fixed effects.
The constant is omitted for the ease of presentation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
establishment level. Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Table 3.7.5: Instrumental variables regressions
(A) Regression for prediction of endogenous variable
Export share
Ln(U.S. exports) 0.864∗
(0.445)
Ln(wage) 1.196
(1.223)
CBA 0.231
(0.337)
Ln(investments) 0.212∗∗
(0.091)
Sh. intermediates 1.699∗∗∗
(0.559)
Single-plant -0.168
(0.456)
Industry × Year Yes
(B) First-stage estimation results from 2SLS
Export Share Ln(wage)* Export Share
Ln(wage) -2.320∗∗ -19.301∗∗
(1.001) (7.928)
CBA -0.229 -1.927
(0.253) (1.949)
Ln(investments) -0.171∗ -1.271∗
(0.086) (0.674)
Sh. intermediates -1.168∗∗ -8.843∗∗
(0.428) (3.375)
Single-plant firm 0.265 2.197
(0.464) (3.715)
̂Ln(U.S. exports) 2.141∗∗∗ 8.628∗∗∗
(0.423) (3.295)
̂Ln(Wage)*Ln(U.S. exports) -0.001 1.014∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.344)
Industry × Year Yes Yes
No. of observations 21,245 21,245
F-Test of excluded instruments 7.88 8.87
Notes: In Panel A (B) standard errors are clustered at the plant (two-digit industry) level. Significance levels
are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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Table 3.7.6: Effects by worker type: Fixed Effects results
Dep. var.: Ln(employees) High-skilled Medium-skilled Low-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(high-skilled wage) -0.386*** -0.273*** 0.0422 0.0550 -0.0430 -0.0895
(0.103) (0.0967) (0.0448) (0.0428) (0.0672) (0.0834)
Ln(medium-skilled wage) 0.127 0.0430 -0.488*** -0.517*** -0.132 -0.178
(0.170) (0.172) (0.126) (0.125) (0.196) (0.216)
Ln(low-skilled wage) 0.0659 0.0742 0.0981*** 0.114*** -0.427*** -0.461***
(0.0485) (0.0621) (0.0344) (0.0379) (0.0962) (0.119)
Ln(high-skilled wage) × Export
Share
-0.0024
(0.0020)
Ln(high-skilled wage) × Export
Share × No CBA
-0.0004
(0.0025)
Ln(high-skilled wage) × Export
Share × CBA
-0.0041*
(0.0023)
Ln(medium-skilled wage) ×
Export Share
-0.0025**
(0.0013)
Ln(medium-skilled wage) ×
Export Share × No CBA
-0.0039**
(0.0018)
Ln(medium-skilled wage) ×
Export Share × CBA
-0.0012
(0.0016)
Ln(low-skilled wage) × Export
Share
-0.0015
(0.0014)
Ln(low-skilled wage) × Export
Share × No CBA
0.0000
(0.0019)
Ln(low-skilled wage) × Export
Share × CBA
-0.0021
(0.0018)
Ln(high-skilled wage) × CBA -0.212 -0.0234 0.0921
(0.132) (0.0602) (0.0950)
Ln(medium-skilled wage) ×
CBA
0.166
(0.128)
0.0286
(0.0869)
0.0581
(0.162)
Ln(low-skilled wage) × CBA -0.0186 -0.0344 0.0438
(0.0714) (0.0450) (0.133)
Export Share 0.0209 0.0040 0.0209** 0.0318** 0.0126 0.0013
(0.0164) (0.0208) (0.0101) (0.0142) (0.0105) (0.0145)
CBA -0.0107 0.555 -0.0182 0.218 -0.0405 -1.563
(0.0208) (0.959) (0.0150) (0.684) (0.0311) (1.172)
Export Share × CBA 0.0315 -0.0214 0.0159
(0.0234) (0.0164) (0.0177)
Plant-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry × Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 13,414 13,414 13,414 13.414 13,414 13,414
No. of plants 4,058 4,058 4,058 4,058 4,058 4,058
Within R-Squared 0.0615 0.0645 0.0632 0.0643 0.0817 0.0825
Notes: Results are obtained by means of fixed effects OLS, standard errors are clustered at the plant level.
Significance levels are 0.1 (*), 0.05 (**), and 0.01 (***).
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3.7.3 Details on the theoretical model
Following Krishna et al. (2001), firms’ are assumed to maximize profits while facing
a less than infinitely elastic overall product demand curve of type:
pi = θpQ
− 1
i
i , (3.7.1)
with term pi denoting the own price, p the average global product price, θ a
scaling factor, Qi the firm’s output and i the price elasticity of demand. Given
non-homothetic consumer preferences across countries (Markusen, 2013) and each
firm serving their domestic market and different foreign markets at varying extents,
we modify the model by considering the price elasticity of product demand to be
firm-specific.
The production function is Cobb–Douglas in variable inputs, and given by:
Qi =
n∏
k=1
V αkki , (3.7.2)
where the term V αkki denotes the k
th input in production. Factor markets are
assumed to be fully competitive, with the firm taking factor prices (wk) as given.
Partially differentiating profits with respect to the lth input, labor, and equating
it to zero, yields the following first order condition:
θpQ
1− 1
i
i
(
1− 1
i
)
αlV
−1
li = wl. (3.7.3)
Taking logs and reorganizing terms, this condition can be rewritten as:
lnVli = −
ln
(
θ
(
1− 1
i
)
αl
)
[
αl
(
1− 1
i
)
− 1
] + 1[
αl
(
1− 1
i
)
− 1
] ln(wl
p
)
−
∑
k 6=l
αk
(
1− 1
i
)
[
αl
(
1− 1
i
)
− 1
] lnVki. (3.7.4)
Substituting the first order conditions for inputs Vk 6=l into equation (3.7.4), the
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optimal labor demand function is given by means of:
lnVli = δ0 +
n∑
k=1
−
[
1−
(
1− 1
i
)(∑
k 6=l
αk
)]
[
1−
(
1− 1
i
)( n∑
k=1
αk
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
δk
ln
(
wk
p
)
, (3.7.5)
with δ0 and δk being functions of i.
From equation (3.7.5), the own-wage elasticity of labor demand can be derived as:
∂ lnVli
∂ ln
(
wl
p
) = ηlli = −
[
1−
(
1− 1
i
)(∑
k 6=l
αk
)]
[
1−
(
1− 1
i
)( n∑
k=1
αk
)] < 0, (3.7.6)
with labor demand decreasing in case wages increase. In line with the Hicks-
Marshall law of derived demand, it can be further shown that the absolute value
of the own-wage elasticity of labor demand increases with the price elasticity of
product demand:
∂ |ηlli|
∂i
=
αl
2i
[
1−
(
1− 1
i
)( n∑
k=1
αk
)]2 > 0. (3.7.7)
Given non-homothetic consumer preferences across countries, the absolute value of
the country-specific price elasticity increases with per-capita income. Thus, firms
located in high-income countries and serving its domestic market only face a less
elastic demand for their products compared to those firms that export some share
of their output to foreign destinations, especially to low- and medium-income coun-
tries. In accordance with equation (3.7.7), a more price elastic product demand
faced by exporting rather than non-exporting firms should thus translate into a
higher own-wage elasticity of labor demand.
Chapter 4
Benefit Duration and Job Search∗
4.1 Introduction
A central challenge of unemployment insurance (UI) schemes is to allow unem-
ployed individuals to actively search for suitable reemployment opportunities by
partly compensating for income losses while at the same time repressing the un-
intended incentives to lower search intensity. Disincentive effects of UI systems,
triggered by both the level of benefits as well as the potential benefit duration
(PBD), have been, however, well identified by empirical research. In a nutshell,
extensions of the PBD have been shown to significantly extend individuals’ nonem-
ployment duration, irrespective of personal characteristics or institutional regula-
tions of the labor market (see, for example, Katz and Meyer, 1990; Card and
Levine, 2000; Lalive et al., 2006; Van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006; Chetty, 2008;
Schmieder et al., 2012, 2015).1
While standard job search theory shows that increases in the duration of
nonemployment spells due to the extension of the PBD can be attributed to lower
search effort and/or higher reservation wages, direct empirical evidence regarding
∗ This chapter is based on a (so far unpublished) single-authored manuscript titled “Benefit
Duration and Job Search Effort: Evidence from a Natural Experiment”, see Lichter (2015).
1 Card et al. (2007) show that the extent of the observed spike in exit rates prior to the ex-
piration of benefits significantly depends on the measurement of individuals’ unemployment
spells: reemployment hazards increase significantly less than unemployment exit rates. Given
that unemployment registration is not mandatory in many countries after benefit exhaustion,
spikes in unemployment exit rates may hence overstate the extent of a UI-induced moral hazard.
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the importance of reduced job search effort in contributing to this aggregate effect
is sparse. Absent direct evidence, findings of prolonged spells of nonemployment
are rather commonly interpreted as suggestive evidence of reduced search effort
and the presence of moral hazard.2 Two recent studies by Baker and Fradkin
(2015) and Marinescu (2015) aim at filling this gap by relating state-level vari-
ation in the PBD in the U.S. to changes in state-level internet job search intensity,
with both providing evidence of less job search in response to increases in the PBD
during the time of the recent recession.
The present paper adds to this limited evidence by using quasi-experimental
variation in the PBD for one specific age group of the unemployed in conjunction
with detailed, direct information on individuals’ search effort and reservation wage
choices to provide causal evidence of the effect of benefit duration on job search
behavior. Variation in the PBD comes from an unexpected and rapidly implemen-
ted policy change in Germany in late 2007. The new legislation was motivated by
concerns of social injustice and took place during times of stable-macro-economics
conditions. On December 11, 2007, only two months after the initial reform pro-
posal, the then acting coalition of the Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social
Democrats (SPD) issued a law that enabled the extension of the PBD for eligible
workers aged 50 to 54 by twelve weeks (from 12 to 15 months), while the PBD for
younger workers remained unaffected.3
Using data from the IZA Evaluation Dataset Survey, which covers a large
sample of individuals registering as unemployed at the German Federal Employ-
ment Agency between June 2007 and May 2008, the present paper exploits this
policy reform to investigate the effects of the PBD on job search behavior. Using
unemployed individuals aged 45 to 49, who were not affected by the reform, as a
control group allows for applying simple difference-in-differences techniques. Im-
portantly, the swiftness of the political process and uncertainty about the design
2 Chetty (2008) shows that the increase in unemployment duration due to more generous UI
cannot be entirely attributed to moral hazard, but the role of liquidity effects must also be
accounted for.
3 As detailed below, workers were subject to the reform in case having had contributed to UI for
at least 12 months within the last two years (eligibility constraint) and for 30 months within
the last five years. Note that the reform also extended the PBD for eligible workers aged 58
and above. Given that this study bases on data covering unemployed individuals aged 16 to 54
only, the effects of this change are, however, not investigated.
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and scope of the reform until its public announcement by December 11, 2007 limit
the scope of adaptive behavior. Moreover, the reform’s detachedness from ac-
tual labor market conditions allows comparing the job search behavior of the two
groups prior to and after the reform net of any endogenous policy bias.
The results of this study show that unemployed individuals entitled to an ad-
ditional twelve weeks of unemployment benefits exerted substantially lower levels
of job search effort at the beginning of the unemployment spell compared to their
untreated counterparts: they filed less job applications and were less likely to apply
for jobs in distant areas. The effects are robust to the inclusion of a variety of per-
sonal and regional control variables and are of significant magnitude: the increase
in the PBD by three months caused job applications to decrease by around 40%
of a standard deviation, on average. Treatment effects are similar for females and
males but substantially differ by skill. Whereas treated low- and medium-skilled
individuals showed significantly less job search effort in response to the reform, the
high-skilled unemployed did not reduce the number of filed applications. In con-
trast, the increase in the PBD had no effect on reservation wages, which – despite
being counterintuitive to theory – is in line with recent evidence demonstrating
limited responsiveness of individuals’ reservation wage with respect to changes in
UI parameters (see, among others, Krueger and Mueller, 2014; Schmieder et al.,
2015).
Overall, the study offers considerable evidence for UI-induced moral hazard
and strategic search behavior. Unemployed individuals respond to more generous
UI by significantly reducing job search effort. These findings relate to early work
by Barron and Mellow (1979), who report a negative relationship between UI
payments and the time devoted to job search. Moreover, the results correspond
to less direct evidence of moral hazard by Arni and Schiprowski (2015), who show
that externally imposed changes in search effort affect job seekers’ outcomes, and
Black et al. (2003), who demonstrate that individuals leave unemployment upon
receiving notice of required participation in reemployment services, i.e., in case
costs of unemployment increase.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides the theoretical foundation
of this study by highlighting expected changes in job search behavior in response
to an extension of the PBD. Section 4.3 offers a short overview about the key
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institutional characteristics of the German labor market and highlights the key
features of the reform of interest. Information on the dataset are presented in
Section 4.4, Section 4.5 provides the empirical model and details the underlying
identification strategy. The results of this analysis are presented in Section 4.6,
while Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Job search theory
According to the partial-equilibrium models of job search, increases in the PBD
should lower job search effort and increase reservation wages. The theoretical
framework by Schmieder et al. (2015) demonstrates the expected effects in a
discrete-time setting.
Risk-neutral workers are assumed to become unemployed in period t = 0 and
to maximize the present discounted value of income. They receive benefits bt and
choose search effort λt, which is normalized to reflect the probability of receiving
a job offer, in each period. Effort choices generate search costs ψ(λt), which are
assumed to be an increasing, convex and twice differentiable function of the search
effort applied. Constant UI benefits b are limited to P periods and replaced by an
indefinite second tier payment b thereafter (b < b), generating non-stationarity in
the spirit of Van den Berg (1990).
Jobs offer a wage w∗t that is drawn from a distribution with cumulative distri-
bution function F (w∗t ;µt), assumed to vary over the spell of nonemployment t; for
example, due to stigma effects. For simplicity, it is assumed that the distribution
can be summarized by its mean in period t: µt. In this case, w
∗
t = µt + ut, where
E[ut|t] = 0, such that ut reflect random draws from the distribution. If a job
is accepted, workers start at the beginning of the next period and are assumed
to indefinitely stay with their new job.4 Thus, the value of being employed, V e,
satisfies: V e(w∗) = 1
ρ
w∗, with ρ indicating the common subjective discount rate.
Given that V e(w∗) increases with w∗, the optimal search strategy of a job seeker
4 Van den Berg (1990) acknowledges potential criticism regarding this assumption as rejecting a
job offer may be suboptimal to accepting it and quitting immediately thereafter, given that the
latter case may result in a new spell of unemployment and thus extended benefits. However,
given legal boundaries prohibiting or punishing such behavior in reality, the validity of this
assumption seems justifiable.
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thus comprises choosing effort to generate contact and specifying a reservation
wage (φt) in each period such that all wage offers w
∗ ≥ φt are accepted. The
corresponding Bellman equation is then given as follows:
V ut = bt + max
λt
[
− ψ(λt) + 1
1 + ρ
V ut+1 +
λt
1 + ρ
∫
φ
∞
t
(
V e(w∗)− V ut+1
)
dFt(w
∗)
]
.
The environment is assumed to become stationary for t ≥ T : bt = b and Ft(w∗) =
FT (w
∗). This in turn implies that the optimal search strategy is constant for t ≥ T .
Using that V ut = V
u
T ∀ t ≥ T , φt = ρV ut holds true in stationarity. The optimal
reservation wage can then be deduced from the Bellman equation:
φT
ρ
= bT − ψ(λT ) + 1
1 + ρ
φT
ρ
+
λT
1 + ρ
∫
φ
∞
T
(1
ρ
w∗ − φT
ρ
)
dFT (w
∗)
φT = (1 + ρ)(bT − ψ(λT )) + λT
ρ
∫
φ
∞
T
(
w∗ − φT
)
dFT (w
∗). (4.2.1)
Optimal search intensity in stationarity is then obtained by differentiating equation
(4.2.1) with respect to λT , yielding:
ψ′(λT )(1 + ρ)ρ−
∫
φ
∞
T
(
w∗ − φT
)
dFT (w
∗) = 0. (4.2.2)
In the non-stationary segment (t < T ), it in turn holds true that φt = ρV
u
t+1.
Knowledge about φt and λt in period t, with the initial conditions resulting from
equations (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) in t = T , allows derivation of the job seeker’s optimal
strategy in non-stationarity for period t− 1:
φt−1
ρ
= bt − ψ(λt) + 1
1 + ρ
φt
ρ
+
λt
1 + ρ
∫
φ
∞
t
(1
ρ
w∗ − φt
ρ
)
dFt(w
∗)
(1 + ρ)φt−1 = (1 + ρ)ρ(bt − ψ(λt)) + φt + λt
∫
φ
∞
t
(w∗ − φt) dFt(w∗). (4.2.3)
Optimal search effort in period t−1 can then be deduced by differentiating equation
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(4.2.3) with respect to λt−1, which yields:
ρ(1 + ρ)ψ′(λt−1)−
∫
φ
∞
t−1
(w∗ − φt−1) dFt(w∗) = 0. (4.2.4)
Based on equation (4.2.3), it can then be shown that reservation wages increase
in response to an extension of the PBD,
dφt
dP
=
dV ut+1
dP
ρ > 0, (4.2.5)
in case there is some probability of remaining unemployed after the exhaustion
of the PBD, in which case an extension of the PBD will increase the value of
remaining unemployed in each period t ≤ P : dV ut+1
dP
> 0.
Using that
(1 + ρ)ρψ′(λt)−
∫
φ
∞
t
(w∗ − ρV ut+1) dFt(w∗) = 0, 5
it further follows that job search effort decreases in response to an increase in the
PBD in the case where
dV ut+1
dP
> 0 ∀ t ≤ P :
(1 + ρ)ρψ′′(λt)
dλt
dP
= −ρdV
u
t+1
dP
(
1− Ft(φt)
)
dλt
dP
= −dV
u
t+1
dP
1− Ft(φt)
(1 + ρ)ψ′′(λt)
< 0. (4.2.6)
According to the model, an extension of the PBD as given in the empirical setting
of this paper is thus expected to lower job search effort and to increase reservation
wages of the individuals concerned. In the empirical part of this paper, these two
hypotheses, i.e., relations (4.2.5) and (4.2.6), are tested.
4.3 The institutional setting
In Germany, all employees subject to social security contributions are covered by
UI and are entitled to receive unemployment benefits if having had contributed to
5 Note that this expression can be derived by differentiating equation (4.2.3) with respect to λt
and is equal to equation (4.2.4) in period t.
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UI for at least twelve months within the last two years preceding their job loss.
The duration of benefits is subject to the number of months employed within a
given time frame and increases with age. Monthly benefits amount to 60% (67%
for recipients with children) of the last net wage, which is capped at the upper
ceiling of the social security contributions, and payments are generally rescinded
for up to twelve weeks if workers terminate their job themselves, which lowers the
maximum benefit duration accordingly. Each recipient of unemployment bene-
fits is further obliged to actively search for a job and to be at the Employment
Service’s disposal, while failure to comply with these requirements may result in
benefit cuts.6 Individuals who are not entitled for or exhaust their unemployment
benefits may receive welfare benefits, which are granted for an unlimited period
and designed to assure living at subsistence level.
UI benefit extension for older workers in 2007 The extension of the PBD
for older workers was the result of an unexpected policy reform under the grand
coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU) and Social Democrats (SPD) in late 2007.
The remarkably rapid implementation of the reform proposal, uncertainty about
the design and scope of the reform until its public announcement, and its detached-
ness from the business cycle allows for the investigation of the effects of the PBD
on job search effort and reservation wages in absence of (the common challenges
of) avoidance behavior and endogenous policy bias. Below, the key features of this
reform are detailed.
Since their implementation in the early 2000s, the Social Democrats were heav-
ily divided about the evaluation of their large, structural reforms that had made
the German labor market much more flexible (Hartz IV, Agenda 2010, among
others) but had marked a significant shift in the party’s policy agenda, resulting
in electoral defeats and a challenge to the identity of the party. On October 1,
2007, the then acting party leader of the Social Democrats, Kurt Beck, marked
the party’s public turn from its (more) liberal policy by calling for an extension
of the PBD for older workers. The reform proposal was motivated on the grounds
of social injustice concerns – long periods of UI contributions were ought to be re-
6 Note that there is no general minimum number of applications required by law.
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warded by extended PBD7 – and was made during times of stable macro-economic
conditions (see Figure 4.8.1 in the Appendix).
The initial proposal was met with considerable skepticism, from politicians in
both the Christian Democratic and the Social Democratic parties. Disagreement
about the proposal, and hence uncertainty about the implementation of the sug-
gested reform, lasted for several weeks and raised rumors about the collapse of
the acting coalition. To ease the growing tensions8, both parties negotiated over
pending disputes in a coalition meeting on the night of November 12, and a gen-
eral decision in favor of an extension of the PBD was announced by the following
morning. However, details about the actual changes of the UI scheme did not
become public until December 11, 2007, when the corresponding law was issued
to parliament.
Ultimately, the reform affected those unemployed individuals aged 50 or above
who fulfilled the given entitlement criteria. PBD for workers aged 50 to 54 was
extended by twelve weeks (from 12 to 15 months) if having had contributed to
UI for at least 12 months within the last two years (eligibility constraint) and for
30 months within the last five years.9 Likewise, UI benefit duration was extended
from 18 to 24 months for all workers aged 58 or above if they had fulfilled the
eligibility constraint and had contributed to UI for at least four out of the last
five years. The reform also contained a transitional agreement which extended
the PBD for those respective workers who were unemployed prior to the reform,
fulfilled the entitlement criteria highlighted above and whose eligibility period was
not exhausted by December 31, 2007.10 The reform was passed by parliament on
January 26, 2008 and retroactively extended back to January 1, 2008. Table 4.8.1
in the Appendix outlines the relationship between the claimant’s age and length
7 The reform proposal followed claims of the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB), who
initially suggested the extension of the PBD for all workers aged 45 and above to up to 24
months.
8 The coalition also disagreed about other pending topics, such as the introduction of minimum
wages in the postal sector, for example.
9 Note that the reform extended the qualifying period from three to five years, too.
10 Hence, the reform subsequently extended the PBD for all eligible individuals who had become
unemployed before January 1, 2008 and were entitled to receive benefit payments on Decem-
ber 31, 2007 by three months (see §434r, SGB III). However, note that this only applied to
those individuals who fulfilled both criteria (above the respective age threshold and sufficient
contributions to UI) at the time of unemployment registration.
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of UI contributions and the PBD prior to (upper panel) and after the reform
(lower panel). However, as the data used in this analysis focuses on unemployed
individuals aged 16 to 54, this study exploits information about the reform for the
younger of the two age groups only.
4.4 Data
In order to investigate the consequences of this reform, the analysis in this paper
uses data from the IZA Evaluation Dataset Survey, which covers a large sample of
individuals registering as unemployed at the German Federal Employment Agency
between June 2007 and May 2008, i.e., prior to and after the reform (see Arni et al.
(2014) for details). Designed to allow for the investigation of active labor market
program (ALMP) effects, the dataset surveys prime-aged workers (aged 16 to 54)
who enter unemployment, search for reemployment opportunities and qualify for
participation in ALMPs. Individuals close to (early) retirement and all recipients
of welfare benefits, who are thus not entitled for participation in ALMPs, are in
turn not covered by the survey.
In order to obtain a representative sample of the unemployed population in
this survey and to account for seasonal effects over one year, a random sample of
unemployed individuals was drawn from the monthly unemployment inflow stat-
istics of the German Federal Employment Agency in each month between June
2007 and May 2008. In total, 17,396 individuals were first interviewed around two
months after becoming unemployed and were repeatedly questioned over time.
For the present analysis, the first wave of the survey is exploited, which provides
detailed information on individual job search behavior at the beginning of the
unemployment spell.
More precisely, the survey covers information on the number of applications,
the filing of applications that require moving and the reservation wage, i.e., the
indicated lowest wage rate at which an unemployed person would consider working.
This information is supplemented by a large set of variables on the respondents’
employment history, personal characteristics (e.g., the age, education or level of
professional training) and personality traits, such as the locus of control or the Big
Five. The data also include information on individuals’ supervision intensity by
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the local Employment Agencies (the number of agency visits or received job offers,
among others) and local labor market conditions, such as regional unemployment
and vacancy rates.
For the empirical analysis presented below, all individuals who are already
reemployed at the time of the first interview11 – around 25% of the observations
– or did not participate in the labor market are excluded.12 Descriptive statistics
for the estimation sample are provided in Table 4.8.2 in the Appendix.
4.5 Identification
The dataset allows observing the job search behavior of unemployed individuals
who were interviewed prior to or after the public announcement of the reform
and its details on December 11, 2007. Variation in the date of unemployment
registration, the policy reform and the date of the interview provide a clear quasi-
experimental setting to identify the effects of the PBD on job search effort.
Figure 4.5.1: Unemployment entry, interview date and expected benefit duration
06/2007 09/2007 11/2007 1/2008 03/2008 05/2008
Introduction of bill
IaUa IcUc IbUb
E[PBD]=12 months E[PBD]=15 months
Notes: The figure plots the setting of this analysis. For example, individuals i ∈ {a, b, c}
registered as unemployed at Ui and were interviewed at Ii. Expectations about the potential
benefit duration change on December 11, 2007; the day the bill was introduced to the parliament.
Figure 4.5.1 illustrates the setting of the analysis. Individual a registered as
unemployed (Ua) and was interviewed about her job search behavior (Ia) prior to
11 On average, the interview is conducted around eight weeks after the individuals’ unemployment
registration.
12 Note that both the probability of being reemployed at the time of the first interview as well as
the probability of participating in the labor market are not affected by the reform of interest.
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the reform, thus choosing her job search effort while expecting a PBD of twelve
months. In turn, individual b became unemployed and chose job search effort while
knowing about the extension of the PBD. For individual c, expectations about the
PBD were updated after unemployment registration but prior to the interview.
Some part of the relevant job search period was thus subject to the new PBD
regime, whereas initial job search effort was chosen while expecting a PBD of 12
months. The job search effort of individual c may thus have converged towards the
search effort level of individual b after the extension of the PBD became public.13
Based on this setting and in line with the empirical strategies pursued by
Kyyra¨ and Ollikainen (2008) as well as Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008), a simple
difference-in-differences strategy is applied to compare pre- and post-reform out-
comes. Unemployed workers aged 50 to 54, who were interviewed after the an-
nouncement of the reform and hence gained knowledge about the extension of the
PBD prior to choosing their job search behavior, constitute the treatment group.
Same-aged individuals interviewed prior to the introduction of the reform serve as
the comparison group.14 Unemployed workers aged 45 to 49, interviewed prior to
or after the reform, serve as control groups in order to account for any seasonal
aggregate effects.
Eligible individuals As highlighted before, benefit duration in Germany is sub-
ject to the claimant’s age and length of UI contributions within a given qualifying
period. The reform of interest thus changed the PBD for a subset of individu-
als aged 50 to 54 only. Individuals were entitled to extended PBD if having had
contributed to UI for at least 12 months within the last two years (eligibility
constraint) and for 30 months within the last five years (coverage constraint).
For the purpose of this analysis, all unemployed individuals that did not fulfill
the contribution criteria were thus excluded, irrespective of the claimant’s age.
Unfortunately, the present dataset provides information on the respondents’ last
employment period only, which limits the analysis to those claimants who have ful-
13 In the empirical analysis presented below, special attention is paid to those individuals whose
expectations about the PBD updated after unemployment registration but prior to the inter-
view.
14 Note that the comparison group is equivalent to the treatment group observations measured
pre-treatment.
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filled both entitlement criteria without any interrupting period of non-employment.
Compared to the entire eligible population, the individuals in this sample are thus
positively selected with regard to their labor market history given that the sampled
individuals were not subject to unemployment in the recent past. If the sampled
individuals responded differently with regard to this reform compared to the eli-
gible individuals not covered in the analysis, the estimates of this study may thus
not provide the true treatment effect for the entire eligible population.
In general, heterogeneous responses by these two groups may be due to con-
sequences and causes of prior unemployment experience. First, UI-induced moral
hazard may be less (more) pronounced among the group of those eligible indi-
viduals who have experienced unemployment prior to the current unemployment
spell if these individuals had encountered net (dis)utility from unemployment and
include past experiences in their current decision about job search effort. Second,
unobservable and observable differences between both groups may have caused
prior unemployment spells and could affect individuals’ responses with respect to
the reform of the PBD.
The analysis presented below, however, suggests that past unemployment ex-
perience does not affect current choices about job search effort. UI-induced moral
hazard is of similar magnitude for those individuals in the sample who have been
unemployed prior to the current spell and those who have not. Evidence of more
pronounced UI-induced moral hazard among the low- and medium-skilled com-
pared to the high-skilled unemployed further implies that the sample may under-
estimate the overall treatment effect for the entire eligible population if the covered
sample is positively selected on skills.
Empirical model and identification The present setting allows for testing the
two hypotheses of the job search model presented in Section 4.2. Using difference-
in-differences techniques, it is tested whether an extension in the PBD lowers the
job search effort (cf. equation (4.2.6)) and increases the reservation wage (cf. equa-
tion (4.2.5)) of the individuals concerned. The underlying empirical specification
reads as follows:
yi = α + βTi + γAi + δ(Ti × Ai) +X ′iρ+ εi, (4.5.1)
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with the dependent variable yi indicating measures of job search effort or the
reservation wage of individual i, Ti being a dummy variable indicating whether
the individual was interviewed after the reform, and Ai indicating whether the
individual is aged between 50 to 54. The treatment effect is given by δ, X ′i defines
a vector of control variables and εi the error term.
Identification of the model rests upon the assumptions that (i) no observable or
unobservable individual characteristics determined the allocation to the treatment
or comparison group and (ii) potential changes in labor market conditions over the
sampling period affected treatment and control groups to an equal extent. Put
more precisely, except for differences in knowledge about the reform due to the
timing of being interviewed/becoming unemployed, the comparison group should
be highly similar to the treatment group. Moreover, changes in business cycle con-
ditions should not have had asymmetric effects on treatment and control groups.
The remainder of this section aims at validating these identifying assumptions.
Voluntary quits and strategic layoffs In order for the identifying assump-
tions to hold, layoffs have to be exogenous from the individual’s perspective. As
some workers may, however, potentially opt to become unemployed in response to
the extension of the PBD, the treatment group may be self-selected in this respect.
To account for potential selection, all workers that voluntarily quit their job or be-
came unemployed by mutual agreement are therefore excluded from the sample.
Excluding these individuals from the analysis further accounts for the fact that
payments of UI can be suspended for up to twelve weeks if workers voluntarily opt
out of employment, which lowers the PBD accordingly.
Strategic layoff decisions by firms may further violate the identifying assump-
tion. If firms deliberately suspend dismissals of older workers (aged 50 or above)
to allow for a longer PBD, allocation into the treatment and comparison group
would be non-random. Due to the fast implementation of the reform, adaptive
behavior of firms is highly unlikely, and strict dismissal laws impede strategic tim-
ing of layoffs in Germany. However, as a robustness check, the analysis is further
limited to layoffs where strategic timing of terminations can be ruled out, focusing
on those workers who became unemployed either due to plant closings or the expir-
ation of a temporary contact. As detailed below, the results of the analysis remain
CHAPTER 4. 127
unaffected in the cases where the analysis is limited to the respective subgroups.
Concurrent ALMP reforms Estimates would be biased if simultaneous re-
forms had occurred that asymmetrically affected treatment, comparison and con-
trol groups. Concurrent with the extension of the PBD, the government did indeed
introduce labor market integration vouchers (Eingliederungsgutscheine). In brief,
these vouchers slightly modified eligibility criteria for unemployed individuals aged
50 or above so that they could receive employment integration subsidies (Einglie-
derungszuschu¨sse). These subsidies have long been used as an ALMP instrument
in Germany, and all unemployed individuals are allowed to file for integration
subsidies in general. Approval, duration as well as the amount of the subsidy
are subject to the discretion of the local Employment Agency and are dependent
upon applicants’ work productivity limitations, with the scope and availability of
integration subsidies being extended for individuals aged 50 or above (since May
2007).
The existence of integration vouchers and extended subsidies for the unem-
ployed aged 50 or above should, however, not impede the causal interpretation of
the findings in this analysis. Given that all unemployed individuals in the treat-
ment and the comparison group were potentially eligible for extended subsidies in
general, potential effects arising from these subsidies should be captured by the
parameter of the age group dummy and therefore not affect the treatment effect
of interest. Moreover, the slight modifications in the eligibility criteria for sub-
sidies invoked by the introduction of the integration voucher as of January 1, 2008
only had a marginal, negligible effect on take up rates. In 2008, the Federal Em-
ployment Agency granted 3,000 vouchers only, compared to more than 1.5 million
ALMP measures in total (Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency).15
Observable characteristics by age group and interview period As high-
lighted above, besides differences in knowledge about the reform and the timing
of becoming unemployed, the comparison and treatment group should be highly
15 By April 2012, the voucher program was stopped. Over the course of its existence, a total
of around 20,000 vouchers had been issued. The total number of subsidies granted was quite
constant over the period of interest. Figure 4.8.2 in the Appendix shows the annual number of
subsidies granted from 2006 to 2010.
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similar in observable characteristics. Moreover, labor market conditions should
be either constant over time or change to an equal extent for the treatment and
control group. The IZA Evaluation dataset allows for extensive testing of both
identifying assumptions. Table 4.5.1 shows (differences in) mean characteristics
by age groups and within the treatment and control group prior to and after the
reform.
Columns (1) to (3) show means for the two age groups and the results of
a simple t-test (p-values) on the equality of the means for a large set of vari-
ables. Besides expected differences in age, it becomes apparent that both groups
of individuals are not systematically different from each other. On average, indi-
viduals from both groups are married, completed an apprenticeship and generated
a monthly net labor income of around 1,400 euros prior to unemployment, for
example. Evaluated at the mean, both groups of workers come from comparable
regions across Germany, with differences in local unemployment and vacancy rates
being small and insignificant. Moreover, the individuals in both groups received
equal supervision by local Federal Employment Agencies, for example, by means
of the number of agency visits or job offers. Lastly, both groups are similar with
respect to personality traits, measured by means of individuals’ locus of control,
extroversion or openness, among others.
It is further tested whether mean characteristics within one age group differ
before and after the reform. Columns (4) to (9) show the corresponding results.
Both of the two control groups as well as comparison and treatment group are
highly similar in terms of observable personal characteristics. Most importantly,
the comparison and treatment group neither differ in terms of personal character-
istics nor personality traits when being compared at the mean. The only notable
exception is the share of respondents that has been unemployed prior to this cur-
rent spell, which is higher in both the control and treatment group after the reform
but only significantly different in the latter group.
When focusing on regional characteristics and individual ALMP measures, dif-
ferences in some variables become apparent. However, changes over time occur for
both age cohorts symmetrically and to a similar extent. In detail, the data sug-
gest local active labor market intensity, measured by means of the share of ALMP
participants over the number of total unemployed individuals, to be higher after
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the reform, yet for both treatment and control group. Local unemployment rates,
in turn, remain constant. The same pattern applies to individual-level measures
of support by the local Federal Employment Agencies. On average, the number of
visits at the local agency is slightly lower after the reform. These small difference
may, however, be explained by the fact that the mean number of weeks elapsed
between the individuals’ unemployment registration and the interview decreased
for both age groups from nine weeks prior to the reform to seven weeks afterwards.
Against the background of these similarities, it is further investigated whether
treatment and control group would have followed the same trend in the outcome
variables over time absent treatment. In order to investigate this identifying as-
sumption, respondents are grouped according to their interview date and trends in
the average job search intensity and the reservation wage are compared between
treatment and control group.16 For example, Figure 4.5.2 visualizes the mean
number of applications for the treatment and control group over the course of the
survey period.17 First, the graph provides evidence in favor of a common trend
for both groups absent the treatment. Average job search intensity is higher for
the treatment than for the control group (cf. Table 4.5.1), but trends are highly
similar for both groups prior to the reform. The same applies to our two other
outcomes of interest (see Panels (a) of Figures 4.8.4 and 4.8.5).18
In addition to the visual evidence in favor of a common trend prior to the
reform, Figure 4.5.2 also provides insights about the treatment effect of the reform.
While the mean number of job applications increases slightly for the control group
after the reform, mean job applications for the treated unemployed significantly
decrease. As indicated in Panel (a) of Figure 4.8.4 in the Appendix, the same result
is found for the second measure of job search effort, the probability of applying
for a job in distant areas. In contrast, reservation wages for both the control and
16 Recall that the underlying dataset is based on monthly-drawn random samples from the
unemployment inflow statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency over the course
of one year, such that interview dates vary for the respondents in the treatment and control
groups.
17 The corresponding figures for the two other outcomes of interest are provided in the Appendix
of this paper (see Panels (a) of Figures 4.8.4, 4.8.5)
18 Panels (b) of Figures 4.8.3, 4.8.4 and 4.8.5 in the Appendix further demonstrate that this result
holds true when controlling for differences in observable characteristics for the respondents
covered in each of the three periods prior to treatment.
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Figure 4.5.2: Trends in the number of job applications
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Notes: The graph plots variation in the mean number of job applications for treatment and
control group over the survey period.
treatment group remain rather constant after the reform (see Figure 4.8.5).
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Baseline estimates
Table 4.6.1 provides the corresponding treatment effect estimates for the three
outcomes of interest, the number of filed applications, the probability of applying
for jobs that require moving and the reservation wage.
Column (1) of Panel A shows that the PBD has a negative and significant effect
on the total number of applications. In this very simple model, the average number
of filed applications drops by around 40% of a standard deviation in response to
the reform. In columns (2) to (5), control variables are successively added to the
model to check the robustness of this result. Adding personal characteristics, such
as the individuals’ gender, level of training or last wage prior to unemployment
hardly changes the treatment effect (see Column (2)). The same conclusions arise
when adding individual-level controls of ALMP intensity (Column (3)), or regional
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controls of the labor market to the model (Column (4)). As it has been shown
that personality traits may affect job search behavior (Caliendo et al., 2015), in-
formation on individuals’ personality traits are added in the most comprehensive
specification. As displayed in Column (5), accounting for these variables, however,
hardly affects the estimate.
Panel B of Table 4.6.1 presents the corresponding results when focusing on the
probability of applying for jobs that require moving as the outcome variable of
interest. The estimates show a statistically significant and robust negative effect
of the PBD on the probability of applying for a job that requires moving. From
the results of the simple model presented in Column (1), it can be inferred that
the probability decreases by around 20% in response to the reform. In line with
the results of Panel A, the effect is very robust with respect to the inclusion of
additional covariates. Estimates of the treatment effect provided in Columns (2)
to (5) do not change much when successively adding controls. Thus, the results
for the two distinct measures of job search effort verify the prediction of the job
search model presented in Section 4.2: an increase in the PBD lowers individual
job search effort (cf. equation (4.2.6)).
The estimates presented in Panel C in turn provide no evidence in favor of
higher reservation wages due to the increase in the PBD. The estimated treatment
effect from the simple model presented in Column (1) is close to zero and statist-
ically insignificant. This holds true when successively adding control variables to
the model. While this result is thus in contrast to the prediction of the job search
model presented before (cf. equation (4.2.5)), it is still in line with recent evidence
by Krueger and Mueller (2014) and Schmieder et al. (2015), who show that reser-
vation wages respond little over the spell of unemployment and with respect to
changes in UI parameters. For example, because job seekers may potentially “an-
chor their reservation wage on their previous wage” (Krueger and Mueller, 2014,
p.31). Overall, the moderate increase in the PBD is thus found to lower job search
effort but keeps reservation wages unaffected.
Adjustment of job search behavior Due to the setup of the reform, the
treatment group comprises a subset of individuals who learned about the reform
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Table 4.6.1: The effects of benefit duration on job search
Panel A – Number of job applications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Date of Reform 3.638 6.410∗∗ 6.969∗∗ 7.419∗∗∗ 7.467∗∗∗
(2.685) (2.804) (2.874) (2.863) (2.790)
Age Group Dummy 8.996∗∗ 5.945 6.898 7.885∗ 6.702
(3.699) (4.712) (4.484) (4.628) (4.793)
Treatment Effect -11.199∗∗ -10.766∗∗ -12.628∗∗∗ -12.914∗∗∗ -12.021∗∗∗
(4.528) (4.456) (4.818) (4.786) (4.606)
Adjusted-R2 0.005 0.044 0.125 0.134 0.151
Panel B – Distant applications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Date of Reform 0.071∗ 0.084∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.077 0.072
(0.040) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Age Group Dummy 0.144∗∗ 0.185∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.194∗∗
(0.057) (0.079) (0.079) (0.081) (0.080)
Treatment Effect -0.205∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065)
Adjusted-R2 0.013 0.152 0.155 0.146 0.151
Panel C – (Log) reservation wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Date of Reform -0.017 0.008 0.011 -0.002 -0.002
(0.061) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Age Group Dummy -0.013 0.065 0.057 0.039 0.046
(0.080) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Treatment Effect 0.022 -0.027 -0.027 -0.022 -0.020
(0.092) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Adjusted-R2 -0.005 0.707 0.710 0.709 0.710
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ALMP measures No No Yes Yes Yes
Regional controls No No No Yes Yes
Personality traits No No No No Yes
Number of observations 598 598 598 598 598
Notes: The table provides the baseline results of the analysis based on equation (4.5.1). Standard
errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.6.2: Benefit duration & the number of applications: treatment duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Date of Reform 3.780 9.152∗∗∗ 3.780 8.304∗∗∗ 7.413 11.060 ∗∗
(2.968) (3.350) (2.971) (3.161) (6.268) (4.801)
Age Group Dummy 9.585∗∗∗ 5.306 9.585∗∗∗ 7.387 9.602∗∗∗ 7.975 ∗
(3.701) (4.645) (3.705) (4.759) (3.699) (4.677)
Treatment Effect -12.555∗∗∗ -13.000∗∗∗ -12.555∗∗∗ -12.377 ∗∗
(4.802) (4.931) (4.807) (4.806)
× UE after reform 3.674 -0.879
(5.578) (5.048)
... interview Dec-Jan -10.539 ∗∗ -12.247∗∗∗
(4.541) (4.495)
... interview Feb-Apr -14.900∗∗∗ -13.813∗∗∗
(5.421) (5.286)
... interview May-Jun -12.250 -12.781 ∗
(7.792) (7.444)
Adjusted-R2 0.008 0.171 0.006 0.150 -0.000 0.152
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ALMP measures No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Personality traits No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 505 505 598 598 598 598
Notes: The table shows the regression results of equation (4.5.1), focusing on differential effects
due to the timing/duration of the treatment. The dependent variable is the number of applica-
tions. In Columns (1) and (2), all individuals who became unemployed prior to the reform but
were interviewed thereafter are dropped. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity
robust. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
after registering as unemployed but prior to the interview.19 These individuals
therefore started their initial job search while expecting a PBD of 12 months but
learned about the reform during the relevant search spell. In this section, it is
hence tested whether there are different treatment effects for the fully and partly
treated individuals. It is further tested whether the treatment effect remains stable
over the survey period by allowing for different treatment effects from December
11 to January, February to April and May to June.
In a first step, all individuals who learned about the reform after unemployment
registration but prior to the interview were dropped from the sample. Columns
19 Note that this group accounts for around 15% of the sample.
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(1) and (2) of Table 4.6.2 indicate that the estimated effect remains virtually un-
changed when using the reduced sample. In line with this result, columns (3) and
(4) further show no evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects for the partly and
fully treated. While the treatment effect may certainly depend on the relative
time period between entry into unemployment, the reform and the interview date,
a small sample size unfortunately precludes further analysis of this potential het-
erogeneity. Columns (5) and (6) in turn indicate that treatment effects do not
differ with respect to the interview date, which corroborates the baseline findings
and evidence in favor of UI-induced moral hazard.
4.6.2 Sensitivity of results and heterogeneous effects
The following section investigates the sensitivity of the previous results and tests
for heterogeneous treatment effects. Sensitivity of the results is studied by (i)
accounting for adaptive behavior, (ii) assessing potential biases due to strategic
layoff decisions of firms, and (iii) testing the unconfoundedness assumption by
means of a pseudo treatment test. Moreover, heterogeneous treatment effects for
particular subgroups of the unemployed are provided to analyze the extent of UI-
induced moral hazard for males and females, different skill groups and individuals
with and without prior unemployment experience.
Salience of the reform The fast implementation of the policy reform limits the
potential of adaptive behavior. Knowledge about important aspect of the reform,
such as the reform’s date of inception and its retroactive implementation, only
became public on December 11, 2007. In conjunction with exact knowledge about
the interview date, this allows for the precise definition of treatment and control
groups. However, as a general agreement about the reform was already reached by
November 12, 2007, adaptive behavior to this news cannot be entirely ruled out.
Although early adaption to the reform would blur the control group and would
bias estimates towards zero, given that the control and treatment group would be
more similar, the sensitivity of the results is tested when redefining treatment and
control groups by November 12, 2007. Table 4.8.4 in the Appendix provides the
corresponding results for the three outcomes of interest, obtained from the most
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simple and most comprehensive version of the empirical model. The estimates
highlight that all qualitative results of the analysis remain robust to the redefinition
of the reform’s date.20
Strategic timing of layoffs As highlighted above, strategic timing of layoffs
may impede the causal interpretation of the findings provided. Although strict em-
ployment protection laws in Germany limit the scope for strategic firing decisions
of firms21, the robustness of the findings is tested by limiting the analysis to those
individuals who became unemployed due to plant closure, the termination of a
temporary contract and alike. Although the number of observations decreases sig-
nificantly, the results presented in Table 4.8.5 demonstrate that estimates remain
robust to this constraint.
Pseudo treatment Identification of the underlying model further relies on the
assumption that individuals are randomly assigned to treatment and control group
and are similar in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics. While
observable characteristics are indeed similar among treatment, comparison and
control groups (cf. Table 4.5.1), unobservable variables may still violate the un-
confoundedness assumption. Following Rosenbaum (1987), this assumption is in-
directly tested by estimating the causal effect of the treatment for two groups of
individuals that were unaffected by the reform (workers aged 40 to 44 and 45 to
49, respectively); with one of the two groups (the older age group) being arbitrar-
ily considered as pseudo-treated. No evidence of any pseudo treatment effect on
the outcomes would strengthen the claim of unconfoundedness. Table 4.8.6 shows
support for the identifying assumption, given that pseudo-treatment effects for all
three measures of job search effort are small and statistically insignificant.22
20 However, point estimates are smaller and less precisely estimated, which suggest that the
reform’s date in the baseline regressions is correctly chosen.
21 Dismissal of regular workers is subject to a variety of legal regulations. Advanced notice
of layoff is required by law, with the period of notice increasing with workers’ tenure (§622,
German Civil Code). Additional rules (Ku¨ndigungsschutzgesetz ) apply for plants that employ
at least ten full-time equivalent workers. Rates of job destruction and creation mirror these
legislative features of the German labor market: job and worker flow rates are around 50%
lower than in the US (Bachmann et al., 2013).
22 Note that, except for the mean age, both groups are highly similar with regard to observable
characteristics. The corresponding descriptive statistics are available upon request.
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Heterogeneous treatment effects Lastly, the presence of heterogeneous treat-
ment effects is investigated, focusing on differential effects by gender, skill and prior
unemployment experience. Estimates of the treatment effect on the number of job
applications are provided for the most simple and most comprehensive specifica-
tion, respectively. Corresponding results for the probability of applying for jobs
that require moving are provided in Table 4.8.7 in the Appendix of the paper.
Table 4.6.3: Benefit duration & the number of applications: heterogeneous effects
Dep. Var.: Job applications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Date of Reform 3.363 7.419∗∗∗ 4.818∗ 7.316∗∗∗ 3.854 7.468∗∗∗
(2.770) (2.783) (2.866) (2.776) (2.830) (2.795)
Age Group Dummy 8.992∗∗ 6.633 8.622∗∗ 6.649 8.751∗∗ 6.686
(3.697) (4.779) (3.642) (4.814) (3.810) (5.003)
Treatment × Female -12.228∗∗∗ -11.560∗∗∗
(4.558) (4.109)
Treatment × Male -9.578∗ -12.568∗∗
(5.543) (6.179)
Treatment × Low-Skilled -11.900∗∗ -11.200∗
(4.772) (5.771)
Treatment × Medium-Skilled -13.374∗∗∗ -14.178∗∗∗
(4.620) (4.667)
Treatment × High-Skilled -1.546 -2.964
(8.410) (8.566)
Treatment × Not UE before -13.286∗∗ -12.100∗
(5.907) (6.341)
Treatment × UE before -9.787∗∗ -11.975∗∗
(4.676) (4.677)
Adjusted-R2 0.008 0.150 0.017 0.154 0.004 0.150
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ALMP measures No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Personality traits No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 598 598 598 598 598 598
Notes: The table shows the regression results of equation (4.5.1), allowing for heterogeneous
treatment effects by (a) gender, (b) education, and (c) prior unemployment experience. The
dependent variable is the number of applications. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteros-
cedasticity robust. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.6.3 show that both females and males respond
similarly to the extension of the PBD. The number of filed job applications de-
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creases by around 9 and 7 applications, respectively. When focusing on individuals’
skills (see Columns (3) and (4)), treatment effects are strong and significant for
low- and medium-skilled workers but insignificant and small for the high-skilled,
suggesting that UI-induced moral hazard is absent for those individuals who have
invested more time and resources in their education.23 Finally, when testing for
heterogeneous effects by prior unemployment experience, the estimates provide
no evidence that the previously unemployed react differently to the reform. The
treatment effect is of similar magnitude for both types of individuals, which in
turn suggests that potential biases due to the study’s limitation on unemployed
individuals who fulfilled both entitlement criteria without any interruption should
be small (cf. Section 4.5).
4.7 Conclusion
To date, a large empirical literature has established that UI generosity significantly
affects the duration of nonemployment. While this finding is usually attributed
to UI-induced moral hazard, empirical evidence on the assumed relationship is
scarce. Using quasi-experimental variation in the PBD for one specific age group
of workers in Germany paired with direct information on the job search behavior of
unemployed individuals, this paper complements the existing evidence by provid-
ing causal estimates of the effect of the PBD on job search effort and reservation
wages.
The results of this analysis lend considerable support to the existence of UI-
induced moral hazard, with the extension of the PBD leading to a considerable
decrease in job search effort measured by the number of filed applications and the
probability of applying for jobs that require moving. In line with recent evidence
(see, among others, Krueger and Mueller (2014) and Schmieder et al. (2015))
but in contrast to standard job search theory, reservation wages, however, remain
unaffected by the reform.
Overall, the study provides comprehensive evidence of strategic search beha-
23 Note that low-skilled individuals have not completed any form of occupational training (∼8%),
medium-skilled individuals have completed some form of apprenticeship (∼74%), and high-
skilled unemployed hold some kind of college or university degree (∼18%).
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vior. Unemployed individuals respond to more generous UI by reducing search
effort, which highlights the trade-off faced by policy makers when designing UI
schemes. While UI should allow individuals to actively search for suitable reem-
ployment, disincentive effects arising from too generous UI should also be avoided
in turn. Based on the findings of this study, future research might aim at estim-
ating effort choices and reemployment probabilities due to changes in UI in one
integrated framework.
4.8 Appendix
Table 4.8.1: Claimants’ age, length of UI contributions and PBD
Before January 1 2008
Period of UI contribution (months) 12 16 20 24 30 36
& Age of eligible person .. or above 55 55
Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) 6 8 10 12 15 18
Since January 1 2008
Period of UI contribution (months) 12 16 20 24 30 36 48
& Age of eligible person .. or above 50 55 58
Potential Benefit Duration (PBD) 6 8 10 12 15 18 24
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the claimant’s age, length of UI contributions
and the potential benefit duration. Note that prior to the reform, the qualifying period de-
termining the length of coverage was three years. It was extended to five years by January 1,
2008.
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Figure 4.8.1: (Seasonal-adjusted) unemployment rate (2006–2010)
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Notes: The graph plots monthly (seasonal-adjusted) unemployment rates from January 2006
to December 2010 for Germany. The data are provided by the German Federal Employment
Agency.
Figure 4.8.2: Number of granted employment integration subsidies (2006–2010)
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Notes: The graph plots the annual number of granted employment integration subsidies. The
data are provided by the German Federal Employment Agency.
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Table 4.8.2: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample
Mean Std Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
Dependent variables
Number of filed applications 16.07 26.82 0.00 400.00 598
Applying for distant jobs 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 598
Log reservation wage 7.00 0.47 5.30 8.99 559
Personal characteristics
Age 49.72 3.00 45.00 55.17 598
Male (no/yes) 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 598
Education 3.74 1.50 0.00 7.00 598
Skill level 2.10 0.50 1.00 3.00 598
Last log wage 7.08 0.56 5.08 9.21 598
Unemployed Before 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 598
Regional characteristics
Local unemployment rate 9.23 3.93 3.00 17.00 598
Local ALMP intensity 15.99 5.60 7.00 30.00 598
State of residence 8.22 4.07 1.00 16.00 598
Individual ALMP measures
Number of agency job offers 1.86 3.00 0.00 25.00 598
Number of agency visits 1.74 0.70 0.00 4.00 598
Personality traits
Internal locus of control 5.90 0.94 1.33 7.00 598
Consciousness 6.33 0.94 1.00 7.00 598
Openness 4.93 1.25 1.00 7.00 598
Extraversion 5.01 1.06 1.00 7.00 598
Neuroticism 3.84 1.20 1.00 7.00 598
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics for the underlying estimation sample. The
number of observations is 598, except for the reservation wage (N=559).
Figure 4.8.3: Trends in the number of job applications
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the variation in the mean number of job applications for treatment
and control group over the survey period. Panel (b) plots the variation in predicted means,
controlling for differences in observable characteristics across groups, over the same period.
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Figure 4.8.4: Trends in the probability of distant applications
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the variation in the mean probability of applying for distant jobs for
treatment and control group over the survey period. Panel (b) plots the variation in predicted
means, controlling for differences in observable characteristics across groups, over the same
period.
Figure 4.8.5: Trends in the reservation wage
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the variation in the mean reservation wage for treatment and control
group over the survey period. Panel (b) plots the variation in predicted means, controlling for
differences in observable characteristics across groups, over the same period.
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Table 4.8.3: Benefit duration & applying for distant jobs: treatment duration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Date of Reform 0.067 0.072 0.067 0.068 0.096 0.100
(0.043) (0.055) (0.043) (0.053) (0.070) (0.072)
Age Group Dummy 0.131 ∗∗ 0.186 ∗∗ 0.131 ∗∗ 0.177 ∗∗ 0.131 ∗∗ 0.179 ∗∗
(0.058) (0.087) (0.058) (0.081) (0.058) (0.081)
Treatment Effect -0.192∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.067)
× UE after reform 0.029 0.038
(0.083) (0.086)
... interview Dec-Jan -0.150 ∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.072)
... interview Feb-Apr -0.184 ∗ -0.182 ∗
(0.097) (0.093)
... interview May-Jul -0.242∗∗∗ -0.217 ∗∗
(0.083) (0.084)
Adjusted-R2 0.011 0.150 0.006 0.144 0.003 0.139
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ALMP measures No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Personality traits No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 505 505 598 598 598 598
Notes: The table shows the regression results of equation (4.5.1), focusing on differential effects
due to the timing/duration of the treatment. The dependent variable indicates whether indi-
viduals apply for jobs that require moving. In Columns (1) and (2), all individuals who became
unemployed prior to the reform but were interviewed thereafter are dropped. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8.4: Benefit duration & job search: salience of reform
Job applications Distant applications Reservation wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Date of Reform 4.291 7.213∗∗∗ 0.070 0.051 -0.026 -0.023
(2.626) (2.611) (0.044) (0.046) (0.069) (0.039)
Age Group Dummy 9.364∗∗∗ 4.339 0.150∗∗ 0.172 ∗ 0.026 0.048
(3.467) (5.298) (0.068) (0.091) (0.093) (0.059)
Treatment Effect -10.399 ∗∗ -7.996 ∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.177∗∗ -0.029 -0.025
(4.311) (4.191) (0.075) (0.075) (0.103) (0.054)
Adjusted-R2 0.001 0.146 0.007 0.141 -0.004 0.711
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ALMP measures No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Personality traits No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 598 598 598 598 559 559
Notes: The table shows the regression results of equation (4.5.1) when defining treatment and
control groups by November 12, 2007. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity
robust. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4.8.5: Benefit duration & job search: accounting for selective layoffs
Job applications Distant applications Reservation wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Date of Reform 8.148 13.306∗ 0.095 0.205∗∗ -0.034 0.006
(6.112) (7.046) (0.069) (0.089) (0.101) (0.075)
Age Group Dummy 3.206 3.888 0.063 0.335∗∗ -0.066 0.012
(2.557) (7.978) (0.088) (0.134) (0.141) (0.111)
Treatment Effect -10.714 -19.745∗ -0.206∗∗ -0.260∗∗ 0.097 0.008
(6.587) (10.082) (0.102) (0.110) (0.160) (0.108)
Adjusted-R2 -0.002 0.331 0.024 0.136 -0.014 0.610
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ALMP measures No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Personality traits No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 200 200 200 200 190 190
Notes: The table shows the regression results of equation (4.5.1) when reducing the scope of
strategic firm behavior. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8.6: Benefit duration & job search: pseudo treatment effects
Job applications Distant applications Reservation wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Date of Reform -0.880 1.205 0.057 0.053 -0.044 -0.052
(2.354) (2.230) (0.045) (0.044) (0.058) (0.041)
Age Group Dummy -1.303 -5.634 -0.026 -0.066 -0.014 -0.012
(2.646) (4.000) (0.049) (0.068) (0.072) (0.053)
Pseudo Treatment 3.621 4.597 0.009 0.025 0.018 0.047
(3.129) (3.193) (0.061) (0.058) (0.085) (0.048)
Adjusted-R2 -0.001 0.113 0.002 0.140 -0.004 0.716
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ALMP measures No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Personality traits No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 639 639 639 639 595 595
Notes: The table shows the regression results of equation (4.5.1) when focusing on two groups
of workers who were unaffected by the reform. Standard errors (in parentheses) are heterosce-
dasticity robust. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8.7: Benefit duration & applying for distant jobs: heterogeneous effects
Dep. Var.: Distant Applications (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Date of Reform 0.061 0.073 0.098∗∗ 0.072 0.076∗ 0.072
(0.040) (0.047) (0.041) (0.047) (0.039) (0.047)
Age Group Dummy 0.144∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.193∗∗
(0.057) (0.080) (0.058) (0.080) (0.058) (0.081)
Treatment X Female -0.199∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.068)
Treatment X Male -0.203∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.075)
Treatment X Low-Skilled -0.307∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.098)
Treatment X Medium-Skilled -0.190∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.065)
Treatment X High-Skilled -0.189∗ -0.204∗
(0.113) (0.111)
Treatment X Not UE before -0.224∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.074)
Treatment X UE before -0.188∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.071)
Adjusted-R2 0.031 0.149 0.077 0.148 0.019 0.149
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
ALMP measures No Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Personality traits No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 598 598 598 598 598 598
Notes: The table shows the regression results of equation (4.5.1), allowing for heterogeneous
treatment effects by (a) gender, (b) education, and (c) prior unemployment experience. The
dependent variable indicates whether individuals apply for jobs that require moving. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 5
The Economic Costs of Mass
Surveillance∗
5.1 Introduction
Millions of individuals are or have been spied upon by their own government.
According to the Democracy Index 2012, published by the Economist Intelligence
Unit, 37 percent of the world population lives in authoritarian states. A key
feature of these regimes is the aim to control all aspects of public and private life
at all times. For this purpose, large-scale surveillance systems are installed that
constantly monitor societal interactions, identify and silence political opponents,
and establish a system of obedience by instilling fear (Arendt, 1951).1 A large
and growing literature suggests that such environments of distrust should exhibit
adverse economic effects (Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).
Spying is likely to destroy interpersonal and institutional trust, i.e., social capital.
As all economic transactions in turn involve an element of trust between trading
∗ This chapter circulates as “The Economic Costs of Mass Surveillance: Evidence from Stasi
Spying in East Germany”, see Lichter et al. (2015).
1 We acknowledge that democratic countries usually spy on their populations as well. Thus, it is
obvious that there is no clear line between democracies and authoritarian states in this respect.
In this paper, we are interested in the effect of surveillance on economic performance and leave
definitional discussions aside. This also concerns the lively debate in political science on how
to precisely define and distinguish different forms of authoritarian regimes, such as totalitarian,
despotic or tyrannic systems.
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partners (Arrow, 1972; Putnam, 1995), government surveillance should exhibit
adverse economic effects.
Despite the prevalence of surveillance systems around the world, there is no
empirical evidence on the effect of spying on economic performance. This is most
likely due to the fact that it is challenging to establish a credible research design.
The empirical challenge is to find random variation in surveillance intensities while
keeping other policies affecting trust and economic performance constant. The
common trend requirement with regard to other policies makes cross-country set-
tings basically inviable as isolating the effect of spying from the authoritarian policy
mix seems impossible. For credible single-country research designs, two conditions
have to be met: (i) there should be observable variation in surveillance density
(regionally or over time) and (ii) the variation in the intensity of the treatment
has to have at least a random component.
In this paper, we aim to overcome these empirical challenges and estimate the
effect of state surveillance on social capital and economic performance by using
official data on the regional number of spies in the former socialist German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR). We argue that the surveillance system implemented by
the GDR regime from 1950 to 1990 was a setting that fulfills both conditions for a
valid research design. The official state security service of the GDR, the Ministry
for State Security (Ministerium fu¨r Staatssicherheit), commonly referred to as the
Stasi, administered a huge network of spies called “unofficial collaborators” (In-
formelle Mitarbeiter, IM). These spies were ordinary people, recruited to secretly
collect information on any societal interaction in their daily life that could be of
interest to the regime. We use the substantial regional variation in the intensity
of spying across GDR counties (Kreise) to estimate the effect of surveillance on
long-term post-regime outcomes of social capital and economic performance, meas-
ured in the 1990s and 2000s, i.e., after the fall of the Iron Curtain and Germany’s
reunification.2
2 An earlier study by Jacob and Tyrell (2010), and a recent paper by Friehe et al. (2015),
which has been conducted simultaneously to and independently of our study, present cross-
sectional OLS regressions showing that Stasi spying is negatively associated with some measures
of personality traits and social capital – assuming the regional spy density to be random. We
demonstrate below that the number of Stasi spies in a county was to a large part driven by
state-level decisions and county characteristics.
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Given that condition (i) is fulfilled, the remaining challenge for identification
is to establish exogenous variation in the intensity of spying. Although historians
and scholars from related disciplines have not yet identified an obvious regional
allocation pattern of spies, it is a priori unlikely that the spy allocation was purely
random. While we demonstrate that endogeneity is likely to drive estimates to-
wards zero, yielding a lower bound, we implement two different research designs
to overcome doubts on identification.3
The first design exploits the specific territorial-administrative structure of the
secret security service. County offices of the Stasi were subordinate to the respect-
ive state (Bezirk) office and each state office in turn bore full responsibility to
secure its territory, leading different state offices to administer different average
levels of spy densities. Indeed, around 25% of the variation in the spy density at
the county level can be explained with state fixed effects. We use the resulting
discontinuities along state borders as the source of exogenous variation and limit
our analysis to all contiguous county pairs that straddle a GDR state border (see
Dube et al., 2010, for an application of this identification strategy in the case of
minimum wages). Hence, identification comes from different intensities of spying,
induced by different state surveillance strategies, within county pairs on either
side of a state border. The identifying assumption is that border pair counties are
similar in all other respects; we carefully test this assumption. An advantageous
feature of our border discontinuity setting is that many of the GDR state borders
do not exist anymore as GDR states were merged into much larger federal states
after reunification. Indeed, around fifty percent of the counties straddling a former
GDR state border in our sample are nowadays part of the same federal state.
For our second identification strategy, we follow Moser et al. (2014) and con-
struct a county-level panel data set that covers both pre- and post-treatment years.
This research design enables us to include county fixed effects to account for time-
invariant confounders, such as a regional liberalism, which might have affected the
allocation of Stasi spies and may also affect the economic prosperity of a county.
Using pre-treatment data from the 1920s and early 1930s, this design enables us to
directly test for pre-trends in the outcome variables. Reassuringly, the Stasi dens-
3 Indeed, the results of our analysis suggest that simple (non-reported) OLS estimates are biased
towards zero.
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ity has no explanatory power for social capital and economic performance prior to
the division of Germany, which strengthens the causal interpretation of our find-
ings. Similarly, controlling for a large set of historical pre-treatment variables that
account for persistent regional differences in economic potential, political ideology
and social capital does not affect the estimates of our border pair research design
qualitatively.
Overall, we find a negative and long-lasting effect of spying on both social
capital and economic performance.4 Using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), we find that more government surveillance leads to lower trust
in strangers and stronger negative reciprocity. Both measures have been used as
proxies for interpersonal trust in the literature (Glaeser et al., 2000; Dohmen et al.,
2009). In line with evidence on the shaping of trust levels (Sutter and Kocher,
2007), the negative effect on interpersonal trust is strongest for the cohort who
spent their entire childhood in the GDR. Looking at institutional trust, we find
that both the intention to vote and engagement in local politics is significantly
lower in counties with a high spy density even two decades after reunification.
Using county-level data, we find that election turnout has been significantly lower
in higher-spying counties in federal elections from 2002 onwards.
In terms of economic performance, we find a negative significant effect of
the spy density on labor income as reported in the SOEP. Using administrat-
ive county-level data, we further show that self-employment rates and the number
of patents per capita are significantly lower in higher-spying counties. Moreover,
post-reunification unemployment is persistently higher in counties with high sur-
veillance levels. Our estimates imply that abolishing state surveillance would, on
average, have reduced the long-term unemployment rate by 1.8 percentage points,
which is equivalent to a ten percent drop given the average unemployment level
in East Germany since reunification. Last, we find significantly negative effects of
the spy density on population: Stasi spying appears to be an important driver of
the tremendous population decline experienced in East Germany after reunifica-
4 The annual number of requests for disclosure of information on Stasi activity (Bu¨rgerantra¨ge)
serves as a first indication that East German citizens are still affected by the surveillance of the
Stasi, even twenty-five years after reunification. Figure 5.7.1 in the Appendix plots the annual
number of requests filed from 1992 to 2012. Unfortunately, there is no regional information on
these requests, which could provide an interesting outcome.
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tion. We find that for both out-migration waves (1989–1992, and 1998–2009, see
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2009), population losses were relatively stronger
in higher-spying counties.
Overall, our paper contributes to the large literature documenting a long-term
positive effect of the quality of political institutions (oftentimes used as measures
of social capital) on economic performance using cross-country research designs
(Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999; Sobel, 2002; Rodrik
et al., 2004; Nunn, 2008; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2015). We
add to this strand of the literature in several ways. First, we study the impact
of a certain element of (lacking) democracy – state surveillance – on economic
performance. Second, we do this in a within-country setting, which is close to
a natural experiment and therefore allows for a clean identification of our effect.
Third, by using surveillance as our source of variation and rich survey data, we
are able to directly link variations in social capital (trust) to changes in economic
performance. In fact, using two-stage least squares and spy density as an instru-
ment, we are able to show that higher trust has a positive and causal effect on
income. Fourth, the persistence of the adverse economic effects documents the
long-term costs of eroding social capital and the transmission of trust across gen-
erations (Guiso et al., 2006; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Tabellini, 2010; Becker et al.,
2015). Lastly, our study is related to the influential study by Alesina and Fuchs-
Schu¨ndeln (2007). While their study shows that ideological indoctrination in the
GDR had long-term effects on individual preferences, we show that the same is
true for the type of governance used to strengthen the power of the regime.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the
historical background and the institutional framework of the Stasi. Section 5.3
describes the data. Section 5.4 introduces our research design and explains the
two different identification strategies. Results are presented in Section 5.5, before
Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Historical background
After the end of World War II and Germany’s liberation from the Nazi regime
in 1945, the remaining German territory was occupied by and divided among the
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four Allied forces – the US, the UK, France and the Soviet Union. The boundaries
between these zones were drawn along the territorial boundaries of 19th-century
German states and provinces that had largely disappeared by then (Wolf, 2009).
On July 1, 1945, roughly two months after the total and unconditional surrender
of Germany, the division into the four zones became effective.
With the Soviet Union and the Western allies disagreeing over Germany’s polit-
ical and economic future, the borders of the Soviet occupation zone soon became
the official inner-German border and eventually led to a 40-year long division of
a society that had been highly integrated prior to its separation. In May 1949,
the Federal Republic of Germany was established in the three western occupation
zones. Only five months later, the German Democratic Republic, a state in the
spirit of “real socialism”5 and member state of the Warsaw pact, was founded in
the Soviet ruled zone. Until the sudden and unexpected fall of the Berlin Wall
on the evening of November 9, 1989 and the reunification of West and East Ger-
many in October 1990, the GDR was a one-party dictatorship under the rule of
the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and its secretaries general.
The regime secured its authority by means of a large and powerful state security
service. The Ministry for State Security was founded in February 1950, just a few
month after the GDR was constituted, and designed to “battle against agents,
saboteurs, and diversionists [in order] to preserve the full effectiveness of [the]
Constitution”6. It soon became a ubiquitous institution, spying on and suppressing
the entire population to ensure and preserve the regime’s power (Gieseke, 2014,
p. 50ff.).
The party leaders’ demand for comprehensive surveillance was reflected by the
organizational structure of the Stasi. While the main administration was located
in East Berlin, the Stasi also maintained offices in each capital of the fifteen states
(Bezirksdienststellen), regional offices in most of the 226 counties (Kreisdienststel-
len) and offices in seven Objects of Special Interest, which were large and strategic-
5 Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the SED between 1971–1989, introduced this term on a
meeting of the Central Committee of the SED in May 1973 to distinguish the regimes of the
Eastern bloc from Marxist theories on socialism.
6 According to Erich Mielke, subsequent Minister for State Security from 1957 to 1989, on
January 28, 1950 in the official SED party newspaper Neues Deutschland as quoted in Gieseke
(2014, p. 12).
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Figure 5.2.1: Share of Stasi employees & spies in the GDR population
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Notes: Own calculations using data on the total number of spies (unofficial collaborators) from
Mu¨ller-Enbergs (2008), information on the number of Stasi employees as reported in Gieseke
(1996), and population figures from Statistical Yearbooks of the GDR.
ally important public companies (Objektdienststellen).7 Following this territorial
principle, state-level offices had to secure their territory and had authority over
their subordinate offices in the respective counties. As a consequence, surveillance
strategies differed in their intensities across GDR states. For instance, about one-
third of the constantly-monitored citizens (Personen in sta¨ndiger U¨berwachung)
were living in the state of Karl-Marx-Stadt (Horsch, 1997), which accounted for
only eleven percent of the total population. Likewise, the state of Magdeburg ac-
counted for 17 percent of the two million bugged telephone conversations, while
this state only accounted for eight percent of the total GDR population. We ex-
ploit this variation in surveillance intensities across states for identification (see
Section 5.4.2).
Over the four decades of its existence, the Stasi continuously expanded its
competencies and duties as well as the surveillance of the population. The unfore-
seen national uprising on and around June 17, 1953 revealed the weakness of the
secret security service in its early years and caused a subsequent transformation
7 Note that the Stasi monitored economic activity but was not involved in economic production.
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and expansion. The number of both official employees and unofficial collaborators
continuously increased until the late 1970s and remained at a high level until the
breakdown of the regime in 1989. Figure 5.2.1 plots the share of regular employees
and unofficial collaborators in the population for the period of 1950 until 1989.
In absolute terms, the Stasi listed 90,257 regular employees and 173,081 unofficial
informants by the end of 1989, amounting to around 1.57 percent of the entire
population.8
The Stasi’s most important tool of surveillance and suppression, and its “main
weapon against the enemy”9 was the dense network of spies called unofficial collab-
orators. These spies were recruited from the population and instructed to secretly
collect information about individuals in their own social network. Being friends,
colleagues, neighbors or sport buddies of the individuals they spied on, collabor-
ators were able to provide valuable personal information that complemented the
Stasi’s knowledge of the population and helped creating an overall picture about
anti-socialist and dissident movements and hence guaranteed surveillance of the
society’s everyday life (Gieseke, 2014, p. 163ff.). At the same time, the threat
of being denunciated and the concealed presence of the state security caused an
atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion (Wolle, 2009; Gieseke, 2014).10
There were different reasons for serving as a collaborator. Some citizens agreed
to cooperate due to ideological reasons, others were intrigued by personal and
material benefits accompanied with their cooperation. However, the regime also
urged citizens to act as unofficial collaborators by creating fear and pressure. The
body of spies was administrated in a highly formalized way, with cooperation being
sealed in written agreements and spies being tightly led by a responsible official
8 Note that the number of regular employees of the Stasi was notably high when being compared
to the size of other secret services in the Eastern Bloc (Gieseke, 2014, p. 72). Although figures
on the number of spies in other communist countries during times of the Iron Curtain entail
elements of uncertainty, the level of surveillance was comparable to the Soviet Union.
9 Directive 1/79 of the Ministry for State Security for the work with unofficial collaborators
(Mu¨ller-Enbergs, 1996, p. 305).
10 For example, Wolle (2009) characterizes the society as deeply torn. Spies were oftentimes in
close contact with the spied-upon person and citizens felt the Stasi’s presence like a “scratching
t-shirt” (Reich, 1997, p. 28). For less scientific documentations about the impact of the Stasi,
see the Academy Award winning movie “The Lives of Others” and the recent TED talk “The
dark secrets of a surveillance state” given by the director of the Berlin-Hohenschnhausen Stasi
prison memorial, Hubertus Knabe.
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Stasi agent (Gieseke, 2014, p. 114ff.).
5.3 Data
In this section, we briefly describe the various data sources collected for our em-
pirical analysis. Section 5.3.1 presents information on our explanatory variable,
the spy density in a county. Section 5.3.2 and Section 5.3.3 describe the data
used to construct outcome measures and control variables. Detailed information
on all variables are provided in Appendix Table 5.8.3. The Data Appendix 5.8
also provides details on the harmonization of territorial county borders over time.
5.3.1 Spy data
Information on the number of spies in each county is based on official Stasi records,
published by the Agency of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records (BStU )
and compiled in Mu¨ller-Enbergs (2008). Although the Stasi was able to destroy
part of its files in late 1989, much information was preserved when protesters
started to occupy Stasi offices across the country. In addition, numerous shredded
files could be restored after reunification. Since 1991, individual Stasi records are
publicly available for personal inspection as well as requests from researchers and
the media.
Given that the Stasi saw unofficial collaborators as their main weapon of sur-
veillance, we choose the county-level share of unofficial collaborators in the pop-
ulation as our main measure of the intensity of surveillance. Most regular Stasi
officers were based in the headquarter in Berlin, and only 10-12 percent of them
were employed at the county level.11 In contrast, the majority of all unofficial col-
laborators were attached to county offices. The Stasi differentiated between three
types of unofficial collaborators: (1) collaborators for political-operative penet-
ration, homeland defense, or special operations as well as leading informers, (2)
collaborators providing logistics and (3) societal collaborators, i.e., individuals
11 Nevertheless, we note that the county-level correlation between the number of spies and the
number of regular employees is 0.85. This high correlation reflects the fact that regular Stasi
employees administered the body of spies at the county level.
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publicly known as loyal to the state. We use the first category of unofficial col-
laborators to construct our measure of surveillance density, as those were actively
involved in spying and are by far the largest and most relevant group of collabor-
ators. If an Object of Special Interest with a separate Stasi office was located in a
county, we add the unofficial collaborators attached to these object offices to the
county’s number of spies.12 As information on the total number of spies are not
given for each year in every county, we use the average share of spies from 1980
to 1988 as our measure of surveillance.13 The spy density in a given county was
very stable across the 1980s, the within-county correlation being 0.93. For further
details on our main explanatory variable, see Data Appendix 5.8.
Figure 5.3.1 plots the density of unofficial collaborators (spy category 1) for
each county. Today, the number of spies is known for about ninety percent of the
counties for at least one year in the 1980s. The density of spies differs considerably
both across and within GDR states, with the fraction of unofficial collaborators in
the population ranging from 0.12 to 1.03 percent and the mean density being 0.38
percent. The median is similar to the mean (0.36 percent), one standard deviation
refers to 0.14 spies per capita.
5.3.2 Individual-level data
For the empirical analysis presented below, we rely on two distinct datasets to
estimate the effect of state surveillance on social capital and economic performance.
First, we use information from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP),
a longitudinal survey of German households (Wagner et al., 2007). Established for
West Germany in 1984, the survey covers respondents from the former GDR since
June 1990. The SOEP contains information on the county of residence and when
individuals have moved to their current home. We identify and select respondents
living in East German counties in 1990 who have not changed residence in 1989
or 1990. We then follow these individuals from the 1990 wave of the SOEP over
time. By exploiting a variety of different waves of the survey we are able to observe
various measures of social capital as well as current gross labor income (see Section
12 In the empirical analysis, we explicitly control for the presence of such offices in Objects of
Special Interest.
13 Data from earlier years is only available for a limited number of counties.
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Figure 5.3.1: Percentage share of Stasi spies at the county level
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Notes: This graph plots the county-level surveillance density measured by the average yearly
share of unofficial collaborators relative to the population between 1980 and 1988. Thick black
lines show the borders of the fifteen GDR states. White areas indicate missing data.
5.4.2 and Data Appendix 5.8).
In order to proxy interpersonal trust, we use two standard measures provided
in the SOEP: (i) trust in strangers (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000), and (ii) negative
reciprocity (see, e.g., Dohmen et al., 2009). To capture trust in the political system,
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we investigate two measures as well. First, we take the survey question about the
intention to vote if federal elections were held next Sunday. The question captures
the stated preferences to participate in the most important German election.14
Second, we exploit the question whether individuals are engaged in local politics.
Apart from these variables measuring social capital, we also take reported
monthly gross labor income as a measure of individual economic performance.
Moreover, we use the rich information of the SOEP to construct a set of individual
control variables: gender, age, household size, marital status, level of education
and learned profession. For the underlying survey questions, data years and exact
variable definitions, see Data Appendix 5.8.
5.3.3 County-level data
For the second dataset, we compiled county-level data on various measures of
economic performance (self-employment, patents, unemployment, population) as
well as electoral turnout as a proxy for social capital. We collected county-level
data for two time-periods, data from the 1990s and 2000s as well as pre-World
War II data. Post-reunification data come from official administrative records;
historical data come from various sources (see Data Appendix 5.8 for details).
In addition to our outcome variables, we further collect various county-level
variables that we use as control variables to check the sensitivity of our estimates.
These control variables are used in both individual- and county-level models.
In total, we construct three sets of control variables. The first set measures
the strength of the opposition to the regime. As mentioned in Section 5.2, the
national uprising on and around June 17, 1953 constituted the most prominent
rebellion against the regime before the large demonstrations in 1989. The riot
markedly changed the regime’s awareness for internal conflicts and triggered the
expansion of the Stasi spy network (cf. Figure 5.2.1). We use differences in the
regional intensity of the riot to proxy the strength of the opposition. Specifically,
we construct three control variables: (i) a categorical variable measuring the strike
intensity with values “none”, “strike”, “demonstration”, “riot”, and “liberation of
prisoners”, (ii) a dummy variable indicating whether the regime declared a state
14 We also use a measure of revealed preferences, i.e., electoral turnout, below.
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of emergency in the county and (iii) a dummy equal to one if the Soviet military
intervened in the county (for details on the source and the construction of the
variables, see Appendix Table 5.8.3).
The second set of controls takes into account that the Stasi tried to protect
certain firms in the industrial sector. Hence, our industry controls comprise (i) the
share of employees in the industrial sector in 1989 and (ii) a dummy variable in-
dicating whether a large enterprise from the uranium, coal, potash, oil or chemical
industry was located in the county.
The third set of controls is intended to pick up historical and potentially per-
sistent county differences in terms of economic performance and political ideology.
It will be used in the models on the individual level in the absence of pre-treatment
information on the outcomes. Our pre World War II controls include (i) the mean
share of Nazi and Communist votes in the federal elections of 1928, 1930 and the
two 1932 elections to capture political extremism (Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2012), (ii)
average electoral turnout in the same elections to proxy institutional trust, (iii) the
regional share of protestants in 1925 in order to control for differences in work ethic
and/or education (Becker and Wo¨ßmann, 2009), (iv) the share of self-employed in
1933 to capture regional entrepreneurial spirit, and (v) the unemployment rate in
1933 to capture pre-treatment differences in economic performance.
5.4 Research designs
We present two distinct research designs to identify the causal effect of spying on
social capital and economic performance. First, we lay out a very simple linear
model as a benchmark and discuss potential threats to identification and likely bi-
ases (Section 5.4.1). Based on this discussion, we propose two empirical approaches
intended to overcome endogeneity problems (Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3).
5.4.1 Linear model
To identify the long-term effects of surveillance, we regress various measures of
social capital and economic performance on our measure of surveillance intensity.
CHAPTER 5. 160
The simplest model takes the following form:
Yj = α + βSPY DENSc + V
′
j ξ + εj, (5.4.1)
where Yj measures an outcome that may either vary at the individual or county
level, j ∈ [i, c]. Our main regressor is the spy density in county c, defined as
the average number of spies per capita in each county of the GDR in the 1980s.15
Vector Vj may contain control variables. In this simple model, identification comes
from cross-sectional variation in the intensity of surveillance across GDR counties
(see Jacob and Tyrell, 2010, and Friehe et al., 2015, for empirical applications of
this model). Two main threats to identification are obvious: (i) selection out of
treatment and (ii) omitted variable bias. We discuss these concerns in turn.
Selection out of treatment. If people moved away from counties with a high
spying density, we would face a selection problem that could bias our estimates.
However, the authoritarian regime controlled and limited external and internal
migration in a very strict way, making residential sorting a secondary concern.
First, leaving the East German territory without permission was illegal through-
out the existence of the GDR. Refugees could be sentenced to lengthy terms of
imprisonment. However, about three million citizens had escaped to West Ger-
many up until the early 1960s, which was the main reason for the construction of
the Berlin Wall and the expansion of border fortifications in August 1961. Con-
sequently, the large-scale installation of land-mines at the borderland and the
regime’s order for soldiers to shoot at refugees trying to pass the border led to
a sharp drop in the number of refugees. The regime also often punished those
individuals who applied for emigration visas, exposing people to considerable har-
assment in working and private life (Kowalczuk, 2009). Between 1962 and 1988,
only around 18,000 individuals (0.1 percent of the population) managed to leave
East Germany each year, either by authorized migration (U¨bersiedler) or illegal
escape (see Panel (a) in Figure 5.7.2 in the Appendix). The share of refugees on
the total number of migrants was around one-third.
Second, residential mobility within the GDR was highly restricted as all living
15 Results do not change when using the density of specific years as a regressor.
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space was administered by the regime. In every municipality, a local housing
agency (Amt fu¨r Wohnungswesen) decided on the allocation of all houses and flats,
whether privately, cooperatively or publicly owned. Every individual looking for a
new apartment had to file an application at the local housing agency. Processing
times often lasted several years and assignment to a new flat was usually subject to
economic, political or social interests of the regime (Grashoff, 2011, p. 13f.). From
1975 to 1988, the average number of yearly applications was 755,000, constituting
around 4.5 applications per 100 citizens (Steiner, 2006).16 Panel (b) of Figure 5.7.2
in the Appendix shows the extent of residential mobility in the GDR. Mobility of
East German citizens had been considerably lower compared to mobility in West
Germany.
Observing the county-level number of spies in multiple years in the 1980s, we
can further directly test whether the spy density affected population size. Reas-
suringly, we estimate a zero effect of the log number of spies on log population in
a model with county and year fixed effects.17 Hence, selection out of treatment
does not seem to be an issue in our setting.
Confounding variables. The second, more serious threat to identification are
regional confounders that have affected the allocation of Stasi spies in the 1980s
and that affect our outcomes of interest after the fall of the Iron Curtain. As-
tonishingly, there is very little knowledge on what determined the regional spy
density. There is some anecdotal evidence that the Stasi was particularly active
in regions with strategically important industry clusters. In contrast, and a bit
surprisingly, previous research could not establish a clear correlation between the
size of the Stasi and the size of the opposition at the county level (Gieseke, 1995,
p. 190).
Before investigating the effects of spying on social capital and economic out-
comes, we thus try to explain the regional variation in the spy density, which will
be our treatment variable later on. Therefore, we run simple OLS regressions of
16 Some citizens tried to elude the governmental allocation by illegal and unseen movements into
dilapidated flats. There are no official records about the actual number of illegal squatters.
Estimates for the city of Rostock show that the share of squatters within the population was
small, amounting to 0.28 percent in early 1990 (Grashoff, 2011, p. 76).
17 The corresponding regression results are available upon request.
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the spy density on six sets of potential explanatory variables and check the ex-
planatory power of the model as indicated by the R2 measure. Table 5.4.1 shows
the results, while full regression outputs are provided in Appendix Table 5.7.1.
We start off by explaining the spy density with a constant and a dummy variable,
which is equal to one if one of the seven Objects of Special Interest, that is, a
large public company of strategic importance, was located in the county.18 In the
next specification, we add dummy variables for the fifteen GDR states. The R2
measure in column (2) shows that around 25 percent of the county-level variation
can be explained by differences across GDR states. This is suggestive evidence
in line with the claim of historians that county offices responded to higher-ranked
state offices and that decisions made at the state level indeed affected county-level
outcomes. We will exploit this feature in our border discontinuity design presented
in Section 5.4.2.
Table 5.4.1: The allocation of Stasi spies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDR state FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County size controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Opposition controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls No No No No Yes Yes
Pre World War II controls No No No No No Yes
Observations 187 187 187 187 187 187
R2 0.033 0.298 0.529 0.540 0.545 0.561
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.237 0.481 0.475 0.474 0.473
Notes: This table demonstrates the power of different sets of county-level control variables in
explaining the county spy density using a simple OLS regression. Every specification includes
a constant and a dummy for Objects of Special Interest (Objektdienststellen). Full regression
results are shown in Appendix Table 5.7.1.
In the third specification of Table 5.4.1, we add variables controlling for the
size of the county. While the spy density already accounts for differences in county
population, we add the log mean county population in the 1980s and the log square
meter area of the county as regressors. We find that controlling for size – and
18 As described in Section 5.3.1, the Stasi maintained offices in these objects, which recruited
their own spies. As we add the spies working in these objects to the number of spies in the
respective county offices, we control for Objects of Special Interest with a dummy variable in
all regressions below.
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in particular population – increases the explanatory power substantially, raising
the R2 to 0.53. Moreover, the results show that the spy density is decreasing
in the population (cf. Appendix Table 5.7.1), which could be rationalized with
an economies of scale argument. Overall, column (3) suggests that it might be
important to control for county size when identifying the effect of the Stasi on our
outcomes. We test this assertion below.
In columns (4) to (6) we sequentially add opposition, industrial and pre World
War II controls (see Section 5.3.3). In total, neither of the three sets of control
variables adds much to the explanatory power of the model. Nevertheless, we test
the sensitivity of our results with respect to the inclusion of the control variable
sets in both research designs laid out below.
Unobserved confounders and potential bias. While controlling for observ-
able potential confounders may demonstrate the robustness of estimates, it is im-
possible to prove that there are no unobservable variables biasing simple OLS
results in our setting. Let us assume that there is a systematic confounding vari-
able Zc, such as capitalist spirit or strive for freedom, that varies across regions.
Given that measures of liberal attitudes are usually positively correlated with so-
cial capital and economic performance in democratic countries, it is likely that an
unobserved confounder with a positive (negative) correlation with the spy density
also has a positive (negative) correlation with our outcomes. With this claim in
mind, we study the potential endogeneity bias more formally. We rewrite the error
term of equation (5.4.1) as εj = γZc+ηj, with γ being the effect of the unobserved
capitalist spirit on Yj and ηj being noise. In such a case, the OLS estimate would
be given by:
βOLS =
Cov(SPY DENSc, εj)
V ar(SPY DENSc)
= β + γ
Cov(SPY DENSc, Zc)
V ar(SPY DENSc)
+
Cov(SPY DENSc, ηj)
V ar(SPY DENSc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
. (5.4.2)
If, as argued above, the effect of capitalist spirit on the outcome γ and the co-
variance between capitalist spirit and the spying density Cov(SPY DENSc, Zc)
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have the same sign, and if, as suggested by the theory of social capital, β < 0, the
estimate βOLS will be biased towards zero and underestimate the effect of spying
on our outcomes.19
In the following subsections, we present two research designs which are intended
to better account for unobserved confounders and limit the potential endogeneity
bias.
5.4.2 Border discontinuity design
Our first identification strategy exploits the territorial-administrative structure of
the Stasi and the fact that about 25 percent of the county-level variation in the
spy density can be explained with GDR state fixed effects (cf. Table 5.4.1, column
(2)). As the Stasi’s county offices were subordinate to the respective state office,
different GDR states administered different average levels of spy densities across
states. We use the resulting discontinuities along state borders as a source of
exogenous variation. We follow Dube et al. (2010) and limit our analysis to all
contiguous counties that straddle a GDR state border, thus identify the effect of
spy density on our outcome variables by comparing county pairs on either side
of a state border.20 The identifying assumption is that the county on the lower-
spy side of the border is similar to the county on the higher-spy side in all other
relevant characteristics. While such an assumption can be quite strong in similar
border research designs, it might be less critical in our case given that we focus
on post-GDR outcomes and many GDR state borders do not exist anymore. In
fact, after reunification the fifteen GDR states merged into six federal states, and
around half of the counties straddling a GDR border in our sample belong to the
same federal state in post-reunification Germany.
Formally, we regress individual outcome i in county c, which is part of a border
pair b, on the spy density in county c and border pair dummies νb:
Yicb = α + βSPY DENSc +X
′
iδ +K
′
cφ+ νb + εicb. (5.4.3)
19 The results of our analysis indeed suggest that OLS estimates are biased towards zero. OLS
regression results are available upon request.
20 If a county has several direct neighbors on the other side of the state border, we duplicate the
observation. See below for a discussion.
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As outcome variable, Yicb, we use trust in strangers, extent of negative reciprocity,
intention to vote in elections, engagement in local politics and individual gross
income (see Section 5.3.2).
As mentioned before, the identifying assumption in the border discontinuity
design is that counties on either side of a border differ systematically in their spy
density since they belonged to different GDR states. Apart from that, there should
be no systematic differences between the counties straddling a former state border.
However, there might be persistent compositional or historical differences within
county-border pairs which affected the spy allocation in the 1980s as well as the
post-reunification outcomes. For that reason, we add two sets of control variables
as a sensitivity check. First, vector Xi accounts for compositional differences
in the population and includes individual information provided by the SOEP on
age, gender, marital status, education and learned profession. Second, vector Kc
controls for potential county-level differences within a border pair. It is important
to understand that in order to invalidate our research design, these differences
must (i) have influenced the spy allocation in the 1980s and (ii) affect outcome
variables after reunification, making these factors time-persistent per definition.
As a consequence, we include the county size, opposition, industry and pre-World
War II controls that we use above to explain the variation in spy density (cf. Table
5.4.1).21
We use the cross-sectional weights provided by the SOEP to make the sample
representative for the entire population. Given that we duplicate observations
in counties that neighbor multiple counties in a different state, we adjust cross-
sectional weights by dividing them through the number of duplications in our
baseline specification and cluster standard errors at the border pair and the in-
dividual level. We test the robustness of our results by (i) disregarding cross-
sectional weights and only accounting for duplications and (ii) by using original
cross-sectional weights, not adjusting for duplicates. Results (shown in Appendix
Table 5.7.2) prove to be robust to these modifications.
Table 5.4.2 further provides a test of the validity of our research design by
checking whether counties straddling a state border are indeed similar. Based on
21 Recall that we further control for Objects of Special Interest in all regressions (see Sections
5.3.1 and 5.4.1).
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the GDR state average spy density, we assign one county in a border pair to either
the higher- or the lower-spy state side. Table 5.4.2 shows the differences between
higher- and lower-spying counties in terms of the spy density and all other control
variables used in regression equation (5.4.3). We also test whether the differences
are statistically significant by running simple bivariate OLS regressions of each
characteristic on a dummy variable for higher/lower spy density counties.22 We
find that the spy density is indeed significantly higher in counties located in higher-
spying GDR states. Moreover, apart from population, all control variables seem
to be well balanced between the higher and lower spy density side.23 The fact that
the county population is slightly higher on the lower-spy side is in line with the
results from Table 5.7.1: the spy density was lower in cities. For that reason, we
test the sensitivity of our results with respect to population and county size as
controls.
5.4.3 Panel data design
In Section 5.4.1, we discussed that time-persistent confounders that have affected
the spy allocation and are still affecting post-reunification outcomes are a potential
threat to identification. Given that the social capital measures obtained from
the SOEP are only observed post-treatment, we cannot account for these time-
persistent potential confounders by including county fixed effects.
However, certain outcomes such as measures of economic performance or polit-
ical participation can be observed pre-treatment. Using county-level outcome vari-
ables from the late 1920s and early 1930s, we apply a panel data research design
following Moser et al. (2014) that allows us to include county fixed effects to ac-
count for any time-invariant confounder.24 The panel data model reads as follows:
Yct = α +
∑
t
βtSPY DENSc × τt +L′ctζ + ρc + τt + εct. (5.4.4)
22 Note that we use the same weights as in the regression.
23 Note that Table 5.4.2 is based on the SOEP sample. As the SOEP does not sample individuals
from every county, there is a small difference in the mean spy density in this sample compared
to the overall mean (cf. Section 5.3.1).
24 Note that many (though not all) potential confounders are likely to be time-invariant by
definition, since they must have affected the spy allocation in the 1980s and outcomes in the
1990s and 2000s.
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Table 5.4.2: Descriptive statistics for the border pair sample
Mean by county type Difference
Mean SD Low-spying High-spying ∆ p-value
Spy density 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.38 -0.04 0.04
County variables
Log mean population 1980s 11.14 0.72 11.23 11.04 0.19 0.13
Log county size 6.14 0.52 6.10 6.19 -0.10 0.28
Object of Special Interest 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.31
Share indust. employment 1989 45.70 12.15 45.85 45.55 0.30 0.89
Important industries 1989 0.25 0.44 0.19 0.31 -0.12 0.11
Uprising 1953: None 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.31 -0.04 0.57
Uprising 1953: Strike 0.25 0.44 0.24 0.27 -0.03 0.69
Uprising 1953: Demonstration 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.15 -0.03 0.62
Uprising 1953: Riot 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.18 0.13 0.07
Uprising 1953: Prisoner liberation 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.51
State of emergency 1953 0.75 0.43 0.79 0.72 0.07 0.32
Military intervention 1953 0.57 0.50 0.54 0.60 -0.06 0.49
Electoral turnout 1928–32 84.10 3.64 83.69 84.52 -0.83 0.19
Vote share KPD 1928–32 15.45 6.83 15.71 15.20 0.52 0.66
Vote share NSDAP 1928–32 25.36 3.84 25.54 25.17 0.36 0.59
Share self-employed 1933 15.75 2.52 15.92 15.57 0.35 0.43
Share protestants 1925 91.77 3.85 91.23 92.30 -1.07 0.11
Share unemployed 1933 16.80 5.45 17.16 16.44 0.72 0.45
Individual characteristics (in 1990)
Male (in percent) 46.56 49.89 45.89 47.52 -1.64 0.29
Age 46.58 18.72 46.75 46.32 0.44 0.80
Household size 2.72 1.16 2.67 2.80 -0.13 0.20
Share of singles 21.08 40.79 22.66 18.80 3.86 0.23
Share of married 59.29 49.13 56.92 62.71 -5.79 0.11
Other marital status 19.63 39.72 20.42 18.49 1.94 0.45
Share of low-skilled 45.45 49.80 42.92 49.11 -6.19 0.33
Share of medium-skilled 34.42 47.52 34.34 34.52 -0.18 0.94
Share of high-skilled 20.13 40.10 22.74 16.37 6.36 0.20
Blue-collar worker 51.50 49.98 49.41 54.51 -5.10 0.16
Self-employed 2.62 15.98 3.24 1.73 1.51 0.15
White-collar worker 23.51 42.41 25.08 21.23 3.85 0.35
Civil servant 0.25 5.01 0.09 0.49 -0.40 0.25
Other/unknown 22.12 41.51 22.18 22.04 0.14 0.96
Notes: The contiguous border pair sample covers 134 counties. Lower-spying and higher-spying counties are
determined by means of the population-weighted GDR state average of the county-level spy density in the
border pair sample. Lower-spying counties include 1,131 individuals, higher-spying counties 748 individuals.
Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics are based on the 1990 wave of the SOEP data and calculated
using cross-sectional weights, adjusted for duplications of counties that are part of multiple border pairs. The
corresponding p-values are based on OLS regressions of individual characteristics on an indicator variable for
lower-/higher spy density counties, clustering standard errors at the county and person level. For information
on all variables, see Appendix Table 5.8.3.
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Outcomes Yct are county c’s election turnout, self-employment rate, number of
patents per capita, unemployment rate and log population in year t (see Section
5.3.3).
We allow the effect of spying to evolve over time by interacting the time-
invariant spy density SPY DENSc with year dummies τt. Coefficients βt,∀t ≥
1989 show the treatment effect after reunification and demonstrate the potential
persistence of the effect. Moreover, coefficients βt,∀t < 1989 provide a direct
test of the identifying assumption. If the surveillance levels in the 1980s had an
effect on social capital or economic outcomes prior to fall of the Iron Curtain, this
would be an indication that spies were not allocated randomly with respect to the
outcome variable. Hence, we need to have flat, insignificant pre-trends to defend
our identifying assumption.25
Year fixed effects τt account for trends in outcome variables over time. In
our preferred specification, we even allow for heterogeneous and flexible trends by
region (see below). County fixed effects ρc account for persistent confounding vari-
ables such as geographic location or regional liberalism. Note that identification in
this panel model is somewhat more subtle than in the standard case since the Stasi
density is constant across the panel and identification cannot be within-county as a
consequence. Instead, the model is identified by exploiting cross-sectional variation
in post-treatment adjustment paths. The interactions of the spy density with the
year dummies thus capture the potential relationship between state surveillance in
the 1980s and different adjustment paths after reunification relative to the initial
base levels prior to the treatment.
Although we account for county fixed effects, we test the robustness of our
results and include several sets of control variables, which are captured in Lct. In
all specifications, and as done above, we control for the presence of an Object of
Special Interest in county c by interacting a dummy variable with year dummies
after the treatment (t ≥ 1989). Moreover, we account for both county size and
regional trends. Clearly, rural and urban jurisdiction are likely to show different
25 We omit the spy density for the last pre-treatment year and normalize βt to zero in the respect-
ive year. With the exception of the regression for population, our pre-treatment variables are
measured prior to World War II. For unemployment, we only observe one pre-treatment year
(1933). While this is sufficient to identify county fixed effects, we cannot test for pre-trends
regarding regional unemployment in this model.
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economic developments in the 1990s and 2000s independent of the Stasi density.
The same is true for certain regions. Given that both population and GDR states
explain up to 50 percent of the spy density variation (cf. Table 5.4.1), it is crucial
to account for both regional and county-size trends. Concretely, we add GDR
state times year fixed effects to the model26 as well as size controls (log mean
population in the 1980s and log county area) interacted with a dummy indicating
the post-treatment period. In our richest and preferred specification, we also
add the opposition and industry controls as used in Table 5.4.1 – each variable
interacted with a post-treatment dummy. Lastly, we apply two other sensitivity
checks: First, we add current population to the model. Despite being a potential
outcome and hence being considered as a bad control, we test the robustness of
our results when controlling for current population size, which captures different
regional adjustment paths and also accounts for selection out of counties. Second,
we control for federal and state transfers as well as investment subsidies paid to
East German counties after reunification.
5.5 Results
In the following section, we present the empirical results. First, we focus on the
effect of the spy density on individual-level measures of interpersonal and insti-
tutional trust (Section 5.5.1). In Section 5.5.2, we investigate how governmental
surveillance affects economic performance. Last, we test the theoretical mechan-
ism between government surveillance, social capital, and economic performance
using the spy density as an instrument for trust (see Section 5.5.3).
5.5.1 The effects of surveillance on social capital
We apply the border discontinuity design (see equation (5.4.3)) to identify the
effect of spying on measures of interpersonal and institutional trust. For each out-
come, we estimate three specifications of the model: (i) only controlling for border
pair fixed effects, (ii) adding individual characteristics to pick up compositional
26 For the pre-war periods, we use German states and Prussian provinces from the time of the
Weimar Republic.
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differences in the population, and (iii) additionally including county-level controls
to capture differences in county size, oppositional strength, industry composition,
and persistent political ideology and economic performance (as captured by the
pre World War II controls).
Panel A of Table 5.5.1 presents the results for our measures of interpersonal
trust. We find that spying significantly affects both of our outcomes, trust in
strangers and negative reciprocity. Results are significant in our leanest specifica-
tion and also conditional on individual- and county-level controls, the latter spe-
cification being our preferred one.27 For a one standard deviation increase in the
spy density (see Table 5.4.2), the estimate in column (3) implies that the prob-
ability to trust would be around four percentage points lower, which is a large
effect given that the average probability is fourteen percent. When focusing on
reciprocity, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the spy density raises
negative reciprocity by 0.7 points, the mean level of reciprocity being 9.2 points.
In Panel B of Table 5.5.1, we test for heterogeneous effects by age. We interact
our main regressor with cohort dummies for individuals born (i) before 1940, (ii)
between 1940 and 1961, and (iii) after 1961. Psychological and economic research
has shown that trust is shaped during adolescence and does not change much after
the age of 21 (Sutter and Kocher, 2007). With the Berlin Wall being built in 1961,
this implies that the youngest cohort in our analysis was fully socialized in the GDR
and should have been influenced most by Stasi spying. The second cohort, born
between 1940 and 1961, was predominantly socialized in the immediate aftermath
of World War II and during the first years of the GDR. In contrast to the youngest
cohort, these respondents (or their families) also had the chance to move out of
the GDR prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Lastly, people
born before 1940 experienced World War II and reached adulthood prior to 1961.
Interestingly, and in line with our expectations, we find that the negative effect
of spying on trust is strongest – and statistically significant – for the youngest
cohort. When focusing on negative reciprocity, we find the medium cohort to be
most affected, although point estimates for all three cohorts are not statistically
27 Given that trust in strangers is a binary outcome and negative reciprocity is measured on a 21
point scale, we estimate equation (5.4.3) using Ordinary Least Squares to ease interpretation.
We find similar results when estimating a binary probit model for trust and an ordered probit
model for reciprocity (cf. Table 5.7.2 in the Appendix).
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Table 5.5.1: The effects of spying on interpersonal trust
Trust in strangers Negative reciprocity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A – Baseline effects
Spy density -0.293∗∗ -0.279∗ -0.319∗ 5.120∗∗∗ 4.912∗∗∗ 5.283∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.154) (0.184) (1.803) (1.698) (1.747)
Adjusted-R2 0.061 0.090 0.106 0.063 0.130 0.142
Panel B – Heterogeneous effects by age
Spy density × Born bef. 1940 -0.241 -0.191 -0.254 4.286∗ 3.421 4.424∗
(0.191) (0.219) (0.241) (2.346) (2.550) (2.288)
Spy density × Born 1940–1961 -0.245 -0.237 -0.285 6.530∗∗∗ 5.812∗∗∗ 6.444∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.176) (0.205) (2.054) (2.028) (2.167)
Spy density × Born after 1961 -0.604∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ 4.201 3.527 4.008
(0.255) (0.226) (0.222) (3.241) (3.205) (3.549)
Adjusted-R2 0.068 0.094 0.108 0.082 0.134 0.146
Panel C – Heterogeneous effects by mobility
Spy density × Stayed -0.321∗∗ -0.318∗∗ -0.338∗ 5.325∗∗∗ 4.865∗∗∗ 5.311∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.153) (0.188) (1.781) (1.734) (1.811)
Spy density × Moved -0.197 -0.125 -0.189 3.839 4.866 4.968
(0.236) (0.229) (0.237) (4.101) (3.668) (3.655)
Adjusted-R2 0.063 0.092 0.108 0.063 0.129 0.142
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County size controls Yes Yes
Opposition controls Yes Yes
Pre World War II controls Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,014 3,014 3,014
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the border pair model laid out in equation (5.4.3)
using SOEP data. All specifications include border pair fixed effects and a dummy variable
indicating the presence of an Object of Special Interest. Standard errors are two-way clustered
at the border pair and the individual level with usual confidence levels (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01). We restrict the sample to border pairs for which we observe individuals in both
counties along the border. All specifications use cross-sectional weights adjusted for duplicates
of counties that are part of multiple border pairs. For detailed information on the control
variables, see Data Appendix 5.8.
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different from each other. In Panel C, we split the sample by individuals’ moving
decision after reunification. We will discuss these effects in Section 5.5.2, when
looking at the population effect of state surveillance.
Next, we turn to institutional trust with Table 5.5.2 providing the results.
We find a significant negative effect of the spy density on the intention to vote
in elections throughout all specifications. This effect is driven by the medium
cohort. On average, a one standard deviation increase in the intensity of spying
leads to a decrease in the intention to attend elections of seven percentage points.
In contrast, when looking at engagement in local politics, the young and the old
cohorts seem to be negatively affected, while the overall average effect is negative
but statistically insignificant.
While the intention to vote is a soft measure of institutional trust capturing
stated preferences, we can use administrative data on electoral turnout to check
whether intentions actually translate into real political participation. Given that
county-level data on voter turnout are available since the 1920s, we apply our panel
data model (see equation (5.4.4)), which allows us to control for time-invariant
political preferences and historical differences in social capital by adding county
fixed effects.
Figure 5.5.1 plots the corresponding β coefficients obtained from our preferred
specification, i.e., when adding the full set of control variables: county size, oppos-
ition and industry controls as well as state times year fixed effects. Table 5.7.3 in
the Appendix presents the corresponding regression results and shows that we find
similar effects for leaner specifications as soon as we control for different trends
in county size after reunification. Our results clearly indicate that the electoral
turnout starts to decline in the 1990s for counties with a higher spy density. In the
2000s, voter turnout is about 4.8 percentage points lower relative to low-spying
counties. For a one standard deviation increase in the spy density, average electoral
turnout would be about 0.7 percentage points lower.
The figure also contains information on the potential endogeneity of the in-
tensity of surveillance. If estimates of the intensity of spying were significant prior
to World War II, the allocation of spies would have responded to pre-treatment
trends in electoral turnout and would thus have been endogenous in this respect.
While we indeed find a lower turnout in the 1930 election, significant at the ten
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Table 5.5.2: The effects of spying on institutional trust
Attend elections Engagement in local politics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A – Baseline effects
Spy density -0.434∗ -0.335∗ -0.537∗∗ -0.040 -0.027 -0.195
(0.222) (0.186) (0.252) (0.131) (0.116) (0.123)
Adjusted-R2 0.053 0.137 0.146 0.020 0.125 0.134
Panel B – Heterogeneous effects by age
Spy density × Born bef. 1940 -0.268 -0.084 -0.292 -0.385∗∗ -0.246 -0.424∗∗∗
(0.243) (0.209) (0.264) (0.160) (0.155) (0.158)
Spy density × Born 1940–1961 -0.622∗∗∗ -0.597∗∗ -0.800∗∗∗ 0.135 0.140 -0.016
(0.239) (0.240) (0.287) (0.151) (0.131) (0.137)
Spy density × Born after 1961 -0.163 -0.023 -0.271 -0.022 -0.092 -0.259∗
(0.313) (0.298) (0.336) (0.163) (0.142) (0.147)
Adjusted-R2 0.079 0.145 0.153 0.035 0.132 0.141
Panel C – Heterogeneous effects by mobility
Spy density × Stayed -0.404∗ -0.314 -0.529∗∗ -0.057 -0.051 -0.227∗
(0.229) (0.193) (0.247) (0.134) (0.117) (0.125)
Spy density × Moved -0.572∗ -0.339 -0.508 0.043 0.103 -0.002
(0.334) (0.311) (0.375) (0.169) (0.167) (0.161)
Adjusted-R2 0.053 0.138 0.149 0.020 0.126 0.135
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County size controls Yes Yes
Opposition controls Yes Yes
Pre World War II controls Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes
Number of observations 3,116 3,116 3,116 3,563 3,563 3,563
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the border pair model laid out in equation
(5.4.3) using SOEP data. All specifications include border pair fixed effects and a dummy
variable indicating the presence of an Object of Special Interest. Standard errors are two-
way clustered at the border pair and the individual level with usual confidence levels (∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). We restrict the sample to border pairs for which we
observe individuals in both counties along the border. All specifications use cross-sectional
weights adjusted for duplicates of counties that are part of multiple border pairs. For detailed
information on the control variables, see Data Appendix 5.8.
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Figure 5.5.1: The effect of spying on electoral turnout
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Notes: The graph plots the point estimates and corresponding 95 % confidence intervals of
the spy density interacted with year dummies; see regression model (5.4.4). The specification
includes county fixed effects and state times year fixed effects as well as controls for Objects
of Special Interest, county size, opposition and industry composition. See specification (6) in
Table 5.7.3 for details.
percent level, the remaining pre-treatment effects both before and after 1930 are
insignificant and small. This suggests that the spy allocation was not systematic-
ally determined by pre World War II trends in institutional trust, which is crucial
for establishing causality in our panel model.
5.5.2 The effects of surveillance on economic performance
Theoretically, we expect government surveillance to deteriorate social capital,
which in turn leads to lower economic performance. While we have demonstrated
the first part of this mechanism in the previous section, we now turn to the eco-
nomic effects of state surveillance. First, we look at the direct effect of spying on
economic outcomes, hence we estimate reduced form effects.
We begin by analyzing the effect of spying on entrepreneurial activity, given
that lacking trust results in extensive monitoring of “possible malfeasance by part-
ners, employees, and suppliers [and] less time to devote to innovation in new
products or processes” (Knack and Keefer, 1997). Indeed, many studies have
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shown that more trustful people are more likely to become entrepreneurs (Welter,
2012; Caliendo et al., 2014). Hence, we consider two outcomes related to entre-
preneurial activity, county-level self-employment rates and the number of patents
per 100,000 inhabitants.
Figure 5.5.2: The effect of spying on self-employment rates
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Notes: The graph plots the point estimates and corresponding 95 % confidence intervals of
the spy density interacted with year dummies; see regression model (5.4.4). The specification
includes county fixed effects and state times year fixed effects as well as controls for Objects
of Special Interest, county size, opposition and industry composition. See specification (6) in
Table 5.7.4 for details.
Figures 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 plot the respective regression estimates; full regression
results are shown in Appendix Tables 5.7.4 and 5.7.5. We find that the self-
employment rate is significantly lower (at the ten percent level) the higher the
county’s spy density. This negative effect is quite persistent and varies around
−2.5 percentage points.28 This estimate implies that for a one standard deviation
increase in the spy density, the self-employment rate would be around 0.4 percent-
age points lower. Reassuringly, we detect no significant pre-trend, which implies
that our estimates are not driven by different pre-treatment trends in entrepren-
eurial spirit.
28 However, as shown in Appendix Table 5.7.4, we lose precision when including county size
controls.
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Figure 5.5.3: The effect of spying on patents per 100,000 inhabitants
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Notes: The graph plots the point estimates and corresponding 95 % confidence intervals of
the spy density interacted with year dummies; see regression model (5.4.4). The specification
includes county fixed effects and state times year fixed effects as well as controls for Objects
of Special Interest, county size, opposition and industry composition. See specification (6) in
Table 5.7.5 for details.
When looking at patents in Figure 5.5.3, we see no effect of spying on innovat-
iveness in the first years after reunification. However, starting in 1997, the number
of patents per capita in counties with a high spy density starts to drop. In 2005,
the last year of our data, the point estimate is around −17, which implies that a
one standard deviation decrease in the intensity of spying would, on average, lead
to 2.4 patents more per 100,000 inhabitants, which is an increase of about twenty
percent.
With entrepreneurial spirit lagging behind in counties with a high spy density,
we can expect more comprehensive measures of economic performance to be lower
as well. Ideally, we would look at the effect of spy density on GDP. Unfortunately,
there is no pre World War II county-level measure available that is comparable
to today’s GDP. Hence, we take two other proxies for economic performance for
which pre-treatment information is available. First, we look at the counties’ un-
employment rates and then at population size, which has been used as a proxy for
regional growth (Redding and Sturm, 2008).
Figures 5.5.4 and 5.5.6 as well as Appendix Tables 5.7.6 and 5.7.7 show the
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Figure 5.5.4: The effect of spying on unemployment rates
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Notes: The graph plots the point estimates and corresponding 95 % confidence intervals of
the spy density interacted with year dummies; see regression model (5.4.4). The specification
includes county fixed effects and state times year fixed effects as well as controls for Objects
of Special Interest, county size, opposition and industry composition. See specification (6) in
Table 5.7.6 for details.
results. Figure 5.5.4 shows that unemployment is indeed higher in counties with
a high spy density. The effect is persistent and oscillates around 4.7 percentage
points. A one standard deviation increase in the spy density leads to an increase
in the unemployment rate of 0.7 points. Unfortunately, there is only one reliable
pre-treatment observation for the unemployment rate. While we can still identify
the effect of spying in our panel research design, we cannot check for pre-trends in
unemployment.
Next, we investigate the effect of state surveillance on county population. Av-
erage yearly and cumulated county-level population growth since the mid-1980s
are depicted in Figure 5.5.5. The graph shows two emigration waves after the fall
of the Iron Curtain – a severe and temporary one immediately after reunification
(between 1989 and 1992) and a moderate and persistent one starting in 1998.
Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2009) investigate the age, skill, and gender com-
position of these two migration waves in detail. They find that in the first wave
it was rather the low-skilled who moved, while the second wave of migrants was
driven by more educated and younger individuals.
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Figure 5.5.5: Average county-level population growth in East Germany
November 9, 1989
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Notes: The graph shows yearly and cumulative average population growth for East German
counties from 1985 to 2009. Cumulative growth is measured relative to the year 1988.
In Figure 5.5.6 and the corresponding Table 5.7.7, we test whether these two
emigration waves can be related to the intensity of Stasi spying in GDR counties.
Using yearly county-level population data from 1985 to 1988 as our pre-treatment
observations, we indeed find a negative population effect of spying that can be
related to the two migration waves.29 First, population in higher-spying counties
sharply drops in the first post-treatment year 1989.30 This implies that the initial
emigration wave was significantly driven by people leaving high-spying counties.
For a one standard deviation decrease in the spy density, the population would be
0.9 percent higher. Given that the average population loss in 1989 was 1.5 percent,
this is a substantial effect.
Further note that the effect of spying is flat after 1989. From 1990 to 1997,
we do not see a significantly different population effect between high- and low-
29 Note that effects are always relative to lower spying counties. Hence, a negative population
effect does not need to result in a lower number of inhabitants if population levels increased
in lower-spying counties. Given that populations dropped in almost all counties, the most
relevant interpretation of a negative effect seems to be a faster decline in population.
30 Population is measured on December 31, 1989, hence hardly two months after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. However, many people already tried to escape from the GDR in the summer of
1989 either via Hungary and Austria or by fleeing to the West German embassies in Warsaw,
Prague, and Budapest.
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Figure 5.5.6: The effect of spying on log population
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Notes: The graph plots the point estimates and corresponding 95 % confidence intervals of
the spy density interacted with year dummies; see regression model (5.4.4). The specification
includes county fixed effects and state times year fixed effects as well as controls for Objects
of Special Interest, county size, opposition and industry composition. See specification (6) in
Table 5.7.7 for details.
spying counties in addition to the initial population outflow. In other words, the
population response driven by spying was immediate. In 1998, i.e., the first year
of the second emigration wave, the effect of spying on population size starts to
decline again and continues to do so until 2009. Given that the overall population
loss in 2009 for East German counties was fifteen percent (relative to 1988, see
Figure 5.5.5), we use back-of-the-envelope calculations to assess how much of this
decline can be attributed to spying. Given that the mean spy density is 0.38, the
point estimate for the year 2009 of −0.169 implies that the population would, on
average, be 6.6 percent higher in the absence of any spying. Hence, about forty
percent of the overall decline can be explained by people moving away from former
high-spying counties.
The strong population effect of spying gives rise to the question of how much of
our effects on social capital and other economic outcomes are driven by selection
out of high-spying counties. For the panel estimates, we show that results for
all outcomes are robust to the inclusion of the current population as a control
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variable, acknowledging that this only accounts for the population drop but not
for potential differences in the composition of emigrants. Moreover, we can re-
assess the timing of the effects, bearing in mind that the first wave of migrants
was rather negatively selected in terms of education, while the second wave was
positively selected (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2009). For unemployment
and self-employed, we find the strongest negative effects in 1996 and 1997, hence
prior to the second migration wave. Given that the stayers were positively selected
in the first wave, it is possible that the true effect of spying is even more negative
than estimated. In terms of patents, it is interesting to see that the decline actually
starts with the beginning of the second migration wave. Hence, it is possible that
the effect of spying on patents is of second order and triggered by the emigration
of young and highly educated people.
In terms of social capital, we can go a bit further in assessing the potential
selection effect. First, note that Table 5.4.2 indicates that the initial level in
terms of education and learned occupation was not statistically different between
higher and lower spy density counties. Second, we interact the spy density with a
dummy variable indicating whether that individual moved out of the 1989 county of
residence; see Panels C of Tables 5.5.1 and 5.5.2. Our results show no significantly
different effects between movers and stayers.31 This suggests that the compositions
of movers is not different from stayers in terms of social capital and our findings
are not driven by selection of movers.
5.5.3 Linking spying, trust and economic performance
In the previous two sections, we provided evidence of negative effects of spying on
social capital and economic performance. In a last step, we aim at documenting
the theoretical mechanism between government surveillance, social capital, and
economic performance. We use gross labor income reported in the SOEP as our
measure of economic performance.
First, we estimate the reduced form effect of spying on income (see Table 5.5.3,
columns (1) to (3)). As expected, we find a negative significant effect of the spy
31 Given that the group of movers is much smaller, we do not obtain statistically significant
effects for them.
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Table 5.5.3: The effect of spying on monthly gross labor income
Reduced form 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Income Income Income Trust Income
Spy density -1.043 ∗ -0.776 ∗ -0.915 ∗∗ -0.744 ∗∗∗
(0.560) (0.423) (0.416) (0.245)
Trust in strangers 1.354 ∗
(0.725)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
County size controls Yes Yes Yes
Opposition controls Yes Yes Yes
Pre World War II controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,743 1,743
Adjusted-R2 0.084 0.313 0.341 0.134
F -Test 9.237
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the border pair model laid out in equation (5.4.3) using SOEP data.
All specifications include border pair fixed effects and a dummy variable indicating the presence of an Object of
Special Interest. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the border pair and the individual level with usual
confidence levels (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). We restrict the sample to border pairs for which we
observe individuals in both counties along the border. All specifications use cross-sectional weights adjusted for
duplicates of counties that are part of multiple border pairs. For detailed information on the control variables,
see Data Appendix 5.8.
density on log gross income of −0.915. The effect implies that a one standard
deviation increase in the spy density leads to a gross income loss of twelve percent.
To test the suggested channel with surveillance affecting trust, and trust affecting
income, we run a two-stage least squares regression of income on trust using the
spy density as an instrument. Column (4) of Table 5.5.3 shows the first-stage
result of the regression.32 The F -test of the first-stage regression is 9.2, which
suggests that the instrument has reasonable power. The second-stage results are
presented in column (5). Using the change in trust induced by a one standard
deviation decrease in surveillance, the first stage implies a ten percent increase in
the probability to trust strangers, which in turn increases gross income by 15.1
percent.
32 As found in Table 5.5.1, spying has a significantly negative effect on trust. Note that the
point estimate is twice as high and more significant despite the smaller sample. This can be
explained by the fact the 2SLS sample is restricted to individuals with positive labor income
who are, on average, younger compared to the full estimation sample. In fact, the magnitude
of the first-stage estimate is comparable to the one found for the youngest cohort.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the effect of state mass surveillance on social capital
and economic performance by exploiting county-level variation in the number of
spies per capita in the former socialist German Democratic Republic. To account
for the potentially non-random regional allocation of spies, we implement two
different research designs. First, we exploit discontinuities at state borders arising
from the administrative-territorial structure of the Ministry for State Security.
Second, we set up a long-term panel with pre World War II measures of social
capital and economic performance. This allows us to control for county fixed effects
and identify the effect of cross-sectional spy density variation through different
adjustments paths after the breakdown of the socialist regime. Moreover, we are
able to inspect potential pre-treatment trends in outcome variables, which would
invalidate our identifying assumption.
The results of our analysis show that more intense state surveillance had neg-
ative and long-lasting effects on both social capital and economic performance.
Our estimates imply that an abolishment of all spying activities would have led
to an increase in electoral turnout of 1.8 percentage points. Moreover, it would
have increased regional innovativeness and entrepreneurship through more patents
per capita and higher self-employment rates. Eventually, the average unemploy-
ment rate would have been about 1.8 percentage points lower, which is equivalent
to a ten percent drop compared to the average in East Germany. We also find
that Stasi spying can explain a large part of the decline in population levels in
East Germany. Hence, we show that the former East German regime did not only
have a long-lasting impact on political preferences (Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln,
2007), but it also eroded institutional and interpersonal trust, which in turn has
long-lasting negative effects on the society and the economy.
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5.7 Appendix
Figure 5.7.1: Annual number of requests for inspection of Stasi files
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Notes: The graph plots the annual number of requests for disclosure of information on Stasi
activity. Data are provided by the Agency of the Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records
(BStU).
Figure 5.7.2: Migration in socialist East Germany
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Notes: Panel (a) is based on own calculations using data from Ru¨hle and Holzweißig (1988),
Ritter and Lapp (1997) and monthly announcements of the West German Federal Ministry
for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War Victims. Panel (b) is based on own calculations
using data from the Statistical Yearbooks of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal
Statistical Office of Germany.
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Table 5.7.1: The allocation of Stasi spies: full regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Object of Special Interest 0.160 0.172 0.261∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.114) (0.067) (0.069) (0.070) (0.076)
Log mean population 1980s -0.134∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
Log county size -0.006 -0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Uprising 1953: Strike 0.004 -0.001 -0.005
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027)
Uprising 1953: Demonstration 0.002 -0.006 -0.014
(0.026) (0.027) (0.031)
Uprising 1953: Riot -0.030 -0.035 -0.041
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Uprising 1953: Prisoner liberation 0.002 -0.005 -0.015
(0.034) (0.035) (0.038)
Military intervention 1953 0.037 0.037 0.045∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
State of emergency 1953 -0.014 -0.009 -0.009
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029)
Share indust. employment 1989 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Important industries 1989 -0.003 -0.011
(0.022) (0.022)
Mean electoral turnout 1928–1932 0.001
(0.006)
Mean vote share NSDAP 1928–1932 0.006∗∗
(0.003)
Mean vote share KPD 1928–1932 -0.000
(0.003)
Share protestants 1925 -0.001
(0.001)
Share unemployed 1933 0.001
(0.004)
Share self-employed 1933 0.004
(0.009)
GDR state FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 187 187 187 187 187 187
R2 0.033 0.298 0.529 0.540 0.545 0.561
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.237 0.481 0.475 0.474 0.473
Notes: This table shows the simple OLS coefficients of regressing the mean county-level spy density in the 1980s
on different sets of control variables. For details on the source and construction of the variables, see Appendix
Table 5.8.3.
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Table 5.7.2: The effects of spying on trust: robustness checks
Border pairs (OLS) Border pairs (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weights Adj. Adj. Adj. Cross None Adj. Adj.
Panel A – Trust in strangers
Spy density -0.293∗∗ -0.279∗ -0.319∗ -0.422∗∗ -0.088 -1.611∗∗ -1.689∗∗
(0.141) (0.154) (0.184) (0.191) (0.129) (0.734) (0.695)
Observations 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389 3,389
Adjusted-R2 0.061 0.090 0.106 0.078 0.076
Pseudo-R2 0.088 0.155
Panel B – Negative reciprocity
Spy density 5.120∗∗∗ 4.912∗∗∗ 5.283∗∗∗ 5.877∗∗∗ 5.439∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗
(1.803) (1.698) (1.747) (1.878) (1.849) (0.376) (0.350)
Observations 3,014 3,014 3,014 3,014 3,014 3,014 3,014
Adjusted-R2 0.063 0.130 0.142 0.146 0.125
Pseudo-R2 0.015 0.034
Panel C – Attend elections
Spy density -0.434∗ -0.335∗ -0.537∗∗ -0.578∗∗ -0.297 -1.226∗∗ -1.753∗∗
(0.222) (0.186) (0.252) (0.256) (0.209) (0.560) (0.697)
Observations 3,116 3,116 3,116 3,116 3,116 3,116 3,116
Adjusted-R2 0.053 0.137 0.146 0.135 0.102
Pseudo-R2 0.058 0.152
continued
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Opposition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre W II controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5.7.2 continued
Border pairs (OLS) Border pairs (Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weights Adj. Adj. Adj. Cross None Adj. Adj.
Panel D – Engagement in local politics
Spy density -0.040 -0.027 -0.195 -0.180 -0.083 -0.203 -2.109∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.116) (0.123) (0.127) (0.141) (0.647) (0.603)
Observations 3,563 3,563 3,563 3,563 3,563 3,563 3,563
Adjusted-R2 0.020 0.125 0.134 0.115 0.100
Pseudo-R2 0.062 0.250
Panel E – Monthly gross labor income
Spy density -1.043∗ -0.776∗ -0.915∗∗ -0.671 -0.666∗
(0.560) (0.423) (0.416) (0.470) (0.388)
Observations 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773 1,773
Adjusted-R2 0.084 0.313 0.341 0.325 0.266
Pseudo-R2
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Opposition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pre WW II controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the border pair model laid out in equation (5.4.3) using SOEP
data. All specifications include border pair fixed effects and a dummy variable indicating the presence of
an Object of Special Interest. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the border pair and the individual
level in specifications (1)-(5) and one-way clustered at the border pair level only in specifications (6)-(7). We
use the usual confidence levels (∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). We restrict the sample to border
pairs for which we observe individuals in both counties along the border. Columns (1)-(3) and (6)-(7) present
estimates using cross-sectional weights, adjusted for duplications of counties that are part of multiple border
pairs. Estimates in column (4) use unadjusted cross-sectional weights, column (5) shows unweighted regression
results but adjusts for duplicates. Specifications (6)-(7) present ordered probit results if negative reciprocity is
the outcome variable. For detailed information on the control variables, see Data Appendix 5.8.
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Table 5.7.3: The effect of spying on electoral turnout
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spy density × 05/1924 0.327 0.327 -1.305 -1.305 -1.305 -1.343 -1.305
(1.515) (1.516) (1.460) (1.462) (1.463) (1.453) (1.462)
Spy density × 12/1924 0.341 0.341 -0.972 -0.972 -0.972 -1.022 -0.972
(1.420) (1.421) (1.452) (1.454) (1.455) (1.442) (1.454)
Spy density × 1928 2.316 2.316 0.354 0.354 0.354 0.357 0.354
(1.661) (1.662) (1.581) (1.583) (1.584) (1.584) (1.583)
Spy density × 1930 -2.379∗ -2.379∗ -2.192∗ -2.192∗ -2.192∗ -2.183∗ -2.192∗
(1.219) (1.219) (1.164) (1.166) (1.166) (1.166) (1.165)
Spy density × 07/1932 -0.479 -0.479 -0.239 -0.239 -0.239 -0.231 -0.239
(0.811) (0.811) (0.580) (0.580) (0.581) (0.581) (0.580)
Spy density × 1990 -1.888 -5.534∗∗ -0.554 -0.745 -0.480 -0.510
(2.340) (2.647) (2.101) (2.166) (2.162) (2.166)
Spy density × 1994 -2.894 -6.540∗∗ -2.710 -2.901 -2.635 -2.667
(2.340) (2.740) (2.212) (2.278) (2.256) (2.223)
Spy density × 1998 -6.505∗∗∗ -10.151∗∗∗ -1.585 -1.776 -1.511 -1.558 -0.866
(2.202) (2.640) (1.975) (2.037) (2.036) (2.072) (2.071)
Spy density × 2002 0.963 -2.683 -3.988∗ -4.179∗∗ -3.914∗ -3.919∗ -3.082
(2.170) (2.641) (2.041) (2.092) (2.086) (2.047) (2.087)
Spy density × 2005 0.500 -3.147 -3.726∗ -3.917∗ -3.652∗ -3.592∗ -2.643
(2.053) (2.513) (2.067) (2.124) (2.134) (2.038) (2.166)
Spy density × 2009 2.924 -0.723 -4.878∗∗ -5.069∗∗ -4.804∗∗ -4.644∗∗ -2.971
(2.335) (2.779) (2.190) (2.268) (2.269) (2.201) (2.273)
Post × Object × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × County size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Opposition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Log current population Yes
Post × Transfers Yes
Observations 2232 2232 2232 2232 2232 2230 1858
Adjusted R2 0.826 0.829 0.919 0.920 0.921 0.923 0.930
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the panel data model laid out in equation (5.4.4). All specifications
include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level with the usual confidence
levels (∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01). The Stasi share-year interaction for November 1932 is omitted.
The district of East Berlin is excluded from the data because East and West Berlin cannot be separated after
reunification. Post is a dummy for the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall (t ≥ 1989). Object stands for
Object of Special Interest. County size controls include log county area and log mean 1980s population. State
refers to GDR states in the 1980s and post-reunification, and to Weimar provinces prior to World War II. For
detailed information on the control variables, see Data Appendix 5.8.
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Table 5.7.4: The effect of spying on self-employment rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spy density × 1925 -1.353 -1.353 -0.083 -0.083 -0.083 0.023 -0.083
(1.330) (1.330) (1.437) (1.439) (1.439) (1.441) (1.440)
Spy density × 1996 -4.155∗∗∗ -2.938∗ -2.188 -2.468 -2.837∗ -2.769∗ -2.773∗
(1.117) (1.512) (1.455) (1.517) (1.540) (1.421) (1.532)
Spy density × 1997 -4.197∗∗∗ -2.979∗ -2.132 -2.412 -2.782∗ -2.708∗ -2.733∗
(1.164) (1.558) (1.485) (1.544) (1.565) (1.454) (1.557)
Spy density × 1998 -4.061∗∗∗ -2.843∗ -2.125 -2.405 -2.774∗ -2.704∗ -2.755∗
(1.170) (1.571) (1.479) (1.536) (1.557) (1.453) (1.556)
Spy density × 1999 -3.949∗∗∗ -2.731∗ -2.070 -2.349 -2.719∗ -2.652∗ -2.705∗
(1.203) (1.607) (1.474) (1.529) (1.545) (1.445) (1.541)
Spy density × 2000 -3.914∗∗∗ -2.697 -1.777 -2.056 -2.426 -2.366 -2.433
(1.229) (1.633) (1.460) (1.517) (1.538) (1.437) (1.532)
Spy density × 2001 -3.431∗∗∗ -2.213 -1.546 -1.826 -2.196 -2.145 -2.218
(1.234) (1.633) (1.489) (1.545) (1.565) (1.469) (1.558)
Spy density × 2002 -3.332∗∗∗ -2.115 -1.523 -1.803 -2.173 -2.133 -2.160
(1.241) (1.629) (1.493) (1.547) (1.567) (1.477) (1.555)
Spy density × 2003 -3.214∗∗ -1.996 -1.399 -1.678 -2.048 -2.022 -2.041
(1.286) (1.669) (1.528) (1.582) (1.599) (1.513) (1.594)
Spy density × 2004 -3.213∗∗ -1.995 -1.355 -1.635 -2.004 -1.992 -1.946
(1.317) (1.691) (1.541) (1.597) (1.614) (1.526) (1.600)
Spy density × 2005 -2.779∗∗ -1.562 -1.154 -1.434 -1.804 -1.810 -1.728
(1.348) (1.716) (1.558) (1.611) (1.625) (1.540) (1.614)
Spy density × 2006 -3.086∗∗ -1.868 -1.434 -1.714 -2.083 -2.107 -2.021
(1.354) (1.715) (1.571) (1.620) (1.635) (1.558) (1.627)
Spy density × 2007 -2.935∗∗ -1.717 -1.494 -1.774 -2.143 -2.184 -2.132
(1.311) (1.676) (1.562) (1.612) (1.630) (1.560) (1.619)
Spy density × 2008 -2.560∗∗ -1.342 -1.542 -1.822 -2.192 -2.251 -2.186
(1.297) (1.668) (1.542) (1.593) (1.611) (1.539) (1.601)
Spy density × 2009 -2.484∗ -1.266 -1.781 -2.061 -2.430 -2.507 -2.413
(1.299) (1.676) (1.539) (1.593) (1.611) (1.541) (1.612)
Post × Object × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × County size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Opposition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Log current population Yes
Post × Transfers Yes
Observations 2976 2976 2976 2976 2976 2976 2974
Adjusted R2 0.877 0.878 0.915 0.916 0.917 0.920 0.918
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the panel data model laid out in equation (5.4.4). All specifications
include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level with the usual confidence
levels (∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01). The Stasi share-year interaction for 1933 is omitted. The district
of East Berlin is excluded from the data because East and West Berlin cannot be separated after reunification.
Post is a dummy for the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall (t ≥ 1989). Object stands for Object of Special
Interest. County size controls include log county area and log mean 1980s population. State refers to GDR states
in the 1980s and post-reunification, and to Weimar provinces prior to World War II. For detailed information
on the control variables, see Data Appendix 5.8.
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Table 5.7.5: The effect of spying on patents per 100,000 inhabitants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spy density × 1928 3.685∗ 3.685∗ 4.285 4.285 4.285 4.289 4.285
(1.952) (1.953) (2.887) (2.891) (2.892) (2.895) (2.893)
Spy density × 1993 -4.891 -0.411 -2.008 -0.966 -0.373 -0.396
(4.463) (5.511) (5.898) (5.834) (5.850) (6.050)
Spy density × 1995 -3.361 1.118 -1.118 -0.076 0.516 0.507 0.714
(5.416) (5.857) (6.659) (6.296) (6.051) (6.132) (6.097)
Spy density × 1996 -5.109 -0.629 -0.958 0.084 0.677 0.678 0.519
(5.668) (6.146) (6.825) (6.446) (6.228) (6.340) (6.302)
Spy density × 1997 -6.052 -1.572 -2.673 -1.631 -1.038 -1.029 -1.134
(5.128) (5.462) (5.722) (5.411) (5.249) (5.378) (5.332)
Spy density × 1998 -13.433∗∗ -8.954 -8.741 -7.699 -7.106 -7.102 -7.578
(5.471) (6.239) (6.380) (5.974) (5.722) (5.803) (5.678)
Spy density × 1999 -9.350 -4.870 -6.416 -5.374 -4.781 -4.782 -5.261
(5.848) (6.576) (6.708) (6.284) (6.061) (6.183) (6.036)
Spy density × 2000 -13.858∗∗ -9.378 -11.724∗ -10.682∗ -10.089∗ -10.102∗ -10.335∗
(5.862) (6.603) (6.572) (6.052) (5.833) (5.925) (5.832)
Spy density × 2001 -10.716 -6.236 -9.451 -8.409 -7.816 -7.846 -7.741
(6.538) (7.167) (6.868) (6.515) (6.327) (6.456) (6.282)
Spy density × 2002 -13.265∗ -8.785 -11.676 -10.633 -10.041 -10.088 -9.837
(7.870) (8.427) (8.366) (7.911) (7.681) (7.751) (7.561)
Spy density × 2003 -18.940∗∗ -14.460∗ -18.417∗ -17.375∗ -16.782∗ -16.852∗ -16.317∗
(8.013) (8.282) (9.498) (8.928) (8.560) (8.602) (8.391)
Spy density × 2004 -12.959 -8.479 -11.568 -10.526 -9.934 -10.027 -9.194
(7.905) (8.410) (8.674) (8.220) (7.984) (8.091) (7.935)
Spy density × 2005 -15.291∗ -10.811 -18.778∗∗ -17.736∗∗ -17.143∗∗ -17.267∗∗ -16.280∗∗
(8.377) (8.877) (8.548) (8.114) (7.921) (7.987) (7.855)
Post × Object × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × County size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Opposition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Log current population Yes
Post × Transfers Yes
Observations 2604 2604 2604 2604 2604 2604 2418
Adjusted R2 0.427 0.430 0.504 0.509 0.511 0.513 0.532
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the panel data model laid out in equation (5.4.4). All specifications
include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level with the usual confidence
levels (∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01). The Stasi share-year interaction for 1929 is omitted. The district
of East Berlin is excluded from the data because East and West Berlin cannot be separated after reunification.
Post is a dummy for the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall (t ≥ 1989). Object of SI stands for Object of
Special Interest. County size controls include log county area and log mean 1980s population. State refers to
GDR states in the 1980s and post-reunification, and to Weimar provinces prior to World War II. For detailed
information on the control variables, see Data Appendix 5.8.
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Table 5.7.6: The effect of spying on unemployment rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spy density × 1996 21.075∗∗∗ 10.195∗∗∗ 4.287∗ 4.734∗ 4.838∗ 4.741∗∗ 4.916∗∗
(3.016) (3.296) (2.453) (2.510) (2.466) (2.327) (2.465)
Spy density × 1997 20.269∗∗∗ 9.388∗∗∗ 4.377∗ 4.824∗ 4.928∗ 4.822∗∗ 4.990∗∗
(3.058) (3.303) (2.515) (2.564) (2.524) (2.387) (2.517)
Spy density × 1998 19.101∗∗∗ 8.220∗∗ 2.440 2.887 2.991 2.891 3.042
(2.940) (3.242) (2.448) (2.494) (2.465) (2.315) (2.461)
Spy density × 1999 19.261∗∗∗ 8.380∗∗∗ 1.977 2.424 2.528 2.433 2.574
(2.825) (3.189) (2.345) (2.409) (2.379) (2.223) (2.377)
Spy density × 2000 20.078∗∗∗ 9.197∗∗∗ 2.650 3.097 3.202 3.119 3.221
(2.827) (3.215) (2.379) (2.451) (2.423) (2.279) (2.418)
Spy density × 2001 21.204∗∗∗ 10.324∗∗∗ 3.188 3.635 3.739 3.675 3.734
(2.825) (3.193) (2.416) (2.496) (2.464) (2.335) (2.466)
Spy density × 2002 20.811∗∗∗ 9.931∗∗∗ 2.932 3.379 3.483 3.438 3.504
(2.841) (3.185) (2.459) (2.544) (2.515) (2.367) (2.519)
Spy density × 2003 22.497∗∗∗ 11.617∗∗∗ 3.529 3.976 4.081 4.061 4.086
(3.081) (3.397) (2.586) (2.660) (2.629) (2.506) (2.629)
Spy density × 2004 23.330∗∗∗ 12.450∗∗∗ 3.975 4.422 4.526∗ 4.531∗ 4.567∗
(3.137) (3.458) (2.655) (2.732) (2.704) (2.584) (2.701)
Spy density × 2005 22.625∗∗∗ 11.744∗∗∗ 4.584∗ 5.031∗ 5.136∗ 5.175∗∗ 5.187∗
(2.999) (3.357) (2.585) (2.674) (2.648) (2.528) (2.638)
Spy density × 2006 23.246∗∗∗ 12.366∗∗∗ 4.719∗ 5.166∗ 5.270∗ 5.342∗∗ 5.298∗∗
(2.972) (3.381) (2.642) (2.714) (2.689) (2.594) (2.683)
Spy density × 2007 23.237∗∗∗ 12.357∗∗∗ 4.504∗ 4.951∗ 5.055∗ 5.159∗ 5.025∗
(2.927) (3.379) (2.670) (2.743) (2.722) (2.626) (2.727)
Spy density × 2008 21.914∗∗∗ 11.034∗∗∗ 3.448 3.895 3.999 4.138∗ 3.969
(2.766) (3.249) (2.494) (2.574) (2.553) (2.447) (2.561)
Spy density × 2009 20.537∗∗∗ 9.657∗∗∗ 3.264 3.711 3.816 3.985∗ 3.916
(2.653) (3.118) (2.460) (2.547) (2.523) (2.404) (2.531)
Post × Object × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × County size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Opposition controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Industry controls Yes Yes Yes
Log current population Yes
Post × Transfers Yes
Observations 2790 2790 2790 2790 2790 2790 2788
Adjusted R2 0.609 0.656 0.823 0.829 0.829 0.837 0.829
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the panel data model laid out in equation (5.4.4). All specifications
include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level with the usual confidence
levels (∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01). The Stasi share-year interaction for 1933 is omitted. The district
of East Berlin is excluded from the data because East and West Berlin cannot be separated after reunification.
Post is a dummy for the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall (t ≥ 1989). Object of SI stands for Object of
Special Interest. County size controls include log county area and log mean 1980s population. State refers to
GDR states in the 1980s and post-reunification, and to Weimar provinces prior to World War II. For detailed
information on the control variables, see Data Appendix 5.8.
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Table 5.7.7: The effect of spying on log population
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spy density × 1985 -0.009 -0.009 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Spy density × 1986 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Spy density × 1987 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Spy density × 1989 0.016 *** -0.063 ** -0.069 ** -0.070 ** -0.067 **
(0.005) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
Spy density × 1990 0.029 *** -0.050 ** -0.062 ** -0.064 ** -0.060 **
(0.007) (0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Spy density × 1991 0.023 *** -0.056 ** -0.068 ** -0.070 ** -0.066 **
(0.008) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Spy density × 1992 0.028 *** -0.051 ** -0.065 ** -0.067 ** -0.064 **
(0.009) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Spy density × 1993 0.031 *** -0.048 ** -0.065 ** -0.067 ** -0.064 **
(0.011) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Spy density × 1994 0.041 *** -0.037 -0.062 ** -0.063 ** -0.060 **
(0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
Spy density × 1995 0.055 *** -0.024 -0.059 ** -0.060 ** -0.057 ** -0.083 **
(0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.033)
Spy density × 1996 0.071 *** -0.008 -0.054 * -0.056 * -0.052 * -0.082 **
(0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035)
Spy density × 1997 0.088 *** 0.009 -0.050 -0.052 -0.048 -0.078 **
(0.030) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039)
Spy density × 1998 0.101 *** 0.022 -0.052 -0.054 -0.051 -0.084 *
(0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
Spy density × 1999 0.112 *** 0.033 -0.055 -0.057 -0.053 -0.086 *
(0.041) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049)
Spy density × 2000 0.118 *** 0.039 -0.060 -0.062 -0.059 -0.090 *
(0.044) (0.046) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Spy density × 2001 0.119 ** 0.040 -0.068 -0.070 -0.067 -0.096 *
(0.048) (0.049) (0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055)
Spy density × 2002 0.118 ** 0.039 -0.077 -0.078 -0.075 -0.103 *
(0.050) (0.052) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058)
Spy density × 2003 0.117 ** 0.038 -0.088 -0.089 -0.086 -0.111 *
(0.053) (0.054) (0.060) (0.061) (0.062) (0.061)
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Spy density × 2004 0.114 ** 0.035 -0.099 -0.100 -0.097 -0.119 *
(0.055) (0.056) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
Spy density × 2005 0.110 * 0.031 -0.113 * -0.115 * -0.112 * -0.133 **
(0.057) (0.058) (0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Spy density × 2006 0.106 * 0.027 -0.128 * -0.130 * -0.126 * -0.145 **
(0.059) (0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.067)
Spy density × 2007 0.101 * 0.023 -0.142 ** -0.143 ** -0.140 ** -0.156 **
(0.061) (0.062) (0.068) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069)
Spy density × 2008 0.095 0.016 -0.157 ** -0.158 ** -0.155 ** -0.172 **
(0.062) (0.064) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071)
Spy density × 2009 0.090 0.011 -0.170 ** -0.172 ** -0.169 ** -0.177 **
(0.064) (0.066) (0.071) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Post × Object × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × County size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post × Opposition controls Yes Yes Yes
Post × Industry controls Yes Yes
Post × Transfers Yes
Observations 4650 4650 4650 4650 4650 3532
Adjusted R2 0.528 0.548 0.703 0.703 0.704 0.799
Notes: This table shows the β coefficients of the panel data model laid out in equation (5.4.4). All specifications
include county and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level with the usual confidence
levels * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). The Stasi share-year interaction for 1933 is omitted. The district of
East Berlin is excluded from the data because East and West Berlin cannot be separated after reunification.
Post is a dummy for the period after the fall of the Berlin Wall (t ≥ 1989). Object of SI stands for Object of
Special Interest. County size controls include log county area and log mean 1980s population. State refers to
GDR states in the 1980s and post-reunification, and to Weimar provinces prior to World War II. For detailed
information on the control variables, see Data Appendix 5.8.
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5.8 Data Appendix
This appendix provides additional information on the different data sets and vari-
ables used for our empirical analysis. We present descriptive statistics for our
outcome measures as well as definitions of the used control variables and detailed
information on the data sources in Section 5.8.1. In Section 5.8.2, we describe the
harmonization of the county-level data to the administrative territorial structure
and county border definitions as of October 1990.
5.8.1 Descriptive statistics and data sources
Table 5.8.1 shows descriptive statistics for outcome variables at the county level,
Table 5.8.2 for outcomes at the individual level. Table 5.8.3 describes all variables
used and lists the respective sources.
The sets of control variables listed in the result tables for both SOEP and panel
regressions are defined as follows. County size controls include log county area and
log mean population in the 1980s. Opposition controls account for the intensity of
the uprising in 1953 and include uprising intensity (four dummy variables) as well
as two dummy variables for state of emergency and Soviet military intervention.
Industry controls include the industrial employment share in September 1989 and
a dummy variable equal to one if a strategically important industry (coal, oil,
uranium, chemical, potash) was present in the county. Transfers are measured
after 1994 and comprise federal and state transfers as well as investment subsidies
paid to the counties. Pre World War II controls account for unemployment and
self-employment in 1933, the share of protestants as of 1925, and the average
election turnout as well as the average vote share of the Communist party and the
Nazi party in the federal elections from 1928 to 1932. Individual controls include
gender, age (and age squared), education (six dummy variables), learned profession
(four dummy variables), household size (three dummy variables), marital status
(two dummy variables), and SOEP wave fixed effects.
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Table 5.8.1: Descriptive statistics on panel outcomes and controls
Mean SD Min Max N
Electoral turnout 77.3 7.4 56.6 92.6 2,232
Self-employment rate 11.4 3.6 5.0 31.8 2,976
Patents per 100,000 inhabitants 11.9 14.6 0.0 212.6 2,604
Unemployement rate 18.4 4.0 3.7 31.3 2,790
Log population 10.9 0.6 9.6 13.2 4,650
Stasi share 0.4 0.1 0.1 1.0 186
Dummy: Object of Special Interest 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 186
Log mean population 1980s 11.0 0.6 9.8 13.2 186
Log county size (in sqm) 6.0 0.8 3.3 7.1 186
Uprising intensity 1953 1.4 1.4 0.0 4.0 186
Dummy: State of Emergency 1953 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 186
Dummy: Military intervention 1953 0.7 0.5 0.0 1.0 186
Share indust. employment 1989 45.3 13.6 16.8 74.5 186
Dummy: Important industries 1989 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 186
Log transfers 16.9 0.7 15.6 19.9 2,788
Log investment subsidies 16.2 0.7 14.6 19.1 2,788
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on outcome and control variables at the county
level. Information on the respective years covered are provided in Appendix Table 5.8.3.
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Table 5.8.2: Descriptive statistics on SOEP outcome variables
Mean SD Min Max N
Dummy: Trust in strangers 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 3,389
× Born before 1940 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 895
× Born 1940–1961 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 1,867
× Born after 1961 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 627
× Stayed in county 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 2,713
× Moved 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 676
Negative reciprocity 9.22 4.23 3.00 21.00 3,014
× Born before 1940 8.80 4.41 3.00 21.00 754
× Born 1940–1961 9.10 4.11 3.00 21.00 1,673
× Born after 1961 10.09 4.25 3.00 21.00 587
× Stayed in county 9.26 4.20 3.00 21.00 2,443
× Moved 9.03 4.40 3.00 21.00 571
Dummy: Attend elections 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 3,116
× Born before 1940 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 789
× Born 1940–1961 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 1,732
× Born after 1961 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 595
× Stayed in county 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 2,484
× Moved 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 632
Dummy: Engagement in local politics 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 3,563
× Born before 1940 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 926
× Born 1940–1961 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 1,959
× Born after 1961 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 678
× Stayed in county 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 2,890
× Moved 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 673
Log monthly gross labor income 7.52 0.66 4.09 9.52 1,773
Notes: This table presents descriptives statistics for the SOEP outcome variables. For inform-
ation on the respective years covered, see Appendix Table 5.8.3.
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Table 5.8.3: Data sources and variable construction
Variable Years Source
Panel A – Stasi data (see Section 5.3.1)
Spy density 1980–1988 The main explanatory variable of interest, regional spy
density, is calculated as the average spy density at the
county level in the period 1980–1988 (see Section 5.3.1
for details). Data on spies, called unofficial collab-
orators, are based on official Stasi records published
by the Agency of the Federal Commissioner for the
Stasi Records (Bundesbeauftragter fr die Unterlagen des
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen De-
mokratischen Republik, BStU ) and compiled by Mu¨ller-
Enbergs (2008). Population figures come from the Stat-
istical Yearbooks of the GDR.
Our measure of spy density covers unofficial collabor-
ators for political-operative penetration, homeland de-
fense, or special operations, as well as leading informers
(IM zur politisch-operativen Durchdringung und Sicher-
ung des Verantwortungsbereiches, IM der Abwehr mit
Feindverbindung bzw. zur unmittelbaren Bearbeitung im
Verdacht der Feindttigkeit stehender Personen, IM im
besonderen Einsatz, Fhrungs-IM ). In cases where Stasi
held offices in Objects of Special Interest, the number of
spies attached to these offices was added to the number
of spies in the respective county.
Panel B – Individual SOEP data (see Section 5.3.2)
Attend elections 2005, 2009 The question exploited reads as follows: “If the next
election to the German ‘Bundestag’ were next Sunday,
would you vote?”. Response options were given on a
five-point scale to allow respondents to express different
levels of conviction (not) to vote (“in no case”, “prob-
ably not”, “possibly”, “probably”, “in any case”). We
construct a zero/one dummy grouping the former three
and the latter two response options.
continued
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Table 5.8.3 continued
Variable Years Source
Engagement in
local politics 2001, 2007 Respondents are questioned about their involvement in
citizen’s groups, political parties and local governments
(the question reads: “Which of the following activities
do you take part in during your free time?”). Response
options vary on a four point scale indicating weekly,
monthly, less often or no involvement at all. We con-
struct a zero/one dummy variable indicating whether
respondents are involved at all. Note that information
on individuals’ engagement in local politics is provided
in additional waves as well. We choose the years of 2001
and 2007 to cover similar points in time with all of our
four measures of social capital.
Labor income 2003, 2008 Information on current monthly gross labor income is
provided in every wave for East German respondents
since 1992. As we aim to identify the direct relationship
between surveillance, trust, and economic performance,
we focus on those two waves in which both trust and
wages can be observed.
Reciprocity 2005, 2010 We use three statements on negative reciprocity, re-
sponse options varying on a seven-point scale. We follow
Dohmen et al. (2009) by combining the three questions
into one single measure. The respective questions read
as follows: (i) “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take
revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost,”
(ii) “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will
do the same to him/her,” and (iii) “If somebody offends
me, I will offend him/her back.”
Trust
in strangers 2003, 2008 The question on interpersonal trust reads as follows: “If
one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be care-
ful before one can trust them.” Response options were
given on a four-point scale, allowing the respondents to
totally or slightly agree, or totally or slightly disagree
with the given statements. To simplify interpretation of
our estimates we group the first and latter two answers.
continued
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Table 5.8.3 continued
Variable Years Source
Control
variables The set of control variables includes information on the
respondents’ age, sex, household size, marital status,
education and learned profession. As different measures
of social capital are measured in various waves of the
survey; samples slightly differ for the outcome variables
of interest.
Panel C – County-level data (see Section 5.3.3)
Election
turnout
1924–1932 We use election turnout in the federal elections in
the Weimar Republic in 05/1924, 12/1924, 1928, 1930,
07/1932 and 11/1932. The data is provided in the replic-
ation data of King et al. (2008), available at the Harvard
Dataverse, handle: hdl/1902.1/11193.
1990–2009 Data on regional election turnout in the federal elections
in 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005 and 2009 are provided
by the Federal Returning Officer (Bundeswahlleiter).
Industry
controls 1989 Industry composition is measured by means of the share
of employees in the industrial sector as of September
1989, reported in Rudolph (1990). We further collect
information from various sources whether large enter-
prises from the uranium, coal, potash, oil or chemical
industry were located in the respective county. We con-
struct a zero/one dummy based on this data.
Patents 1928–1929 We approximate county-level patent filings in 1928
and 1929 with data on high-value patents provided by
Jochen Streb. High-value patents are defined as patents
with a life span of at least ten years (Streb et al., 2006).
1993–2005 Information on post re-unification patent filings come
from the German Patent and Trade Mark Office
(Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt). Yearly data are
provided for 1995–2005; for 1992–1994 the aggregated
number of patents is given. We assign the average num-
ber of patents to the year of 1993.
continued
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Table 5.8.3 continued
Variable Years Source
Political
ideology 1928–1932 We proxy historic political ideology by the mean vote
shares of the Communist party (Kommunistische Partei
Deutschlands, KPD) and the Nazi party (Nationalsozi-
alistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP) in the fed-
eral elections in 1928, 1930, 07/1932 and 11/1932 to con-
struct two distinct measures of political ideology. Data
on Weimar Republic election results are based on King
et al. (2008).
Population 1925–1933 Population figures for the Weimar Republic are obtained
from King et al. (2008) and Falter and Ha¨nisch (1990).
1980–1989 Data collected from the Statistical Yearbooks of the
German Democratic Republic (Statistische Jahrbcher
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik).
1990–2009 Collected from the Regional Database Germany (Re-
gionaldatenbank Deutschland), the Statistical Offices of
the Federal States (Statistische Landesmter) and the
Working Group Regional Accounts (Arbeitskreis Volk-
swirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Lnder).
Religion 1925 The share of protestants in the population was published
in the 1925 census of the Weimar Republic (Volkszhlung
1925 ). Our data stems from King et al. (2008).
Revenues 1995–2009 Data on revenues are obtained from the Regional Data-
base Germany (Regionaldatenbank Deutschland). Rev-
enues cover monetary transfers from the federal and
state level (allgemeine Zuweisungen und Umlagen von
Bund, Land, Gemeinden/Gemeindeverbnden) as well as
investment subsidies granted to the counties (Zuweisun-
gen und Zuschsse fr Investitionsfrderungen).
Self-
employment
1925, 1933 County-level self-employment rates from the 1925 and
1933 censuses of the Weimar Republic (Volks- und
Berufszhlung 1925 und 1933 ). Data for 1925 are ob-
tained from Falter and Ha¨nisch (1990); data for 1933
from King et al. (2008). Note that numbers for 1925
refer to households and should be considered as an ap-
proximation of the self-employment rate.
continued
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Table 5.8.3 continued
Variable Years Source
1996–2009 County-level data on the share of self-employed is avail-
able in the INKAR data base of the Federal Institute for
Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial De-
velopment (Bundesinstitut fr Bau-, Stadt- und Raum-
forschung, BBSR).
Unemployment 1933 County-level unemployment rates are based on the 1933
census of the Weimar Republic (Volks- und Berufszhlung
1933 ), provided in King et al. (2008).
1996–2009 Monthly county-level unemployment rates are made
available from March 1996 to December 2009 by the
Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fr Arbeit).
We calculate yearly means from this data.
Uprising 1953 We use cartographic statistics published by the former
West German Federal Ministry of Intra-German Rela-
tions (Bundesministerium fr gesamtdeutsche Fragen) to
create two dummy variables indicating whether the re-
gime declared a state of emergency and whether the So-
viet military intervened in the particular county. In ad-
dition, the data provides an ordinal, additive measure
of strike intensity (“none”, “strike”, “demonstration”,
“riot”, “liberation of prisoners”). The map is avail-
able in the archives of the Federal Foundation for the
Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship (Bundesstiftung
zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur), signature: EA 111
1889.
5.8.2 Redrawn county borders and data harmonization
We combine county-level data from various sources and decades in this study. Since
1925, the first year in our data set, county borders have been redrawn multiple
times. To account for these territorial changes, we harmonize all county-level data
to borders as of October 1990.
The Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial De-
velopment (BBSR) provides population and area weighting factors for all county
border reforms from 1991 onwards to harmonize the data. We rely on popula-
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tion weights because population shares yield the most accurate harmonization of
different border definitions with regard to our outcomes, which are mainly driven
by people, not space. The outlined procedure is important as the number of East
German counties was gradually reduced from 216 at the time of the German reuni-
fication to 87 in 2009 (the boroughs of East Berlin counting as one single county).
Of course, this harmonization is only valid when looking at county-level aggregates
and not individual data. The panel dimension of the SOEP, however, allows us to
identify individuals’ county of residence prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Unfortunately, there are no administrative weighting factors available for the
harmonization of county borders prior to reunification. However, there were only
minor territorial reforms between 1953 and 1990, the period we cover with our
GDR data. In ten cases, neighboring counties were merged together. In five cases,
bigger cities became independent from the surrounding county (Stadtkreise). We
manually account for these administrative changes using detailed maps and other
historical sources. When merging two counties, we always use the maximum for
each of the three riot variables (state of emergency, Soviet military intervention,
strike intensity). In case new counties were constituted, we assign historical values
of the emitting county to the created one.
When harmonizing data from the Weimar Republic with county borders as of
1990, considerable administrative territorial reforms have to be taken into account.
Due to the lack of adequate population weighting factors, the harmonization is
based on geospatial area weighting factors (Goodchild and Lam, 1980). We merge
the corresponding shapefiles from the Weimar Republic with the shapefile for 1990
to determine weighting factors that allow to adjust the historical data to the county
borders as of 1990. Given that most of our outcomes and control variables refer to
people and not space, it needs to be stressed that this procedure is aﬄicted with
some degree of imprecision. Given the long time span, the numerous territorial
reforms, and the lack of population weighting factors, this procedure is, however,
the most accurate harmonization procedure we can apply.
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